THE *ARS BREVIS* OF RAMON LULL

A STUDY

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

Lull's Vision; Lull Teaching the Art



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INTRODUCTION

The philosophical problem of the One and the Many is as ancient as philosophy itself. A metaphysical problem primarily, it manifests itself in the epistemological and logical orders. One of the several forms this problem has taken in the history of philosophy has been a search for a unifying factor or element by means of which science may reduce the nearly limitless variety and number of knowable data to a more unified order. Science aims at discovering as few basic principles and as simple an explanation as possible which will still be consistent with the facts it endeavors to explain. The search for unity and order, however, has not ceased with the creation of distinct bodies of knowledge, i.e. the specific sciences. Without a doubt and in a very large measure these sciences are the result of attempts to order and unify the appropriate subject matter. In the technical language of traditional philosophy the material and formal objects of a science make it one. It may also be argued that the identity of a science is strengthened by its particular method which is determined ultimately, though not exclusively, by the nature of its object. But as indicated above, the efforts have not ceased with the creation of the various distinct sciences. Unsatisfied thinkers have frequently pursued the matter further and asked whether it is possible to continue the process by a further reduction of the various types of knowledge, the specific sciences, to a more basic and universal unity and order.

The classical philosophers of ancient Greece replied to the question in accordance with their whole-mindedness. To them human life and culture were not something partial, but rather a unified whole which engaged the whole man with all of his activities. The universe was to them an organic and ordered whole and was therefore well designated as a cosmos. Beneath the multiplicity and variety of life and nature the Greek mind encountered the inner essence of reality which is one and common. The very fact of their existence pointed to an underlying unity. It is through their being or existing that all the factors are in some way linked.

Many Christian thinkers of the Medieval West built an analogical concept on the Aristotelian notion of being. With it they were able to achieve and defend a synthesis of the sciences known to them. The term science itself was an analogical term, for scientific knowledge was realized in different degrees according to the various modes of abstraction. With the doctrines of abstraction, and of the differences in subject matter and various kinds of causality some of the Schoolmen elaborated a systematic doctrine concerning scientific knowledge and methodology remarkable for its clarity and comprehensiveness.

It is of the nature of philosophy that each age must rethink the more important philosophical questions in order to examine the soundness of previous answers and perhaps to attempt its own solutions. As they make use of the heritage of the past, philosophers can thus make additions of their own which bear the mark of a later time. It should not surprise anyone, therefore, if he finds modern attempts to rediscover an underlying basic unity of human knowledge. The search of Descartes, Espinoza, Leibnitz, and others for self-evident truths and a universal method with which to establish the foundations of all knowledge is not entirely new therefore, even though it gives a special character to their philosophies. The father of Modern Philosophy conceived human wisdom almost as a tree whereof the branches are the particular sciences which draw their life from, and are established on, the roots of the radical principles discovered in the reflections of First Philosophy.

If we remember this tendency of the human mind, which is evidenced in history, it becomes less difficult to understand the Great Art of Ramon Lull. A study of the Great Art will reveal his vision of a virtually universal science and method. With its universal principles, rules and procedures, the Art envisages the reduction of the multiplicity of scientific knowledge to an all embracing unity. The Art of Lull, it must be admitted, is but little known today and only by very few students of philosophy. This is particularly true in the English speaking world. But precisely for this reason and because of the almost contradictory appraisals of the Art (either that it is totally useless, or that it contains valuable insights and anticipations of the important development of modern symbolic or mathematical logic) an attempt to understand this somewhat mysterious Art is more than useful. Since, after many earlier expositions of the Art its author intended to give an authentic outline of it in the Ars Brevis it is appropriate that an initiation into the problems of the Art commence with that book. Through a direct contact with the writings on the Art one will be truly able to form conclusions with the awareness that he knows whereof he speaks.

The understanding of the Ars Brevis, therefore, constitutes the principal objective and concern of this study. The order which will be followed herein will be that of the Ars Brevis, which was divided into thirteen sections by its author. In the exposition of the Art, the initial sections of each principal part will be a paraphrase of the actual text of the Ars Brevis. The paragraphs or pages which follow these sections will develop, both doctrinally and historically, the meaning and procedures proposed in the actual text. In order to attain a clearer and more adequate understanding of the Art, use will be made of appropriate passages in other writings wherein Lull developed and explained the essential content of the Ars Brevis. It cannot be gainsaid that the best commentaries of the Ars Brevis are those other expositions of the Art prepared by Lull himself. Neither can it be denied that certain useful clarifications have been made by later students of the writings of Lull, particularly by recent investigators of the Art. Accordingly, it is only proper to take their ideas into account.

As suggested already, there is an almost complete ignorance of both the person of Lull and of the influences which his philosophical thought has exercised for centuries. It is on this account that the first chapter provides a short biographical account. In this manner, it is hoped, one may discover in the case of Lull and his philosophy another instance of the conception that great philosophical visions and systems are oftentimes the expression of the life and attitudes of the particular philosopher who originated them.

Once he is acquainted with the character and life of Lull, the reader may well require some knowledge about the history of the tradition initiated by, or which reacts to, the thought of an outstanding Christian thinker. Without a doubt his name belongs among those of the giants who developed Christian Medieval thought in the Golden Age of Scholasticism. An awareness of the history of Lullism, of its doctrines and of the conception of the Art, cannot but contribute to a more adequate judgment about the principles, method and procedures which constitute the Ars Brevis.

To complete the picture as much as possible, it is well-nigh a necessity to have some knowledge of the literary tradition of the Ars Brevis. For this reason an appendix will be included for the purpose of listing the known manuscripts and printed editions of the Ars Brevis and of related writings still in existence. These are of course of different chronological and geographical origins, and today they are dispersed throughout libraries of the Old and the New World. The lists of the main expositions of the Art by Lull and of commentaries by other writers will contain a number of explanatory notes concerning their nature and other pertinent data.

Before concluding this introduction it is well to recall a judgment made a little over a century ago to the effect that the Art of Lull was forever a thing of the past and fortunately so. This judgment has not been verified by subsequent, particularly recent, events.

Within the last three or four decades, numerous studies have been made by outstanding scholars of various national origin. Spanish, French, Italian, German and English scholars have written and continue to do so in order to unravel the history, the influences, and, what is more important, the meaning and value of the Art. All of this has been aided, it must be granted, by the interest in other aspects of the thought of Lull. But, as a result, monographs, articles and books intended to explicate the apparent intricacies of the Art are not rare today. The recently completed edition of Lull's Catalan writings, consisting of twenty-one volumes, includes writings which refer to the role of the Art in the thought of its author. Another edition, now in progress, of the Latin Opera will include, among other works, the critical text of the Latin expositions of the Art prepared by Lull. The Ars Brevis itself will be published about four years from now, according to the time-table of the director of the edition, Professor Stegmuller, who heads the Lullistische Institut at the University of Freiburg in Bresgau, Germany.

Until the Latin critical edition is completed, the study of Lull's philosophical thought will continue to be difficult for most American students. Some of his writings can be found only in manuscripts or in rare editions. But in a way we are most fortunate today because it is possible to use microfilms. One can of course, and sometimes one has to, travel to European libraries. One of the libraries which the writer made use of, and found very helpful, was the library at the Colegio de la Sapiencia, located in Palma, Mallorca, the birthplace of Lull. No serious student of the Art can fail to draw inspiration from a library and city which, in addition to the books they make available, seem to breathe the air and the spirit of Lull in this day and age. This of course is due mainly to the scholars and students of Lull who come to Palma because of its monuments and memory of Lull.

CHAPTER I

THE LIFE OF RAMON LULL

In several ways Ramon Lull is one of the most interesting figures in the history of Christian philosophical thought. For centuries, which begin in the thirteenth and fourteenth in which he lived, and extend through the Renaissance period, down into the beginning of the modern world of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Lull was widely known and respected even by men opposed to some of his basic philosophical positions.[1] Yet today, with a few exceptions among European scholars, he is almost totally unknown outside of his native land. As suggested in the introduction, it is, therefore, a necessity that a study of the Ars Brevis, one of his writings, be prefaced or preceded by a short account of his life. As shall be seen, this life turns out to have been one of the most varied, adventurous and inspiring lives that we may encounter in the history of philosophy. So attractive and arresting a person was Lull, that the first written narrative of his earthly existence, and of his exploits, goes all the way back to 1311, about five years before his death. At the insistence of his friends, Lull, then nearly seventy-five years old, related the story of his life.[1] Written and copied by one of his early and enthusiastic disciples this account is known today as the Vita Coetanea. A Latin version of it still exists, and also one in Catalan, the language spoken on the island of Mallorca, where Lull was born. In this language he wrote works which are considered outstanding from a literary standpoint, particularly for his time. Of the two versions of the Contemporary Life it is generally agreed that the Latin version is the original one and that the Catalan version is based upon it.[2] Present day biographers recognize in the Contemporary Life the principal source of knowledge about Lull's life. Since there are years and periods on which it yields little or no light, recourse must be had to the works Lull himself wrote for any autobiographical indications they may contain. This is not a very difficult task, especially if one examines the poetic and other literary compositions, as well as those of a mystical character.[3]

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[1] See for example Descartes, Rene, "Discours de la Methode," Oeuvres de Descartes, (ed. Adam and Tannery), Vol. 6, p. 17; Bacon, Francis, "De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum," bk. 6, ch. 2, Opera Omnia (Gosling), Vol. 1, p. 168; Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm, "De Arte Combinatoria," Passim, Opera Omnia (Tournes), Vol. 2, pp. 341-398.

Although much of the life of Lull is known with a high degree of certainty, the dates which mark the beginning and end of it are only probable. The most likely year of birth is given as 1235. But there are biographers who think the year is 1232, or even one of the years between 1232 and 1235.[1] Evidence about the time of death points to the early part of the year 1316. Between these probable dates is a life span of over eighty years. These years may be conveniently divided into three main periods in Lull's life. In the first thirty years may be placed Lull's youth and his years spent at the royal court of James the Conqueror, ruler of Catalonia and Aragon. During this time, Lull lived a rather wordly existence, enjoying the pleasures of life. A sudden change of life, a genuine conversion, initiates a period of seclusion and preparation devoted to study and meditation. In this time, the shortest of the three divisions, some of Lull's early books were written. Of these some are still considered his literary masterpieces, as for example, Blanquerna, and the Liber Contemplationis. A few trips were also undertaken at this time. The beginning of the last period becomes distinguishable by approximately 1387. Then Lull undertook extensive and repeated journeys for the purpose of enlarging, primarily through peaceful means, the spiritual dominion of Christendom. There flowed from his pen numerous writings which mark him as a most prolific writer. Most of his books were written in Latin or Catalan. A few were composed in the Arabian language. Some took the form of prose, others of verse. Many treat of theological and philosophical matters; a few are of a mystical character; while others are simply literary or even encyclopedic in character.

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[1] Anonymous, Vita ab Anonimo Coaevo Scripta, Ipso Beato Adhuc Superstite, in Acta B. Raymundi Lulli of John Baptist Sollier, praefatiuncula, p. 29. This book shall be referred to hereafter as Vita Coetanea.

[2] Llinares, Armand, Raymond Lulle, Philosophe de l'Action, p. 73.

[3] Among the more important writings in this respect these may be mentioned: "De Desconort ou Le Decouragement de Ramon Lull" (crit. ed. and tr. by Amedes Pages), Annales du Midi, Vol. 50 (1938), pp. 140-156, 225-267; Blanquerna: A Thirteenth Century Romance (tr. by E. A. Peers), London, 1926; Magnus Liber Contemplationis in Deum, in Ramon Lull's Opera (Mainz), Vols. 9-10.

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[1] Peers, Edgar Allison, Ramon Lull, A Biography, pp. 7-8.

I - First Period: 1235-1266

As noted before, there is no certainty about the date of Ramon Lull's birth. The years usually given are 1232 and 1235, with the biographers inclining to the later date as the correct one. The actual choice depends on the interpretation one makes of passages within the Contemporary Life and two or three writings of Lull, and the acceptance of his conversion as both a *terminus ad quem* and a *terminus a quo* for whatever occurred in the years of his life. In the Book of Contemplation[1] Lull states that for thirty years he had lived a rather foolish life until his conversion and sudden dedication to the affairs of God and his soul. The Contemporary Life notes that at the time of this conversion Lull was in the service of the King of Mallorca, James the Second, as the latter's seneschal.[2] If this was so, his new life must have begun after August 21, 1262, the date on which James was designated by his father as ruler of Mallorca.[3] In Phantasticus, written in 1311, Lull states that by this time he had labored for both the welfare of the Church and of Christian princes for forty-five years.[4] If we take together these statements we can reasonably conclude that Lull was born very likely in the year 1235.

There is no doubt about the identity of his parents or the city of his birth. Lull was an only son of rather well-to-do Catalan parents who had but recently settled in the beautiful Mediterranean island of Mallorca.[1] The father, also named Ramon Lull, was a nobleman who had sailed from Catalonia with James the Conqueror for the reclamation of the island from the Moors. After the successful conquest of the island his services to the Crown were well rewarded when he was given title to several possessions near Palma. He soon decided to make Mallorca his home and there he brought his wife, Elizabeth d'Erill, also of distinguished ancestry. They probably arrived together on the island early in 1232. Their only son was born sometime after they moved to Mallorca. According to some biographers Ramon and Elizabeth may have been married as long as ten years before Elizabeth became a mother.[2]

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[1] Lull, *Liber Contemplationis*, ch. 70, Vol. 9, p. 155.
[2] *Vita Coetanea*, ch. 1, n. 1, p. 29.
[3] Llinares, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
[4] Llinares, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

Of his boyhood years little is known. This may be an indication that the early years of Lull were not too different from those of contemporary children of well-to-do and noble parents. With the promise of a bright future at court both his religious and secular education were carefully planned and scrupulously carried out. "I crave Thy grace, Lord God," he writes, "devoutly and with all my heart, that Thou wilt bless my father and mother for bringing me up in the way of truth."[3] According to tradition his father had a position near to the king and it was only natural that the education of the young boy should have been arranged in a manner that would prepare him for a similar position in the royal court. With a solid Christian foundation Lull's education would make him ready for the life of a knightly courtier. When he became fourteen years old he entered into the service of King James,[1] and as the king's page he began a series of almost unceasing visits throughout the latter's dominions. These trips allowed the young boy the opportunity to learn at first hand the secrets of a life at court. He also became acquainted with princes and other men of importance from many parts of the then civilized world. So impressed was the king with his young page that soon Lull was named to the position of tutor and companion to one of the young princes, James, who was to inherit the Mallorca throne. By 1256 James governed the island in his father's name. A few years later, probably when Lull was twenty-five years old, the prince, now ruling in his own name, designated him as his seneschal and mayordomo.[2]

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[1] Peers, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
[2] Peers, op. cit., pp. 6-9.
[3] Lull, Liber Contemplationis, ch. 25, Vol. 9, p. 53 (tr. by Peers op. cit., p. 9.

Lull's travels during these years did much to broaden his experience of the world. But at the same time that his easy and genial disposition gained him many and important friends there took place in him an almost inevitable demoralization of character as a result of a life of ease and pleasure. Upon entering manhood he gave signs of becoming a somewhat dissolute man. "I deceived and acted falsely against many of my friends."[3] Though not many details are known we have his own confession that one of his main weaknesses was the inclination to sins of lust.[4] It may have been in order to overcome this tendency that he entered the wedded state with a young lady of gentle birth, Blanca Picany in 1257.[1] Although not always faithful to his wedded vows, the couple had successively a son and a daughter, who were named Dominic and Magdalene by their parents.[2] In about 1265, there occurred an event which was to transform completely the young courtier's life. It marks the end of the first period in Lull's long life, during which he had lived principally for the world and for his own satisfaction and pleasure.

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[1] Carreras y Artau, Thomas and Joaquin, Historia de la Filosofía Española. Filosofía Cristiana de los Siglos XIII al XV, Vol. 1, p. 239.

[2] Llinares, op. cit., p. 80.

[3] Lull, Liber Contemplationis, ch. 23, Vol. 9, p. 4, (tr. by writer).

[4] Ibid., ch. 104, Vol. 9, p. 231.

II - Second Period: 1265 (?) to about 1287

As noted before, it took an extraordinary occurrence to bring about a sudden and complete change in the life of Ramon Lull. So total and complete was this change that one may speak of it as a conversion. Lull was about thirty years old now.[3] As narrated in the Contemporary Life, one **summer evening** he was sitting in his chamber occupied with the composition of a vain love song with which to woo a lady, when suddenly he looked up from his desk and there he saw an image of the Crucified Christ. Overcome by terror he gave up for the time being his attempt to write on that night and straightway went to bed and fell asleep. When he awoke on the next morning, he forgot quickly what had taken place the previous night and went about his usual duties as if nothing had occurred. Approximately a week later he was again busy with the completion of the same romantic ballad to the lady who had caught his fancy. Again he happened to raise his eyes from the paper when for the second time he was aware of the presence of the Crucified Christ. This time he became more terrified and immediately sought refuge and forgetfulness in sleep. Three more times during the next few days he attempted the completion of his song, but each time the vision was repeated, and he was unable to finish his amorous composition. Full of fear and doubt he finally asked himself what the recurring vision of the Crucified image could possibly signify. As a result of this examination his conscience convinced him that the Lord Christ required of him nothing less than a total renunciation of the world and a complete dedication to the service of God's cause.[1]

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[1] Peers, op. cit., p. 16.
[2] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 240.
[3] Llinares, op. cit., p. 83.

On the following morning he made his way to confession with great sorrow and contrition.[2] And only after his soul had been cleansed and transformed did he begin a life of penance, prayer and works of mercy. Kindled with the love for the Crucified, he next deliberated on how he might serve Him best and he soon decided on these three projects as the goals for which he would strive:
1) that, since no greater love can a man have for any one than to risk his own life for him, the most pleasing and nearly perfect act he might perform would be to go forth and undertake the conversion of the unbeliever to the truth of the Catholic Faith, and at the same time expose his own person to the peril of death in martyrdom;
2) to write at least one perfect book, perhaps more, in order to

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[1] Vita Coetanea, ch. 1, n. 1, p. 29.
[2] Peers, op. cit., p. 22. See Lull, Ramon, "Cant de Ramon," Poesies, p. 97.

confute the errors of those outside the Faith; 3) and no doubt aware of his present insufficiency, both spiritual and intellectual, for the accomplishment of these two aims, and also conscious of his friendship and influence with the rich and powerful of the earth, to approach the Vicar of Christ in Rome and to importune princes and rulers to establish several monastery-colleges. In these places men would gather to learn and to teach the languages of the Arabs and other infidels. Once instructed these wise men would then go as missionaries to preach and defend the truths of the Catholic Faith.[1] With these thoughts and aims firm and clear in his heart and mind Lull went to the nearest church and on his knees implored of God the strength to bring to fruition these noble objectives with which He had inspired him.

As a husband and father, not lacking material wealth and possessions, and with offices at the royal court, Lull required some time to dispose of these temporal affairs. Accordingly he remained at home for three months longer, engaged in the disposition of his affairs and possessions. On the feast of St. Francis of that same year, as was now his custom, he attended mass in the church of the Friars Minor. A visiting bishop delivered a sermon in which he spoke with such vigor and conviction about the example of renunciation by the Poverello of Assisi that the young neophyte was moved to expedite what then appeared a too deliberate and slow renunciation. To follow the example of St. Francis he resolved to sell and distribute immediately his possessions to the poor. This he put into effect, setting aside a small portion of his wealth, sufficient to provide for the necessities of his wife and children. That his decision was not an easy one for his family need not be insisted on. In a document dated 1275, a few years afterwards, his wife Blanca demanded the designation of a wise administrator for whatever family possessions still remained.[1] Of the love of Lull for his children there can be no serious question as it is demonstrated by the fact that he dedicated to his young son at least two of his books, namely the Doctrina Pueril and the Book of the First and of the Second Intention.

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[1] Vita Coetanea, ch. 1, n. 4, p. 30.

Free from family obligations and other temporal affairs, Lull set out on a pilgrimage to certain shrines of Catholic devotion where his zeal might continue to be kindled. On the mainland he traveled on foot and oftentimes begged for his food as he visited the Tomb of St. James of Compostela and the Shrine of Our Lady of Montserrat in Catalonia.[2] This pilgrimage may have extended as far as St. Peter's and St. Paul's in Rome and to the Holy Places of Palestine.[3] The time when Lull returned to Spain from this pilgrimage abroad is not known with certitude. However once he was back in Barcelona he considered how he might be able to achieve the second of the projects which he had resolved to complete, although he had not prepared through long years of study and preparation. If he hoped to write a perfect book wherewith to destroy error, it was time that he prepared himself for such a task. As a consequence he made up his mind to journey to Paris in order to attend the greatest Christian center of learning of that time, the University of Paris. From this resolution he was dissuaded by the advice of relatives and friends, especially that of the aged Dominican, Ramon of Penafort, whose ideals were very close to those of the young neophyte. It may be that the saintly Dominican believed that Lull should or would return to his family in Mallorca. Besides, with the comparatively small amount of formal education that he had so far received, he might just as well, and with as much success and profit, study in his native land. There he might, in addition, test the strength of his resolutions by leading a good life in the midst of those to whom he had been a scandal in the not too distant days of his carefree youth. At Mallorca, moreover, Lull would, undoubtedly, have the advantage of being able to learn more easily the language of the Moors who still inhabited the island and whom he hoped to convert.[1]

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[1] Pascual, Anthony Ramon, Vindiciae Lullianae, Vol. 1, p. 212.
[2] Vita Coetanea, ch. 1, n. 5, p. 30.
[3] Peers, op. cit., p. 33. Cf. Batllori, Miguel, "El Lulismo en Italia," Revista de Filosofia, Vol. 2 (1943), p. 257.

Thus in the vigor of youth, in his thirty-second or third year, Lull reappeared in the city that had known him as a boy and a young nobleman. There, as he wrote later on, he was frequently mistreated and looked upon as a demented fool.[2] Now that he was back in Mallorca Lull began a period of concentrated study which lasted

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1. Peers, op. cit., pp. 35-37.
2. Lull, Liber Contemplationis, ch. 10, Vol. 9, pp. 20-21. See Peers, op. cit., p. 37.

nine years, from about 1265 to 1274. Not that he doubted for one minute that he could accomplish more through the aid of inspiration and infused wisdom, but he felt that he must master the scientia acquisita.[1] It is principally during these years that we must look if we wish to discover the human teachers and other sources of the thoughts of Lull. Undoubtedly the men whose books he read and whose thoughts he imbibed could not but influence him. An indication on some of these influences may be gathered, at least in part, from the Doctrina Pueril and the Blanquerna. In both of the books Lull outlines what he considered an ideal education which very likely reflects his own intellectual and moral training. It is known that in order to undertake the study of the Arabian tongue he engaged for nine years the service of a Moorish slave.[2] Without a doubt after nine years of long and concentrated study he mastered the Arabic language and could write in it. The explicit of the early Book of Contemplation, a book of well-nigh one million words, clearly asserts that it marks the end of a translation from an earlier Arabic form into the romance language of Catalan. The Latin version of The Logic of Algazel was also made from an earlier Arabian composition. This long study of the Arabian language came to a tragic end. The servant who in addition to his other household duties acted as a teacher to the master of the house was reported to have used profane language. When Lull both rebuked and punished him for his conduct the slave conceived the

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1. Lull, Ramon, Liber de Fine (ed. partially by A. Gottron, in Ramon Lulls Kreuzzugsideen), p. 88.
2. Peers, op. cit., p. 41.

natural desire for revenge. One day, with a knife in hand, he attacked his master and in the ensuing struggle Lull was injured. In spite of wounds inflicted upon the latter the slave was overpowered with the help of others in the house who had come to Lull's assistance upon hearing the commotion which accompanied the struggle. Unwilling to commit to death one who had done so much good for him and others through his teaching of Arabian, Lull had him placed in prison until he could deliberate more calmly on the course to be taken. On the way back from the seclusion of the Monastery of La Real where he had sought divine guidance in silence, he stopped at the prison to visit the Moorish slave. Lull was surprised when he discovered that the prisoner had committed suicide.[1]

It is not difficult to imagine that at the same time as he studied the Arabian language Lull attended Latin classes with the young student-monks in the Cistercian Monastery of La Real, to which he made frequent visits. Occasionally his writings create the impression that he was not much of an expert with the Latin tongue. This is not substantiated because when he lectured on the Art at Paris and in other universities he had to do so in the language of the schools, namely Latin. His presence at Church councils and religious general Chapters can only mean that he understood Latin well.[2]

Concerning his philosophical and theological formation it is quite certain that he was a self-taught man and that he drew from many and varied sources. Lacking the formal training of the schools he

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1. Vita Coetanea, ch. 1, n. 9, p. 30.
2. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 268.

tried to imitate and improve their methods, but he always made sure that they were in accord with the basic objectives that inspired all his production. Sometimes he is seen as a typical example of what some call a popular Scholasticism outside of the schools.[1]

In his books mention is made of the Bible, the Koran and the Talmud. Sometimes Lull cites and criticizes Aristotle and Plato.[2] His books also have references to Dionysius the Pseudoareopagite, Richard of St. Victor, St. Anselm,[3] Giles of Rome and St. Thomas Aquinas.[4] An opusculum deals with some of the questions of Peter Lombard.[5] Not infrequently Lull defended some of his doctrinal positions with an appeal to the De Trinitate of St. Augustine and to other Fathers of the Church.[6] Amongst Arabian philosophers mentioned or cited are: Al Kindi, Ibn Thofail,[7] Avicenna and Averroes.[8] We have already noted that Lull prepared a compendium of The Logic of Algazel.[9] And particularly in his later years many writings would be directed against the followers of Averroes in Paris.

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1. Loc. cit.
2. Ibid., p. 269. In the seventy-seventh chapter of the Doctrina Pueril Lull gave a short explanation of some of the Aristotelian writings.
3. Lull, Ramon, "Liber Mirandarum Demonstrationum," bk. 1, ch. 14, Opera (Mainz), Vol. 2, opus D, p. 7.
4. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 269. See Llinares, op. cit., p. 93.
5. Lull, Ramon, "Disputatio Eremitae et Raymundi super aliquibus dubiis quaestionibus Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi," Opera (Mainz), Vol. 4, opus D, pp. 1-122.
6. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 269.
7. Loc. cit. Cf. Llinares, op. cit., p. 93.
8. Peers, op. cit., p. 40.
9. Llinares, op. cit., p. 93. See Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 348-356.

Lull may not have known directly the works of the men to whom he refers and whom he sometimes cites. Neither need it be supposed that he had a perfect knowledge of either Aristotle or Plato.[1] His principal study remained that of the Arabic language. But at the same time he must have laid solid foundations for both a general education and a knowledge of natural science, upon which he would continue to build later.

During these nine years of study and preparation Lull commenced to write, with the result that as early as 1275 he had concluded at least two books. One of these is very long, namely the Book of Contemplation. The other was the Book of the Gentile. Both of these books apparently were first written in Arabic, and subsequently translated into Catalan, probably with the aid of the Moorish slave-teacher.[2]

Ten years after **his conversion**, in the fortieth year of his life, Lull sought the refuge of solitude at Mount Randa, eighty kilometers outside of his native Palma, in order to refresh his spirit with the life of a contemplative. This he did for a longer period of time than was his custom. On the eighth day of solitary prayer, there came to him a sudden divine inspiration or illumination which gave to him both the order and the form wherein he ought to write his books against the infidels.[3] After he rendered thanks to God for this favor Lull descended from the mountain and straightway went to the monastery of The Real. There in peace and silence he wrote with comparatively little effort that most precious book he had contemplated in order to oppose the errors of those outside of the Christian fold. To this book he gave the title of the Ars Major which he called the Ars Generalis later.[1] Other books he would compose. They would be modeled after this first one, and they would be better and more suited for simpler intellects.

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[1] Peers, op. cit., p. 40.
[2] For a brief description of these two **books** see Peers, op. cit., pp. 43-87.
[3] Vita Coetanea, ch. 2, n. 10, p. 31. See Peers, op. cit., pp.105-107.

After he finished his magnum opus,[2] Lull went back to the quiet and solitude of Mount Randa, in order to build there, as a memorial of the divine favor, a small hermitage in the exact same place where he had been blessed with the divine illumination. For four months he remained there beseeching God that the Art which he had compiled might lead to His honor and the profit of the Church.[3]

The fame of this great work soon came to the notice of Lull's old friend and ruler, King James the Second of Mallorca who was then residing in Montpellier, a territory beyond the Pyrenees in France, which his father had willed to him in addition to the fair Mediterranean island. King James was particularly amazed by the report of learned books attributed to his former tutor and seneschal, and as a result he directed that his subject come to Montpellier. When Lull arrived at this city, the king commissioned a Franciscan theologian to examine the new books.[4] The report of the learned theologian was both favorable and enthusiastic and as a consequence Lull was permitted, for the first time at Montpellier, to lecture publicly on the *Art*. In addition to his lectures during his stay of two years in cosmopolitan Montpellier, Lull wrote not only expositions and applications of the *Art* but also books which did not directly bear on the essence of the *Art*. Among these other books are the *Doctrina Pueril* and *The Book of the Order of Chivalry*.[1] The many books written at this time indicate how rapidly and without interruption Lull wrote when he set himself to that task. While still at Montpellier, sometime before 1276, Lull received royal authorization to establish a monastery and college at Miramar in Mallorca. There thirteen friars would learn the language of the Arabians and prepare themselves to go forth in a mission to convert them. For the support and upkeep of the monastery the generous king endowed it with a sufficient sum of money. And as a final sign of royal approval he obtained from the Holy See a papal bull granting approval for the foundation of the monastery-college before the end of 1276.[2]

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[1] Vita Coetanea, ch. 2, n. 10, p. 31. This first book on the Art must have been the Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi Veritatem.

[2] Peers, op. cit., p. 111.

[3] Vita Coetanea, ch. 2, n. 10, p. 31.

[4] Llinares, op. cit., p. 95. See also Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 243.

Back in his native Mallorca Lull undoubtedly was directly involved in the supervision of the monastery-college, even though he may not have taught the friars personally, except perhaps to instruct them in both the *Art* and in the Arabic tongue.[3] During this stay at Miramar his time was probably spent in periods of prayer, study and the composition of new books. Some difficulty exists in determining exactly where and how the years between 1277 and 1282 were spent. Biographers state that Lull remained in Mallorca in order to assure the successful development of the incipient school at Miramar.[1] Others say that in 1277 he left in order to request of the Pope in Rome the foundation of schools similar in character and purpose to his own at Miramar.[2] Upon arrival in the Eternal City he found the papal throne vacant. Unable, for the present, to realize his intent, Lull undertook a series of extensive and perilous journeys, until 1282. Although no accurate itinerary can be given, there are indications that during these years he traveled as far north as Guirlanda and Bocinia, south to **Abyssinia**, west to Portugal and east as far as Persia, the land of the famed Tartars.[3]

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[1] Peers, *op. cit.*, p. 119.
[2] Carreras y Artau, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 243.
[3] Peers, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

In the year 1282 Lull returned to visit his king and patron, James the Second of Mallorca who then resided at Perpignan and who was in the midst of difficulties with his older brother. The latter actively conspired for the possession of most of his brother's territories. Early in 1283 Lull passed on to the neighboring city of Montpellier. There he was present at a Chapter general of the Dominicans in which he had hoped to find a long sought for opportunity to publicize his projects. Failing to arouse any enthusiasm amongst the friars there, he remained in the city until about 1285, resuming forthwith his writing with undiminished vigor. First he wrote, in Latin, the Ars Demonstrativa, the first major revision of the Great Art.

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1. Llinares, op. cit., pp. 96-98.
2. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 244. See also Peers, op. cit., p. 143.
3. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 244. See also Peers, op. cit., p. 145.

As a consequence of his lectures on the Demonstrative Art he also prepared an Introductorium and a Compendium of it, as well as a Lectura upon its figures.[1] Also completed during this stay at Montpellier was the second book he dedicated to his son Dominic, The Book of the First and of the Second Intention.[2] Besides these books on the Art and his many other occupations he had enough time to compose and to publish a book many writers consider his literary and non-philosophical masterpiece, a romance called Blanquerna. A part of it, The Book of the Lover and the Beloved, has led some writers to rank Lull among the great Christian mystical writers.[3]

In 1285 Lull again directed his steps to the city of Rome in order to insist on the foundation of missionary colleges. Pope Nicholas the Fourth had died recently and perhaps afraid of a long inter-regnum before the election of the new pope Lull went immediately to the city of Bologna where he attended another General Chapter of the Dominicans, with hardly any success. Consequently he soon went back to Rome and he now succeeded in engaging the interest of the new pope, Honorius the Fourth, in his ideals and projects. It may well be that it was at the suggestion and insistence of the Catalan visitor that the newly elected pope directed that there be established at the University of Paris the study of Arabic and other oriental languages.[4] To this sojourn of one year in Rome may be assigned, among others, the Book of the Tartar and the Christian.[1]

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[1] Peers, op. cit., p. 156.

[2] Ibid., p. 158.

[3] For a brief outline of Blanquerna and its Book of the Lover and the Beloved see Peers, op. cit., p. 159-191.

[4] Peers, op. cit., pp. 192-193.

With the goodwill, and perhaps with letters of introduction, of Honorius the Fourth, probably in the spring of 1286, Lull now traveled for the first time to the renowned city of Paris and its famed university. This first visit to the capital of France may be regarded as the beginning of a third and distinctive period in the life of Lull, particularly if we accept the account of the Contemporary Life. This third and final period is characterized by numerous trips abroad and by an incredible amount of activity. Although now Lull traveled almost incessantly he produced a very large number of books. These he continued to write wherever he might be in a very short time and with extreme rapidity.

III - Third Period: 1287-1316

Not long after his arrival in Paris Ramon Lull was given the opportunity of explaining and lecturing on the Art which he believed he had received through some divine inspiration. According to the Contemporary Life[2] the chancellor of the university at the time was Berthold of St. Dennis. Actually it was some years later that Berthold became chancellor. However it is very possible that the future chancellor had already sufficient influence, and hence might have been instrumental in securing for Lull the required authorization to teach the Art within the lecture halls of the Sorbonne. This first visit to the university had some success because while teaching there

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[1] Ibid., p. 197.
[2] Vita Coetanea, ch. 2, n. 14, p. 31.

Lull appears to have received the title of *magister* which he used sometimes in writings dated after this year. It is not unlikely that the lectures attracted some eager students, one of whom, Thomas Le Myesier, a physician and a canon at Arras, would some years later play an important role in the development of Lullism.

In an autobiographical passage of the *Felix* or *The Book of Marvels* Lull wrote of this first stay in Paris:

> A man who had for long years earnestly labored for the advantage of the Roman Church came to Paris and addressed himself to the King of France and the University of Paris to the effect that in this city convents be established. In these convents were to be taught the languages of those who do not have the Faith and the *Art of Demonstration*. The latter should be translated into these foreign languages. And with the *Art of Demonstration* in their possession missionaries ought to be sent to the Tartars in order that the latter may be preached to and also instructed in the *Art*. Some of these Tartars should be brought to Paris and be taught our language and Faith. Afterwards they should be returned to their country. All of these things and many more this man entreated of the King and the University, and also that the request be forwarded to the Holy Father for his confirmation. In this wise the continuance and permanence of the work would be assured.[1]

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[1] "Um hom qui lonch temps havia treballat en la utilitat de la Igleya Romana, vench a Paris, e dix at rey de Franca e a la universitat de Paris, que en Paris fossen feyts monestirs, on fossen apresos los lenguatges de aquells qui son infaels, e que hom en aquells lenguatges trelladas la *Art Demostrativa*; e que ab aquella *Art Demostrativa* anas als tartres, e que a aquells, hom prehicas e la *Art* mostras; e que de aquells, hom a Paris hagues, e que la nostra letra e lenguatge lurs mostras, e que puxes a lur terra los trametes. Totes aquestes coses e moltes de altres demana aquest hom al rey e a la universitat de Paris, e que los confermat per lo sant apostoli, e sos obra perdurable." Lull, Ramon, "Felix de les Maravelles del Mond," *Obras de Ramon Lull* (ed. J. Rosello), Vol. 3, tom. 2, part 8, ch. 46, pp. 210-211.

On the whole this greatly desired visit to Paris had little success. And as a result, probably in the spring of 1287 Lull was on his way to Montpellier. Upon returning there he lectured on the Great Art and soon prepared another major version of it: the Ars Inventiva Veritatis. This Art of Finding Truth was indeed a major revision with extensive modifications made in concession to the many human frailties. The number of the figures in the Art was diminished to four, and that of the principles to two series of nine. In order to facilitate further its comprehension Lull kept in this book the algebraic notations to a minimum. In addition to his activities as a teacher, writer and a lecturer he found time to attend a general Chapter of the Franciscans. This meeting took place in 1287 at Whitsuntide in the city of Montpellier.[1] The proposal of his projects and ideals found a more receptive audience than it had ever met among the Dominicans.

Lull's next proposed move was to go to Rome to report the tale of his successes and failures to the rather sympathetic Honorius the Fourth. But to his disappointment, on April 3, 1287 the pope died and it was not until the following February that a successor, Nicholas the Fourth, was chosen. Therefore it was not until then that Lull departed for Rome, making a brief stop and visit at Genoa. There he also carried out the translation of the Ars Inventiva Veritatis into Arabic. High were the expectations with which he came to Rome this time, for the new pope was a Franciscan, the first of his

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[1] Peers, op. cit., p. 224.

Order to be elected to the Throne of Peter, and by this time Lull had discovered that his ideals were not unlike those of the Poverello of Assisi.[1] However in spite of sincere interest, particularly in the matter of missionaries, Pope Nicholas was very seriously occupied with problems of great weight relating to opposing claims by Christian princes. Awaiting for a more propitious time to importune anew the goodwill of the pope about the question of language schools and about the unification of the military orders under a single unified command in order to prepare better for the recovery of the Holy Places at Palestine, Lull left for the city of Montpellier in 1289. On the return trip he delayed at Rieti in order to participate in another general Chapter in which Ramon Gaufredi was elected to the post of minister general of the Franciscans. The new minister was genuinely interested in the ideas and projects of the itinerant writer and teacher. Shortly after this time Gaufredi gave Lull letters of introduction declaring in them his general approval of the _Art_ and other doctrines.[2] When he was back in Montpellier, Lull again lectured, this time very possibly at the newly instituted university of that city which had been created by a Papal Bull in 1289. When he was not occupied with lectures, he was occupied writing more books. From the time of his stay in Montpellier dates an _Ars Amativa_ in which Lull would do for love and for the faculty of the will what he envisioned for science and the understanding in the _Ars Inventiva_

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[1] Carreras y Artau, _op. cit._, Vol. 1, p. 245.
[2] _Ibid._, p. 245.

Veritatis. At this time and place was also written a Tree of the Desired Philosophy, one of a series of three 'trees' written by the same author.

It must have been late in the year 1290 when Lull again visited the pope at Rome and presented him with a copy of a newly completed tract in which he detailed a plan for the reconquest of the Holy Land. At this time Nicholas the Fourth was making heroic but unsuccessful efforts to organize a new crusade. His efforts failed and soon afterwards came the crushing news of the fall of Acre in 1291.[1] For all the attention that the pope may have bestowed on Lull's counsels of war, events taking place were too disturbing for the other counsels of peace to be put into effect. A calm and peaceful atmosphere was needed for projects similar to the language school of Miramar. And since time would have to elapse before conditions would be propitious and conducive to the fulfilment of his main objectives Lull resolved that the time had come for him when words must give way to deeds and action. Without delay, therefore, leaving for a later time Gaufredi's letter to the friars at Rome and Appulia to receive him kindly and to be instructed in the Art, Lull made his way to Genoa in 1291. In that city he intended to embark for the land of Barbary on the African coast in order to actively engage in missionary work.

The people of Genoa, whom he had visited but very briefly once before, were not unexpectedly elated and confident that great things were in store. After all they had been informed of the illumination on Mount Randa and God must surely accomplish marvellous deeds amongst the Saracens by means of this man of grace. No sooner, however, had Lull made preparations to board a ship bound for North Africa than his enthusiasm began to waiver, and he grew afraid of the almost hopeless task of conversion in a land where Christianity was practically non-existent. Afraid, perhaps also, of an approaching death and with the consciousness of the feebleness of his fast advancing years, for he was sixty-five years old, Lull contrived to miss the ship, which would have taken him to the land of the Moors. No sooner was the ship out to sea than Lull realized what he had done. When the great moment for which he had long and ardently desired arrived he had faltered. Thereupon a great despair took hold of him and a spiritual malady affected him so violently that he became physically ill. This was a mysterious sickness, the cause of which he dared not reveal to any of those around him at the time. This was a period of spiritual crisis and it seemed to affect even his mental powers to the point that he may have been victim to visions and hallucinations.[1] It was at this time that he decided to enter the ranks of the Franciscans by becoming a lay tertiary in view of the more kindly reception with which his Art had been received by the sons of St. Francis.[2]

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[1] Peers, op. cit., p. 233.

While still in the midst of this long and painful crisis, Lull learned that another ship was being readied to cross the

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[1] Vita Coetanea, ch. 2, n. 16-17, p. 32. See Peers, op. cit., pp. 235-240.

[2] Llinares, op. cit., p. 105.

Mediterranean sea, with Tunis as its destination. On account of his sickness and feeble condition his friends did not permit him to board this second ship. However not long afterwards, when his condition was somewhat improved, he prevailed upon his friends to load his books and luggage, and to carry him to a ship also destined for Tunis. As soon as the ship had left the harbor Lull felt like a new man, his strength recovered, and free of the burden of remorse he had felt during the terrible ordeal.

Thus it came about finally, at the end of 1292, that Lull found himself in North Africa, eager and ready to preach to, and engage in disputations with the wise men among the learned Moors.[1] His arguments and reasons appeared convincing and found favor with many of the latter. Some might have taken the step of conversion but a person in the audience, fearful for his sect, denounced him before the Caliph and demanded that the Christian teacher be put to death. The Caliph summoned his council together and a majority was for doing as they were asked. One of the councilors, however, succeeded in convincing the others that a speedy exile was more in order. As Lull was led to a ship which flew the flag of Genoa, he had to endure insults and repeated physical blows which came to him from an angry and disappointed mob. Somewhat discouraged at the turn of events Lull deliberated on how he ought to continue the self-imposed task of completing the conversion of those Moors whom he had impressed. At a moment which he considered propitious he evaded the ship's crew and hid outside the city walls. The temper of the people, however, was still highly disturbed as he soon discovered when he saw that a Christian who in some way resembled him was mistaken for him and was barely able to convince the crowd of his own identity. No more was needed to convince the aged missionary with a flowing beard that for the time being he could gain nothing by staying. As a result he decided to return immediately to Christendom and wait for a more opportune time. Returning to the ship he had left he embarked for the city of Naples and was there at the end of 1293.[1]

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[1] Vita Coetanea, ch. 3, n. 18, p. 32.

For the present he settled in Naples where in addition to learned disputations with, and preaching to, the Moors who lived in that city Lull continued lecturing on the Art. Amongst the new writings on it mention must be made of the Tabula Generalis. Actually the Tabula had been begun before the departure from Tunis. Other minor expositions of sections of the Great Art were also written at this time.[2] Of a different nature and in a different style was a Book of the Five Wise Men which speaks with concern of the divisions of Christendom and of the consequent problems for the conversion of the Moors and of the Tartars. Of a philosophical character is the work Liber de Affatu seu de sexto sensu in which the power of speech is explained as one more sense.

In the summer of 1294 there came to Naples the rather surprising news of the election to the papal throne of an aged hermit-priest who took the name of Celestine the Fifth. It was only natural that Lull should now continue in Naples to be near the papal court hoping to approach and obtain of the new pope his long dreamed of ideals. In a Petition of Ramon which he presented to the pope he asked for the foundation of language monastery schools. He also spoke in the Petition of the hoped for recovery of the Holy Land and of the unification of the military orders under a great leader who would be proclaimed King of Jerusalem. But as if to upset his plans at the end of five months the saintly hermit abdicated his throne and again the hopes and dreams of the teacher were dashed to the ground. Before the successor, Boniface the Eighth, Lull renewed with greater urgency the requests expressed in his Petition. Unfortunately for him serious difficulties with certain Christian princes, particularly Philip the Fair of France, required the full attention of the pope.[1]

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[1] Ibid., n. 23, p. 33. See Llinares, op. cit., p. 107.
[2] Peers, op. cit., p. 247.

Disheartened and undoubtedly still feeling the sting of rebuff Lull gave vent to his sadness and discouragement in one of his best poems, although a pathetic one, the Desconhort or Disconsolateness. He recounts in few but powerful lines the story of his life, of his conversion and of his ideals before proceeding to express his sadness at the ill reception accorded the Great Art and his other plans at the court of Rome.[2] Never a man to yield for long to feelings of despair, Lull proceeded almost immediately to distract himself by writing in less than six months the second longest of his works in the vernacular, or the Catalan language. This work is an encyclopedic one, a second 'tree', the Tree of Science wherein application of the Art is made to the whole of the human knowledge of his time. From the prologue of this book which, as indicated before was completed in less than six months in spite of its length and the complexity of its subject matter, it may be surmised that in 1295, probably at Assisi Lull joined at last the Franciscan Third Order.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 250-256.

[2] For a description of this poem see Peers, *op. cit.*, pp. 256-267.

With a heavy heart Lull, a year later, abandoned Rome and the papal court, and resolved never to return to them. The next step was to journey again to Genoa for the purpose of a second expedition to North Africa. During the time that he awaited transportation, according to the Contemporary Life,[2] he continued to compile new books on the Art. Of these books there is no trace today. For some unknown reason his plans were altered and Lull traveled to Montpellier to visit with his old friend, James the Second of Mallorca. The prince had for some time been dispossessed of his throne in Mallorca by his older brother's son and was still awaiting to have it restored.[3] From **Montpellier Lull** next went to Paris, with advice from James the Second on how best to handle another of his ambitious nephews, Philip the Fair of France.

As it turned out this second visit and stay in Paris lasted for more than two years. And although the Vita Coetanea speaks of it but briefly and without much apparent enthusiasm, it was more successful than the first visit, for it obtained for the itinerant teacher some eager and noteworthy followers. Best known of these were Peter of

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1. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 247.
2. Vita Coetanea, ch. 3, n. 24, p. 33.
3. Peers, op. cit., p. 274-276.

Limoges and Thomas Le Myesier. In 1299 Le Myesier asked and Lull answered a series of theological questions. The replies given according to the procedures of the Art are contained in a book known as the Quaestiones Attrebatenses. After the death of Lull Le Myesier compiled and edited an Electorium and a Breviculum, both of them syntheses of the thought of his master.[1] Le Myesier is most frequently mentioned as the disciple at whose insistence Lull narrated the story of his life. Le Myesier is also thought to have committed the account to writing and it is this account which is known today as the Vita Coetanea.[2] Encouraged by the reception of students Lull now entered into very vigorous opposition against the Averroists who taught at the Sorbonne. The Declaration of Ramon by means of a Dialogue is an attack upon certain positions which had, in 1277, been condemned by Etienne Tempier, the bishop of Paris. A different writing was the Disputatio Eremitae et Raymundi in which are explained by means of the Art some of the Sentences of Peter Lombard.[3] In October of 1298 Lull finished a new book entitled The Tree of the Philosophy of Love. Through this new 'tree' he hoped to accomplish by way of love, amantia, those things which the way of knowledge, scientia, had failed to bring about for the cause of God and religion.[4] Besides other books of a more scientific, philosophic or polemical nature Lull wrote, while still in Paris in 1299, the Song of Ramon, a poem which is considered to be, by far, his outstanding poetical composition.[1] With swift but telling strokes he speaks of his beloved Miramar and its destruction, of his conversion, his lifelong work and the nature of his inspired Art. From Paris he wrote an interesting letter to console the Venetians on their recent and ignominious defeat at the hand of the Genoese. Among the prisoners was a very famous person, the widely traveled Marco Polo.[2]

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[1] Llinares, op. cit., p. 110.
[2] Peers, op. cit., p. 288.
[3] Ibid., p. 278.
[4] For a summary of the Tree of the Philosophy of Love see Peers, op. cit., pp. 279-287.

Late in the summer of 1299 a strong desire came over Lull to revisit the land of his birth from which he had been away approximately twenty years. Accordingly he left Paris for his native Mallorca making his way back by way of Rome and Barcelona.[3] At the latter city he secured authorization from James the Second of Aragon to enter and to preach in the synagogues and mosques throughout his dominions.[4] After his return to Mallorca in early 1300 he spent a busy year writing new books[5] and continuing his attempts to convert both Jews and Moors who still inhabited the island.

During this year in Mallorca stirring news from the East came to the effect that the Khan of Tartary had just conquered and occupied Syria.[6] What the crusades had failed to accomplish had now occurred. The Moslems would, therefore, soon, so it was rumoured, be driven from their long and secure possession of the Holy Land. With almost youthful enthusiasm Lull took the first ship for Cyprus only to discover there that the truth had been grossly exaggerated and that the news about Syria was false. As a man of apostolic zeal he went directly to the King of Cyprus to request that heretics and schismatics be gathered together and obliged in groups to engage in arguments and disputation with him. For his part he promised thereafter to go to preach the Gospel to the Sultans and rulers of Babylon, Egypt and Syria.[1] When his request went unheeded he set about on his own to teach and to preach to some of the inhabitants of the island. After he had fallen seriously ill two persons who accompanied him, one of them a cleric, for some unexplained reason conspired to poison him. Immediately after this close escape from death he departed for the city of Famagusta where he was kindly and well received by the Master of the Knights Templars.[2]

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[1] Peers, op. cit., p. 289.
[2] Llinares, op. cit., p. 111.
[3] Ibid., p. 112.
[4] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 249.
[5] Llinares, op. cit., p. 113. Peers, op. cit., pp. 298-303.
[6] Peers, op. cit., p. 303.

Before the return trip to Mallorca, with stops at Rhodes and Malta, Lull must have ventured into the mainland, for one of his minor writings, Quid Debet Homo Credere de Deo bears the dateline 1301, at Alleas in Armenia. On the slow return ship he beguiled the time with the composition of still another book of proverbs, the Book of the Thousand Proverbs.

In the spring of 1302 we find Lull back in Mallorca, only to discover that soon after in May of the same year he was busy finishing a Logica Nova at Genoa. A year later in that same city he translated into Latin his Rhetorica Nova. From the many opuscula[3] completed at this time it is almost certain that the last Genoa stay was preceded and followed by visits to the well known city of Montpellier. One of the interesting treatises of this period is a Dispute between Faith and Understanding.[1] Of a philosophical character also, but dated from Montpellier in the year 1305 is the Liber de Ascensu et Descensu Intellectus. Written at this time also was the Liber de Fine which its author intended as a last effort to outline his politico-religious views about the expansion of the realm of Christendom.[2] After having been present at a meeting between Pope Clement the Fifth and the two kings of Aragon and Mallorca, and still hopeful of better results than his previous experiences with popes might warrant, Lull traveled from Montpellier to Lyons, the site chosen by the new pope for his coronation. In this city he remained from October 1305 until at least April of the following year in order to insist at the papal court on the establishment of monastery-schools wherein the languages of the heathen might be studied and learnt. All of this for the final purpose of a spiritual crusade to be fought with the peaceful weapons of reason and understanding. As it had been the case more than once before both the pope and the cardinals had other very pressing matters which required their immediate attention.[3]

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[1] Vita Coetanea, ch. 3, n. 26, p. 33.
[2] Loc. cit.
[3] For a list of these opuscula see Peers, op. cit., p. 310.

Sometime before June of the same year Lull made another brief visit to Paris and its university. A legend has it that during this visit a meeting and a dialogue took place between the now aged teacher and a young resplendent star of the academic world of that age, namely John Duns Scotus, a young Franciscan friar who at the orders of his superiors had left throngs of eager Oxford students to teach his new philosophy in the halls of the Sorbonne.[1]

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[1] For a brief statement of the contents of this book see Peers, op. cit., pp. 311-314.

[2] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 250. See also Peers, op. cit., pp. 316-319.

[3] Vita Coetanea, ch. 3, n. 27, p. 34. See Peers, op. cit., p. 322.

Subsequently to this short stay in Paris we find Lull at Pisa waiting to embark for Barbary. Unable to board a ship which might take him there he returned to Mallorca.[2] Thence he sailed on to a new African campaign landing at Bugia. No sooner had his feet touched land than he commenced to teach publicly the Catholic beliefs. And as a result instead of the reasoned and calm dialogue with the Moors to which he had looked forward all that he accomplished in this manner was to arouse the ire and wrath of many who heard him. Had it not been for the speedy intervention of the Kadi or chief judge in the city the crowd undoubtedly would have sent him to an immediate death. Probably on account of the teacher's advanced age, as well as of his learned answers the Kadi seemed desirous of having his life spared. Accordingly in order to insure this end he had his prisoner removed to a most loathsome dungeon, hoping to appease the people. However there was no way to prevent an infuriated crowd from striking, throwing stones and from pulling at the long white beard of the intrepid and courageous old man.[3]

Fortunately for Lull recent commercial and political alliances between Aragon and certain of the Moorish states permitted merchants from Catalonia and Aragon to intercede in his behalf. As a result he was transferred to a more tolerable prison in which he was treated with some kindness and even allowed visitors. These were mainly religious and learned Moors who were eager to dispute with him on the merits of his and their religions, confident perhaps that with all the reasonable means at their command he would eventually come over to their side and to their law. Both failing in their intent, they to convert him and he them, it was agreed that a book would be written by both sides. In this book each disputant would set down and detail whatever reasons and arguments supported his particular faith. Before the book could be terminated orders came from the King of Bugia, then in Constantine, which specified that he was to be immediately expelled and that should he choose to remain in the king's territory he would do so under penalty of the most severe punishment possible.

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[1] Peers, op. cit., pp. 323-324.
[2] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 250.
[3] Vita Coetanea, ch. 4, n. 30, p. 35. See Peers, op. cit., p. 328.

Led to the harbor, Lull was placed aboard a ship bound for Genoa but before it arrived there a further incident occurred. A storm arose at sea, the ship capsized and was made useless at a distance of ten miles off the cost of Pisa. Among the few saved in a smaller ship was the aged missionary who was, however, unable to salvage either clothes or books. Naked he walked on to the streets of Pisa where on being recognized he was received with honor and made the guest of one of its leading citizens. A few days later he withdrew to a Dominican convent in that city and began to re-write in Latin a Disputatio Raymundi Christiani et Hamar Sarraceni. This is the book he had planned in the Bugia prison.

At Pisa also in 1308 he completed the Ars Generalis Ultima which he intended as the definitive version of the Great Art. He had begun to write it three years before in the city of Lyons, but without a doubt he had to re-write all of it. Early in the same year he prepared and published the summary introduction of this definitive version of the Art which is known as the Ars Brevis.[1]

Before leaving Pisa Lull endeavored to arouse interest in a new crusade for the recovery of Palestine but he succeeded only in obtaining letters of recommendation to the pope with assurance of future support. Joyfully on his way to the papal court he stopped at Genoa with the same intent. On being received warmly and more enthusiastically there he accepted a sum of thirty thousand florins for delivery to the pope for use towards the desired end.

Towards Avignon, the residence of Clement the Fifth, Lull continued to travel after a visit to Montpellier where he tarried long enough to complete in 1309 a Liber de Acquistione Terrae Sanctae. This he then carried and presented personally to the Supreme Pontiff. As in his previous visit to the same Pontiff back in 1305 the results were no more encouraging. Consequently he took the road to Paris in order to request of the king and at the University whatever the pope had failed to grant him.[2]

This visit to Paris was his fourth and last visit and it lasted a little over two years until 1311. In several ways it must have been a more satisfying stay than his previous ones. Again he had the opportunity to lecture freely on the nature and procedures of his Art, as well as on other doctrines developed in his writings. More important and pleasing to Lull was the experience of young and eager students who now flocked to listen to the strange teacher from a foreign land in spite of his advanced age. Among those who came to the lectures at this time there were also many learned teachers who openly declared that his teaching and his doctrines were wholly in accord, not only with the principles of sound philosophy and experience, but also with the rules and principles of Christian theology.[1]

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[1] Peers, op. cit., p. 335.

[2] For the titles of other books written during this time see Peers, op. cit., pp. 337-338.

Encouraged by the enthusiastic reception, both of his words and of his person, Lull rejoined with **obvious** zest the fierce battle still being waged against Averroism which threatened to undermine some basic truths long cherished and defended by the great Christian teachers at the University. Against those who held that the truths of faith are in no way open to understanding and to proof, he composed several works. Resolutely he opposed the Averroistic position that the Christian Faith was impossible to understand, although one must hold it as true because faith so teaches. So strongly did he advocate a prohibition and attack on the thought of the Averroists in the many treatises he wrote during these two years of the last sojourn in Paris and for some time afterwards, that he has been described by at least the historian Renan, impartial on this matter, as the hero of the

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1. Vita Coetanea, ch. 4, n. 34, p. 35.

anti-Averroist campaign.[1] That God is the immediate efficient cause of the world he stoutly defended in the Liber de Efficiente et Effectu, directed against the Averroists in 1310. The Dispute of Ramon and an Averroist, written in April of the following year, considered in a more philosophical manner some of the problems and issues that divided the Schoolmen and the Averroists. Finally in a rather attractive poem written after Christmas eve, in 1310, and before the beginning of the new year he called upon six symbolic ladies to approach, in his behalf, the King of France and to insist on the expulsion from Paris of those books which contained the Averroistic errors.[2] Moreover they should entreat of the king schools for the teaching of the oriental tongues.

Lull's message was not lightly taken. The presence of strong adherents as well as the beginnings of an opposing counter movement to his ideas may be felt and gauged by a couple of laudatory documents traceable to this time. These must have been extremely gratifying to Lull in his old age. In the first of three documents, which dates from February 10th, 1310, a venerable group of forty teachers, or masters, at the University of Paris gave their approval to the Art and to the teachings of Lull. The second document is a letter of August, 1310, in which Philip the Fair asks of his subjects and of Christians in particular that they receive and extend all possible favors to the person of Lull. According to a later document of September, 1311, the Chancellor of the University, Francis of Naples, states that after due examination of certain writings of Lull, by royal injunction, he has found them in perfect accord with Catholic teaching and full of inspiration and ardent zeal.[1]

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[1] Renan, Ernest, "Averroes et L'Averroisme," Oeuvres Completes, Vol. 3, p. 202.

[2] Peers, op. cit., pp. 345-350.

An unexpected opportunity to press his aims and ideals came to Lull with the opening in the fall of 1311 of a General Council in the city of Vienne. With an almost youthful fervor and vigor he again took to the road in order to be present at this council. In a poem, The Council, and in a Petition to the General Council, he spoke to the pope, cardinals and bishops, Christian rulers and others who were present at the council. In the Petition ten problems were outlined. These were matters the council should take up according to Lull: 1) The missionary colleges at Rome, Paris and Toledo for the study of languages. 2) The creation of a unified military order which would press for the recovery of the Holy Places from the followers of Allah. 3) Setting aside at least a tenth of whatever wealth the Church possessed in order to subsidize a new crusade. 4) The uprooting of superfluous luxury and the plurality of benefices in the case of the clergy. 5) Simplicity and uniformity of clerical attire. 6) A prohibition of Averroistic teachings. 7) Measures against the practice of usury by Christians. 8) Teaching Christian truths in mosques and synagogues within Christian countries. 9 & 10) The reform of the sciences of medicine and law according to the requirements of the

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1. Peers, op. cit., pp. 343-344.

Great Art, experiments and experience.[1]

Explicit provision for some of these petitions was actually made by the council. For instance, it was ordered, among other things, that language schools be established in five places: at Rome, Bologna, Paris, Salamanca, and Oxford. The languages to be taught there were Hebrew, Arabic and Chaldean. To Philip the Fair was entrusted a new crusade which, however, failed to materialize. Regulations concerning discipline in the clergy included measures advocated by Lull. The prohibition against Averroism had to wait for the Fifth Lateran Council which was convened two centuries later.[2]

A year after the council had opened it was concluded and Lull went back to Mallorca making a stop at Montpellier where he finished another treatise, a Liber de Locutione Angelorum. With incredible energy for a person of his years he continued to write in Mallorca: fifteen opuscula, all completed in less than a year.[3] It was during this visit to his beloved island that, aware of his fast approaching end, Lull prepared his last testament. In it he showed the love for his own works by specifying with great care how his books were to be distributed after his death. Latin and Catalan copies were to be prepared. One copy of the books should be sent to the Carthusian monastery outside of Paris where he had probably been a frequent guest during his visits there. A second copy should be forwarded to

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[1] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 253. It may be noted that the Contemporary Life ends at this point with Lull making his way to the Council of Vienne. See Vita Coetanea, ch. 4, n. 35-36, p.35.

[2] Llinares, op. cit., p. 122.

[3] Loc. cit. See also Peers, op. cit., p. 362.

Perceval Spinola, his friend in the city of Genoa. A third copy of the books was to remain at Palma in the convent of the Franciscans there. As for a trunk full of his own personal copies these were to be given to the monastery of Santa Maria La Real where he had resided and found inspiration for his early books immediately after his conversion. To his son, daughter and son-in-law he left whatever other meager possessions he still called his own.[1]

It might be thought that as he saw the approaching end he would ready for it in the serenity and peace of the beautiful Mediterranean island. However Lull was not a man to remain still for long. Most of his life he had been on the move and this was not the time to enjoy a leisurely life. Almost at once he journeyed to Messina where he had new friends in the persons of Frederick of Sicily and the archbishop of Montereal. Under their protection he now labored for the conversion of the Jews and Moors who lived in Sicily. Whatever leisure hours he may have had were occupied writing twenty-seven new _opuscula_.[2]

Always eager for the expansion of Christ's spiritual realm and for the glorious death of martyrdom, after a year at Messina and with the knowledge of a favorable accord of peace and friendship between the ruler of Tunis, Ibn Al-Libyani, and Sancho, the son of his late friend, Kind James of Mallorca, Lull resolved to continue the unfinished task in North Africa which he had been forced to abandon

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1. Peers, _op. cit._, pp. 363-366.
2. For a list of these writings see Peers, _op. cit._, p. 367. See also Llinares, _op. cit._, p. 367.

before. On this account he returned to Mallorca to board a ship destined for Bugia or Tunis on August 14th, 1314.[1] After he arrived in North Africa he wrote to James the Second of Aragon asking for letters to the ruler of Tunis in his behalf. Strengthened with these letters and with a greater sense of security he again devoted his energies to preaching and public disputations with learned Moors. To obtain aid in the translation of new books a second time he wrote to James of Aragon requesting that his former pupil, Fr. Simon de Puigcerda, be sent to Tunis. Letters, still extant, show that his desires in this matter were attended to.[2] The manner of his teaching must have been quite different from that of his previous missionary experiences if we may judge from the relative length of one year that he remained in Africa. As late as the middle of December of the year 1315 Lull was still there. This is shown by the books which he wrote at this time.[3]

Exactly what happened after that it is not definite. A very ancient tradition states that on a certain day a group of hostile Mohammedans, stirred up by attacks made upon the Islamic law or religion, perhaps to counteract the relative success of Lull's disputations and his attempts to convert learned Moors, threw itself upon the bearded man. He was dragged as far as the city walls and there he was stoned. The city in which this occurred seems to be Bugia. Two Genoese merchants contrived in some way to obtain permission from the authorities to carry the dying man away in a ship bound for their

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1. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 254-255. Llinares, op. cit., p. 123.
2. Peers, op. cit., pp. 369-370.
3. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 255.

country. At sea, a storm arose which caused the ship to be diverted from its course, and as a result, either within sight of his beloved Mallorca or soon after landing on it, Lull died because of the many blows inflicted on his body.

The lack of written documents about the manner, place and date of Lull's actual death, prior to the latter part of the fifteenth century has led some critics to place in doubt the truth of this tradition and to deny that Lull died a martyr for the Faith.[1] To the Mallorcan people the constancy of the tradition is more than sufficient proof, particularly when they consider that their greatest hero and saint never ceased in his writings to express his ardent desire for the crown of martyrdom.[2] Only once did he appear to waiver. But as has been seen, he overcame his fears and crossing the sea he went to Africa.

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1. Llinares, op. cit., pp. 124-125. See also Peers, op. cit., pp. 372-375.
2. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 256. For an account of the recent history of Lull's cause as a beatus in the Church see Peers, op. cit., pp. 392-393.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF LULLISM

A brief outline of the history of Lullism is in order at this point for it will contribute to a better appreciation of the seriousness with which the Art and other doctrines of Ramon Lull have been received by other thinkers. Space and the scope of this dissertation permit no more than a sketch of this history, sufficient however, to suggest the main points and difficulties of it.

In the preceding pages an account was given of the life of Lull. They show how earnestly he labored for the propagation of the Christian message and of his ideals. Many were the trips that he undertook for that purpose to countries both within and outside of Europe. He visited, and appealed to, men of power and importance, men of religion, and men of the world as we have seen. For months and even years he lectured at universities and other centers of learning. And his numerous writings leave no doubt about his indefatigable yearning to dispel errors and to reveal the beauty and truth of his Beloved.[1] In this way man's intellect and will would be led through both science and amantia,[2] to fulfill their 'primary intention' or purpose, which is to contact the goodness and truth of the Supreme Reality.[3]

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1. Vita Coetanea, praefatiuncula, p. 29.
2. Lull, Ramon, "Ars Amativa Boni," prol., Opera (Mainz), Vol. 6, opus A, p. 1.
3. See Lull, Ramon, "Liber de Prima Secunda Intentione," Opera (Mainz), Vol. 6, opus H, pp. 1-24.

Sincere and serious in his teaching and writings Lull was incessantly occupied with the diffusion of his convictions and doctrines, particularly those about the Art which he had discovered, or received by some inspiration, for the express and original purpose of converting non-Christian minds. Already during his lifetime, but more so after his death, nuclei of followers arose who defended and developed the doctrines of Lull. More than once his teaching and ideas were received by uncommon and powerful minds with very surprising results. This has continued to the present time with the unavoidable ups and downs of historical fortunes. It is not incorrect, therefore, to speak of the history of Lullism, as the history of one more important current of Western thought and culture, principally in Europe.

Moreover at frequent intervals in the history of Lullism one encounters individuals, or groups of individuals who, through their attacks and opposition, bear witness to its vitality. Thus it is that alongside of the Lullian thinkers who pursue, at least in part, or whose work shows definite influences by, the ideas of Lull there is uncovered what may appropriately be named anti-Lullism. Its attacks cannot be entirely ignored because often they have contributed to the conditions under which Lullism has lived and flourished.

The picture would remain incomplete were nothing added about the disfigurations to which Lullism has been at times exposed. Motives and doctrines, very distant from the mind of Lull, have at times been attributed to him. A very particular instance is his false reputation as an alchemist and student of the occult sciences. Numerous are the books which appear spuriously under his name. This aspect of the history of Lullian influences has been labeled Pseudo-Lullism. Accordingly a complete history of Lullism must at least mention certain of the contradictions of anti-Lullism as well as the deviations of Pseudo-Lullism.[1]

As if to complicate matters further, it must also be noted that after the death of Lull no universal heir appeared to preserve the unity of his thought and doctrinal synthesis. Different aspects or parts of his thought have been defended and developed at various times by different individuals or groups of his followers. There are, as a result, three main directions which may be distinguished, not separated, as one studies the history of Lullism:

1) A polemico-rationalistic trend which carried forward, sometimes in a milder form, Lull's efforts to explain and defend rationally the positions of Christian Dogma. A clear example of this is the _Liber Creaturarum_ of Ramon Sibiuda, but influences can also be detected in writings of other writers, as for example Pascal.

2) A logico-encyclopedic trend which has occasioned numerous controversies although it has not always been well understood. The trend centers around, and may be symbolized by, the _Art_. It is through this trend particularly, that Lull's thought has in no small measure entered into the history of philosophy because of numerous contacts and combats with other philosophical and cultural movements.

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1. Carreras y Artau, _op. cit._, Vol. 2, pp. 9-10.

3) A mystical trend which is fundamental and one of the enduring aspects of Lullian philosophy. Its value has not always been recognized and appreciated.[1]

Many more points must be considered as we review the history of Lullism. Some of them are: the geographical and chronological distribution of manuscripts, the numerous editions of a number of Lull's books after the invention of printing, the doctrinal development by other men, the names and history of the many Lullian thinkers, chiefly in Europe, and the periods of history in which they lived.[2] Of the countries where the influence of Lull has been felt, in addition to Spain, mention should be made of France, Italy and Germany. Many of these points will arise as we briefly outline the main periods in the history of Lullism: 1) the dawn of Lullism; 2) the early Lullian Schools in the late Medieval period; 3) the Renaissance era; 4) the modern period; 5) the contemporary age.

I - The Dawn of Lullism

A - Origin of Lullism

The preoccupations of Ramon Lull with the diffusion of his ideas have already been noted. Repeated travels and his many friendships provided Lull with the occasion to propagate his ideas and his books. The latter, and the story of his life give ample evidence of the use he made of spoken dialogues, discussions and disputations. Oral likewise were his many lectures on the Art at Montpellier and at the Sorbonne on more than one occasion. From Ramon Gaufredi he received permission to instruct within the Franciscan convents of Rome and Apulia. And it has been noted that it was the kindly reception accorded to the Art by the Franciscans that caused him to choose the Franciscan Third Order over the Dominican.

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[1] Ibid, p. 11.
[2] Ibid, pp. 12-13.

During his many trips Lull saw to it that any new book which he had completed recently was transcribed so that a copy might be sent to those places where interest for his doctrines had been shown. In many cases this was done at his own expense or with the aid of rich friends and patrons. He dedicated some of his books to the pope, rulers and universities hoping that the success of his message and of his books might thus be insured.

Paris provides a rather good example of the proselytizing spirit of Lull. In that city there were three places which he influenced: the Chartreuse of Vauvert which was a Carthusian monastery outside of Paris, the University, and the royal court.

During his visits to the city Lull often resided at the Chartreuse. In 1298 he completed there the Arbor Philosophiae Amoris, and in 1310 the De Naturali Modo Intelligendi. To the monks of that monastery he dedicated a copy of the first volume of the Liber Contemplationis in 1298. Soon after he gave them copies of the remaining volumes, as well as a copy of Blanquerna with its Book of the Lover and the Beloved.[1] The donation of these books was the beginning of what in his last testament Lull hoped and ordered would be a complete depository of his writings. Both students and teachers at the Sorbonne would then have the opportunity of reading his books.

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[1] Ibid., p. 15.

In the biographical account it has been seen that at the University Lull conducted lectures on at least three different occasions. It seems that he gained a few disciples at the time of the first series of lectures there. But it was not until the last Parisian stay of 1309-1311 that he was acclaimed by both students and teachers.[1] To the University he also donated a number of manuscripts. He hoped that they might initiate the foundation of another storehouse for his books.

The person of King Philip the Fair provided a patron. To him Ramon dedicated several treatises written during the last Paris sojourn. From the Chartreuse he had previously sent to the king a Latin copy of the Tree of the Philosophy of Love, together with a French version of it for his wife Juana of Navarre. French translations of other writings, such as Blanquerna, were also presented to the queen.[2] In this manner the ground was being prepared so that later royal aid might be given to a vast enterprise of diffusion of Lullian doctrine. This was attempted not long afterwards by followers of Lull.

These efforts at Paris, the cultural center of his time, were duplicated at other places. At Genoa for example, there was

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1. Peers, op. cit., pp. 342-344.
2. Ibid., p. 279. See also Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 16.

Persival Espinola who, at the same time when he worked on his design of a proposed crusade,[1] ordered the preparation of manuscripts of certain writings of Lull.

Among persons in the religious life Lull found translators and transcribers of his works, some of whom chose to remain anonymous. For example, there was a priest, William Pages, a Mallorcan grammarian who in 1280 translated the Book of Contemplation and who as late as 1306 was still engaged in the translation of other works of Lull. At the request of Lull the Franciscan Simon of Puigcerda was sent to Tunis by James the Second of Aragon to help with the translation of his most recent writings.[2]

There are indications that groups of followers were formed early, even during the life of Lull. One of the groups was at Valencia. As early as 1317 spurious writings appeared in that city, giving indications that some of Lull's followers had gathered there. The Art of Confession was written anonymously during that year in that city. Also anonymous was a Catalan gloss of a Benedicta Tu in Mulieribus which appeared there eighteen years later. The Art Memorativa by a secular priest, Bernard Gari, a disciple of Master Ramon, and the De Magnitudine et Parvitate Hominis falsely attributed to Lull appeared at Valencia in 1338 and 1339.[3]

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[1] Carreras y Artau, loc. cit. Cf. Batllori, "El Lulismo en Italia," Revista de Filosofia, Vol. 2 (1943), pp. 275, 295.

[2] Peers, op. cit., p. 370. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 16-17.

[3] Carreras y Artau, ibid., p. 17.

The attacks of the arch-persecutor of Lullism, Nicholas Eymeric (1320-1399), as well as other sources bear witness to the continued existence of the Valencian group during the fourteenth century. It was in reference to this group that Eymerich used for the first time the term '*Lullista*' or Lullist. From this Valencia group came the first defenders of Lull. The Franciscan Peter Rosell, whom Eymeric described as the leader of the group, and the university student Anthony Riera upheld the holiness and orthodoxy of Lull. Another member of the group may have been Peter Sesplanes, rector of Silla, who was excommunicated by Eymeric on account of certain opinions about the Eucharist.[1]

There are indications also that another group of followers existed at Marseilles as a result of Lull's teaching at the University. It appears that in that city he won the affection of Ramon Gaufredi who was there in 1290. From Marseilles came the Minorite Bernard of Litioso who was accused of plotting the pope's death through magic and incantations. When Bernard was tried in his possession were found the *Tabula Generalis* and other books written by Lull at the time of his stay in Italy between 1295 and 1296. According to Bernard's testimony the books had been presented to him by Lull at the time of his visit to Rome in 1296.[2]

Without a doubt the most important group was formed at Paris. Among the members of the Paris group were to be found Franciscan,

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

Carthusian and secular priests. With the exception of two who will be mentioned later they are unknown today. It was while in Paris, during his last visit there from 1309 to 1311 as noted before, that at the request of some friends Lull told the story of the life that he had lived in the pursuit of three principal ideals. This account, written down by an anonymous hand is the Vita Coetanea referred to before. Of French origin also are the two oldest catalogues at the end of this biography. One was written in 1311. It has a list of one hundred and twenty works of Lull. In the second catalogue prepared four years later thirty titles were added to the list. The Paris group was also responsible for a series of early French translations some of which are still in existence.[1]

One of the two known Paris students was Peter of Sepeira (or Sepieyra), dean of the medicine faculty, who wrote a mystico-scientific treatise entitled De Oculo Morali. In his personal library of more than a hundred and twenty manuscripts there were five containing a number of Lull's early writings, including a French version of Blanquerna, perhaps his own translation. All of these books were willed to the Sorbonne which acquired them at Peter's death in 1306.[2]

The other Parisian was Thomas Le Myesier, a teacher of medicine and a canon at Arras, somewhat younger but also a socius Sorbonicus approximately in 1287. Towards 1299 in a letter he proposed

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1. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 279; Vol. 2, pp. 19-20.
2. Ibid., p. 20.

a list of twenty questions which Lull answered in a book later as noted before. The terms of the letter suggest a strong friendship. Le Myesier was an ardent and excellent popularizer of Lull's doctrines. In his residence at Arras he had collected close to a hundred and fifty treatises by Lull.[1] Anxious to propagate Lull's doctrines he was aware of the difficulties due to the large number of books and their different nature. To overcome some of these difficulties he planned a compilation of the principal writings of his teacher with the idea of a unified synthesis. The compilation would provide a simplified exposition of Lull's thought in a didactic form. The compilation was known as the *Electorium* and in it were included all the elements that Le Myesier considered best to accomplish the desired end. The *Electorium* contained some treatises by Lull *in toto*, selected parts of others, and introductions and prologues prepared by Le Myesier in order to render the reading of Lull's texts less difficult. Even the parts of books by others, as for example an *opusculum* of John of Paris, were utilized in order to reinforce the arguments of Lull against the errors of the non-Christians.[2]

The culmination point of the *Electorium* was the exposition of the universal *Ars Magna* which was explained as a method of knowing other truths, particularly from the standpoint of causes. A final objective was served with a defense of the Faith, an attack on Averroism, and a constructive declaration of some Christian tenets.

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1. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

The __Electorium__ was completed at Arras in 1325, a date which makes it very improbable that Lull had known about the project. It may have been suggested by friends of both Le Myesier and Lull, possibly by a member of the royal family. The Electorium served as the basis of two __compendia__: an __Electorium Medium__ and a __Breviculum__. As its name suggests, the __Breviculum__ was no more than an outline. Le Myesier himself had charge of the composition of all three. According to a series of still preserved artistic miniatures Le Myesier presented the three writings to the queen, Juana of Evreux.[1] Of the three only the __Breviculum__ is known to be still in existence. After the death of Le Myesier his entire library was transferred to the Sorbonne in accordance with his will. The University had now become the second depository of Lull's works at Paris, with a larger collection than the one at Vauvert.

From what is known about the life of Lull it may be recalled that he strove to spread his doctrines through institutions which he established in the expectation that they would carry on his ideals and his work. As his biography states he first founded the monastery of the Blessed Trinity at Miramar. To it came thirteen friars whose task it was to prepare themselves for a spiritual crusade against the Moors. In addition to the study of languages their apologetic preparation must have consisted in learning the Lullian __Art__. Probably on account of his long absences and also because of other unknown reasons this community was dissolved sometime after 1292. Its failure was heartbreaking but apparently complete.[1] Unable to reconstruct the Miramar institute Lull established with the aid of the grammarian William Pages another school under the direction of William of Vilanova. There are no indications that the life of this school was very impressive.

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[1] __Ibid.__, pp. 22-23.

A final and clear token of Lull's eagerness to publicize his ideas is his last testament and will, dated April 26, 1313. In it Lull appears very anxious to insure the continued knowledge of his doctrines. The will selected three distinct and separate centers where his books might be collected: the Chartreuse of Vauvert outside of Paris, the house of Persival Espinola in Genoa, and the house of his son-in-law, Peter of Sent-menat, in Mallorca.

The books kept in a personal box or trunk were to be forwarded to the monastery of The Real. The proceeds from the sale of other valuables in the trunk were to be used for additional copies of manuscripts with which to complete the collections at Paris and Genoa. More copies were to be made for distribution to the Franciscan houses and various churches throughout Mallorca wherein the books were to be at the disposal of anyone wishing to read them.[2]

These provisions had their desired effect. Mallorca, Paris and Genoa became radiation centers of Lull's writings and ideas.[3] Mallorca's influence spread to the peninsula, particularly in the territories belonging to the Aragon crown, perhaps in no small measure by means of the manuscripts circulated to and dispersed in Franciscan

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1. Peers, op. cit., pp. 129-137.
2. Ibid., pp. 364-366.
3. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 25.

convents. As it might be expected the original Mallorca collection has undergone several dismemberments. Some of the writings were taken to the Barcelona school by a member of the feminine line of the descendants of Lull. Many manuscripts were sent to Rome to be examined. They were to be returned after the process ordered to look into the orthodoxy of Lull's writings and the completion of efforts to obtain his canonization. Philip the Second requested a large number of manuscripts for the new collection being formed or completed at the library of the Escorial. Finally a quantity of excellent original manuscripts were sent to Mainz in connection with the intended edition of all the writings of Lull.[1]

In the city of Paris there existed two important libraries during the first half of the fourteenth century. One of them at the Chartreuse in accordance with the will of Lull. The other one had been established at the Sorbonne, soon after the death of Le Myesier, the holdings of whose library added considerably to the number of books donated by Peter of Limoges or Sepeira. Throughout most of the fourteenth century and at the beginning of the fifteenth century these two libraries acted as a strong ferment in the origin of a Lullian theological movement at the University of Paris. During the sixteenth century some Lullian manuscripts were utilized as texts to be commented on by various faculties there. Some of these manuscripts were likewise used by the editors Jacques Lefevre and Charles Bouvelles for some of their publications during the Renaissance.[2]

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1. _Loc. cit._
2. _Ibid._, pp. 25-26.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century the Paris manuscripts had become widely scattered. New collections, frequently with more recent manuscripts, were located at the St. Victor's Abbey, at St. Martin-des-Champs, at the convent of the Friars of the White Cape, at the library of the priests of Christian Doctrine, and in the personal libraries of members of the nobility, as for example de Melian, de Vassy, de Vignau, de Moreau and de Montarsis. At the time of preparation for the Mainz edition Ivo Salzinger had copies made of manuscripts in these Paris collections, particularly that of the Sorbonne.[1]

At the end of the eighteenth century, probably on account of the events which accompanied the French Revolution, most of the Paris collections were dispersed. Some of the manuscripts and codices were carried to places outside of France, such as Berlin and Munich. Others were kept in France and in time became part of the collections at the Bibliothèque Nationale.

The history and fate of the Genoa manuscript collection at the house of Persival Espinola are not clear. Today only a few components of the original depository remain and are known and they are found in the Munich State Library. The others were soon dispersed and may constitute part of the present collections at Venice and Rome.[2]

The Italian manuscripts appear to have been soon widely

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1. Ibid., p. 26.
2. Loc. cit. See Also Batllori, op. cit., Vol. 2 (1943), pp. 286-294, 296-297.

distributed and it is not unlikely that from them Dante obtained some of his knowledge about Islam. In the fifteenth century their influence was felt by Nicholas of Cusa, Bessarion, and Pico de la Mirandola. At the end of that century also these manuscripts or copies of them provided part of the impetus at Venice for the first Italian printings of books by Lull.[1] Also during this time copies of manuscripts destined for German libraries were prepared at the suggestion of Nicholas of Cusa. In his own hand Nicholas himself transcribed twenty-two writings of Lull. His personal library contained at least fifty treatises by Lull. Some of the manuscript copies were sent to ancient Bavarian abbeys, to the monasteries of Tegernsee, to St. Emeran of Ratisbon and St. Udalrick of Augsburg. Lullian manuscripts were found in other sections of Germany also. The Cathedral of Brandeburg possessed several codices which had been donated by its bishop Stephen (1422-1459). The abbey of St. Maximin of Treveris in Wolfenbuttel and the abbey of Sts. Peter and Paul in Weissenburg, Alsace, were also in possession of certain manuscripts. A little later a Venetian, Nicholas Poli, doctor to the emperors Maximilian and Charles the Fifth, brought from Italy a collection of manuscripts which remained until recently at Innichen in the Tirol.[2]

The most important German collection was set up in the eighteenth century at Düsseldorf at the initiative of the Elector

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[1] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 26, Batllori, op. cit., Vol. 2 (1943), pp. 295-303, 491-495.

[2] Batllori, ibid., pp. 308-309, 483-484, 486-487. Cf. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 26-27.

John William with a view to the projected great edition of the works of Lull. A systematic search was undertaken, with scientific expeditions going to France, Italy and Spain. From Paris alone three hundred copies were gathered and brought to Düsseldorf. In Barcelona the Countess of Manresana who descended from the noble family of Erill allowed the transcription of very ancient manuscripts. From Mallorca were sent numerous copies of manuscripts. Some arrived even from Florence and Milan. After the discontinuance of the Mainz edition the collection was transferred in 1761 from Mainz to the new palatine library at Manhein. In 1807 with the exception of a few manuscripts which were not removed from Mainz the entire collection was taken to Munich.[1]

As the result of these successive transfers and dismemberments of the original depositories the remaining Lullian manuscripts are greatly dispersed. Within Spain Mallorca has the largest and the best collection with some of the oldest codices preserved at the Colegio de la Sapiencia and in the convent of Montesion. A few are also found in public and in private personal libraries. Second to Mallorca's collection is that of the library at the Escorial. Many codices were sent there at the request of Philip the Second. Smaller collections exist at the National and the Royal Libraries of Madrid, at the University and Catalonia Libraries in Barcelona, at Alcalá, and in the cathedral archives of Toledo, Córdoba and Seville.[2]

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1. Carreras y Artau, ibid., p. 27.
2. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

Outside of Spain the largest and most significant collection is that of the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. In it is found a large quantity of the remains of the original Royal Library and of the personal libraries donated to the Sorbonne by the socci Sorbonici who had personal dealings with Lull as noted before. The acquisition of manuscripts of later dates have increased in a very large measure the Lullian collection at the Bibliothèque in Paris.[1]

Nearly as large and important is the National or State Library at Munich in Germany. To it have come the ancient collections of the Bavarian abbeys, the more recent one of the palatine library at Manheim, as well as a number of manuscripts of French and Italian origin. The Latin codices in Munich, approximately two hundred, represent most of the Latin writings of Lull.[2]

Also in Germany but of a more recent origin are a number of Berlin codices. At Mainz appreciable collections still remain from the time of the great but unfinished design of the edition of the Opera Omnia. Of some interest also are the collections of the collegiatas of Reichesberg, Dresde and Karlsruhe.[3]

English collections of Lullian manuscripts exist, for the most part, in the British Museum and in the libraries of the colleges and universities at Cambridge and Oxford.[4]

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1. Ibid., p. 28.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Ibid., pp. 28-29.
4. For an extensive list of the Lullian manuscripts in English libraries see Batista y Roca, J. M., "Catalech de les Obres Lulianes d'Oxford," Boletin de la Real Academia de Buenas Letras, Vol. 8 (1915), pp. 204-228, (1916), pp. 308-330.

In Italy the loss of the original Genoa collection has been compensated in some measure by the formation of collections with manuscripts of more recent dates. Today the most extensive collections are those at the St. Marc's Library in Venice, at the Innichen San Candido Collegiata in the Tirol, at the St. Ambrose Library in Milan, and at the ecclesiastical libraries in the Vatican and Rome. The Vatican collection contains more than eighty manuscripts, most of them fifteenth and sixteenth century copies sent from Spain in order to defend and uphold the orthodoxy of Lull. The Ambrosian Library at Milan has fifty-one manuscripts which were originally the property of John Arce de Herrera, a Spanish Lullist who ardently favored the cause of Lull at Rome during the last decades of the sixteenth century. After his death in 1595 his codices became the possession of Frederich Cardinal Borromeo, the founder of the Milan Ambrosian Library. The Venice and Innichen collections have a greater significance for the history of Lullism in Italy because of their greater antiquity since many of the manuscripts in Venice and some at the Innichen Collegiata were written during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and are of Italian origin. Moreover they were in fact an influence in the diffusion of Lullism since they did not appear in Italy primarily for the purpose of defending Lull's orthodoxy before the ecclesiastical authorities.[1]

Of lesser importance are the smaller collections at the National Library of Turin, those at the universities of Pavia and

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[1] Batllori, op. cit., Vol. 2 (1943), pp. 283-288.

Padua, those at the municipal libraries of Bergamo and Cortona, and the collection at the Estense Library in Modena. Today the Genoa library possesses only one manuscript of a treatise by Lull and it is of a rather late origin. Other important, though even smaller collections, are those at the Riccardiana in Florence, at the University Library in Bologna, at the Biblioteca Nazionale Vittorio Emanuele in Rome, at the Biblioteca Nazionale Braidense in Milan.[1]

B - Note on the Beginning of Anti-Lullism and Pseudo-Lullism

It was not long before suspicions and jealousies were aroused by the apparent wide success of the writings and doctrines of Ramon Lull. This time the opposition did not originate from schismatic, heretical or Arabian religious leaders whom Lull had engaged in repeated disputations. It came rather from amongst those whose philosophical and theological systems were slightly at odds with his own. At the University of Paris he was soon reproached for his new and unfamiliar terminology, for supposed attempts to demonstrate rationally some articles of Faith and for the novel techniques of the _Art_ which gave indications of its oriental influences.

These differences however, did not turn immediately into violent reactions against the person or the teaching of Lull. But after his death Lullism soon became contaminated in certain areas of Spain with certain dangerous and even heretical idiologies. Very decisive appeared to be the connection with a Valencian group of

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[1] _Ibid._, pp. 286, 288-294.

Spirituals, a lay movement within the Franciscan Third Order. Lull had been a Tertiary and of his writings those in the language of the people had had a tremendous success with them. Although Lull was never one of the Spirituals some of the persons with whom he associated apparently belonged to the movement. Ramon Gaufredi, a friend of Lull as seen before, was probably removed from his post as Minister General of his Order because of his connections with the Spirituals. Bernard of Litioso tried for his active hatred of popes was known by Lull. King Frederick of Messina, the Sicilian province where Lull spent a year before his last missionary trip to Africa, played a leading role in the movement of the Spirituals. In 1296 and again in 1312 Lull sent him a number of his books. The library of Peter of Limoges, one of the Parisian students, contained some of the writings of Joaquin of Fiore and other visionary reformers. It is clear therefore, that although Lull did not share the ideas of the Spirituals some of his friends and immediate disciples did.[1]

As just noted it is certain that in the middle of the fourteenth century the teaching of the doctrines of Lull was slightly disfigured at Valencia through the interpolation of Spiritualist and eschatological notions. Adding to the complication were the facts that Lullism had sided with the more traditional Realism against a rising Nominalist theology and that Lullist thinkers were siding in their obedience to the pope in Rome against the one in Avignon.

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[1] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 30-32.

As a result of all of this an investigation was initiated by the Dominican Nicholas Eymeric, a doctor of theology at the Sorbonne who had become the Inquisitor for the Catalonia and Aragon kingdom. More than once he had faced the followers of Lull. But now he noticed a growing adherence to Lullism on the part of the people and in order to put a halt to this state of affairs Eymeric decided to oppose Lullism officially. At once Eymeric denounced before the pope many of the writings of Lull charging that they contained errors and heresies. Pope Gregory the Eleventh heeded the accusation and in two letters dated June and September, 1372, ordered the archbishop of Tarragona to examine some of the writings. He also requested that certain other books be sent to the Roman Curia. Because the Tarragona prelate did not act strongly the pope decided to have the case resolved at the Pontifical Curia. A group of theologians examined twenty of the books and five hundred propositions which had been extracted from them by Eymeric. As a result on February sixth, 1376, Gregory the Eleventh in a public consistory prohibited the reading of these books because of two hundred propositions which had been censured by the theologians who examined them. Among the books attacked by Eymeric were included the Ars Generalis Ultima because of its position on the relation of Faith and reason. Other books were of a mystical character and included the well-known Book of the Lover and the Beloved. A few dealt with metaphysical questions or were didactic in nature as for example the Doctrina Pueril.[1]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 32-36. See also Peers, op. cit., pp. 377-379.

In addition to his efforts to obtain surreptitiously a Bull which contained the 1376 censures against Lull, Eymeric wrote in 1390 a *Dialogus contra Lullistas* and a *Contra Doctrinam Raymundi Lul*. The second of these treatises he presented personally to Clement the Eighth in the presence of a group of cardinals, one of whom was the Valencia prelate who opposed Eymeric. When Benedict the Eleventh ascended to the papal throne Eymeric continued his attack with an *opusculum* *Fascinatio Lullistarum*. He finally ended it in April of 1396 with an *Incantatio Studii Ilerdensis super XX Articulis per quendam Anthonium Riera Studentem Valentinum ut Defertur Seminatis*. In the *Contra Doctrinam Raymundi Lul* the arguments of Eymeric were on a high level. He called attention to the facts that Lull's system begins with principles which are not commonly accepted, that it makes use of new and strange terms, that in its attempts to demonstrate certain dogmas he brings ridicule upon the Faith. In the *Fascinatio Lullistarum* he is even more to the point and attacked the *Ars Brevis* as unnecessary and because it fails in its pretentions. Eymeric could not see any value or use for the destruction of ignorance and error in the algebraic symbols or the figures with their chambers which the *Art* contained. It is not strange that through the *Art* not a single Gentile has been converted he concluded.[1]

On account of the attacks by Eymeric Lullism had received a tremendous blow in the papal censures. For the time being it sought refuge in the royal power of the King of Aragon. Eymeric was exiled and later permitted to withdraw to Gerona on condition that he remain silent. But it was not until 1419 that the Sententia Definitiva of Cardinal Aleman put an end to the question by declaring under the authority of Martin the Fifth that though the papal document of 1376 was authentic it had been surreptitiously obtained. As a consequence its effects had to be nullified and after a more extensive examination both the doctrines and the books of Lull were declared free of opinions against Catholic dogma.[1]

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[1] Carreras y Artau, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 36-43.

Pseudo-Lullism has its beginnings in fourteenth century legends which portray Lull as a successful alchemist. The origins of the legends are unknown. Other great men of the thirteenth century were attributed connections with the pseudo-science of alchemy: Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Roger Bacon. Common to these men is the fact that they were trying to take advantage of the scientific and philosophical knowledge transmitted to the Christian West by the Arabians at that time. For some unexplained reason the beginnings of European alchemy are discovered in places where Arabian culture infiltrated the West: Montpellier, Paris and Oxford. One of the versions of the legend of Lull as an alchemist has it that he traveled to London. The legend is full of inaccuracies sufficient to show its fraudulent nature. However in addition to the explicit condemnation of alchemy in at least one of Lull's authentic writings,[2] the strongest proof against it is the comparative lateness of the spurious books on alchemy attributed to him. Nevertheless, for centuries some devoted followers of Lull and others accepted the authenticity of most of these writings. Ivo Salzinger listed seventy-seven titles of books concerning matters of alchemy which he considered authentic.[1]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 36, 43. See also Peers, op. cit., pp. 379-381.

[2] See for example the Ars Generalis Ultima in Raymundi Lulli Opera ea quae ad Adinventam ab Ipso Artem Universalem, part 11, ch. 25, p. 598.

The Renaissance writers accepted without question many of these books and circulated them freely; for example: Giordano Bruno, Agrippa von Nettesheim, Henry Alsted, Valerio de Valeriis. Numerous editions of the writings on alchemy attributed to Lull came out of the publishing houses in Venice, Cologne, Frankfurt, Basilea and Paris. The number of manuscripts of spurious treatises still in existence throughout many libraries in Europe may be as large as that of the genuine and authentic writings. Only in Spain was there an early recognition of the falsity of the legend and of the spuriousness of these books on alchemy.[2] The Jesuits Custurer and Sollier were careful to point this out to Ivo Salzinger and perhaps as a result of their hesitation none of the writings which were actually printed in the incomplete Mainz edition of 1721-42 are of a spurious character. The Spaniards Fernando Weyler y Lavina and Jose Ramon de Luanco have proved conclusively the falsity of the legend which represented Lull as an alchemist.[3]

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1. For the titles and division of these pseudo-Lullian treatises see the catalogue at the beginning of the first volume of the Mainz edition of Lull's Opera, pp. 4-5, 20-26. See also Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 331-334; Vol. 2, pp. 49-58.
2. Peers, op. cit., pp. 405-407. See Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 45-48.
3. The titles of the books in which their evidence is given are: Ramon Lull Considerado como Alquimista by Luanco, and Raimundo Lulio Juzgado per Si Mismo by Weyler y Lavina. See also Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 48-49.

II - The Late Medieval Period

A - Late Medieval Lullism

As we have seen before indications are that early in the fourteenth century there arose a strong movement of Lullists. Eymeric complained that, in 1376 not more than sixty years after the death of Ramon Lull, his followers constituted a legion. Wide distribution of the manuscripts, vernacular and popular transcriptions, and public discussions may have been responsible for this growing interest. The fruit of the movement however, was the establishment of schools where instruction in Lullian doctrines was given. Lull had given the example with the Miramar school, and later with another one in Mallorca of which little is known as stated before.

Three factors contributed to the formation of the schools: their popularity with the people, the royal protection, and the opposition of ecclesiastical authorities in some areas. The latter implied an opposition which excluded teaching Lull's writings on theological and mystical matters.[1] As a result the teaching was limited to the Art initially. The first of the teaching institutions was set up at Alcoy, Valencia, under Peter Rosell who was attacked by Eymeric. The school was erected thanks to a royal privilege granted by Peter the Third of Aragon to a Valencian merchant, Berenguer de Fluvia on October 10, 1369. The merchant was authorized to teach and to explain, personally or through those whom he considered apt, the Art of Lull either in general or as it can be applied to the study of medicine, astronomy, philosophy and other disciplines. The privilege was renewed in favor of Rosell by King Peter's successors, John the First and Martin the Human in 1393 and 1399.[1]

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[1] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 59-60

Approximately at the time of the renewal to Rosell by John the First similar foundations were authorized. One of them, the Barcelona school endured a rather long time and had a glorious history as it will be seen. A royal privilege of September 12, 1392, licensed the Valencian Francis de Luria to create new Lullian centers of learning. A few months later the same king empowered Francis of Pereta to select a space in his Barcelona palace or elsewhere, if more convenient, in order to house a Lullian school. It was to be at the disposal of a priest Jimenez Tomas and like other schools of that time it would offer instruction in the liberal arts with a particular stress on the philosophy of Lull. The latter's theology was explicitly ruled out. Who were the immediate teachers can only be surmised. One of them may have been the Barcelonian John Bulons who was responsible in some measure for the spread of Lullism in Italy.[2]

The royal protection and favors did not cease quickly. Alphonse the Fifth, the Magnanimous, granted three far reaching privileges. One at Zaragoza in 1425 was directed to the priest Anthony Sedacer and to John Llacer. A second one from Naples applied to an English Carmelite, Landulf of Columba in 1444. And in 1449 also from Naples the third privilege was in favor of John Llovet. The first and the third privileges opened new vistas to the Barcelona and the Mallorca schools. More privileges were obtained later from John the Third and the Catholic Sovereigns of Castille who had received from Aragon its cultural heritage.[1]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 60-61.
[2] Ibid., p. 61.

The teaching of Anthony Sedacer is of interest for the history of the Lullian school at Barcelona. A lady, in gratitude for some manuscripts of Lull which she received from him, willed all of her goods to the Lullian school in 1431. Her possessions included a house and a garden which were to be used for the maintenance and support of the school. Her library was also donated with a provision that the manuscripts of Lull's writings in Catalan should be available to a Sister Brigida. The execution of the will was in the hands of the descendants of Lull and of Sedacer or of the person who was in charge of the school.

The building was a two storied house. The ground floor was used for classrooms and the upstairs for a library. Grammar, writing, arithmetic, logic and probably rhetoric, astronomy and geometry made up the curriculum. An essential part of it also was the explanation of the _Art_ of Lull with the aid of pictorial figures, tables and of a large tree (of science). Among the manuscripts which could be used at the school there were resumés of the _Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi Veritatem_ and the _Ars Demonstrativa_.[2]

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[1] _Ibid._, pp. 61-62.
[2] _Ibid._, pp. 62-63.

Anthony Sedacer died around 1460 and was succeeded by a Valencian Minorite John Ross who had just returned from Italy where he had been instrumental in the spread of Lullism. John Ross was followed by Gabriel Desclapes, a canon of the Gerona cathedral. In 1485 the man in charge of the school was the Castillian Peter of Nieva, a teacher of Sacred Scriptures. In 1488 the direction of the school was in the hands of a priest John Comte and in 1493 the headmaster was the theologian John Bare. The later history of the school has not been reconstructed yet.[1] Shortly after the beginnings of the Barcelona school a similar institution at Mallorca attempted to widen its horizons and to give new vigor to the existing study houses at Miramar and Mount Randa. Each one of these had a teacher and twelve students in imitation of the original Miramar experiment. Neither of the schools had had much influence before except during the period between the years 1449 and 1460 when John Llovet taught there. Llovet had an enviable reputation as a teacher of Lullian philosophy. Students came to him from beyond the seas, from Spain and France and from as far as Italy. He was a theologian, philosopher, mathematician and artist.[2]

In 1478 a noble lady from Barcelona, Da. Beatriz de Pinos, under the direction of the Venetian Fr. Mario de Passa, donated her possessions to the municipality of Mallorca for the purpose of restoring the teaching of Lullian doctrines. Her stipulations

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1. Ibid., p. 63.
2. Ibid., pp. 63-64. See Peers, op. cit., p. 381.

provided for the necessities and livelihood of one teacher and three students who were to be given three year pensions. After they had learned the Lullian Art and science the students were expected to go to other sections of the country where they would teach. For that purpose Mario de Passa gathered a splendid collection of manuscripts and obtained permission to rebuild the Randa Houses which had been used by Llovet. However due to family and political difficulties about the disposition of Lady Pinos' donation the project did not prosper. Fr. de Passa in the meantime returned to Italy where he died in 1481.[1]

More successful was the establishment, within the city, of a house of studies attached to the Cathedral of Mallorca. Dª. Inez Pax de Quint had made available a yearly income of one hundred pounds for the teaching there of the doctrines of Lull. Her only stipulation was that the celebrated Peter Dagui (de Gui) should occupy the first chair . Dagui was thirty-seven years old at the time when he became seriously interested in the ideas of Lull but soon his fame as an accomplished Lullian scholar excelled that of others in his day.[2]

The school suffered somewhat from the repeated absences of Dagui. But his reputation was so great that it attracted both Spaniards and foreigners to the Mallorcan lecture halls. Accused of heresy by Gabriel Casellas, Dagui went to Rome where he defended himself successfully against the charge. King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella respected and trusted him. Among his outstanding students he counted James Janer, Arnold Descos and Fr. Bernard Boyl. Dagui died at Seville in 1500 but because of his teaching Lullism had made great strides in these ways: 1) in Italy he continued the expansion of Lullism; 2) the territories of Castille were introduced to Lullian philosophy and theology by him. Cardinal Cisneros may have been attracted to Lull by the teaching of Dagui. 3) Lullian teaching was decisively transformed for it succeeded in entering the University at the time when the Mallorca Cathedral school was attached to the newly erected University of Mallorca; 4) Dagui did not limit himself to the metaphysical, logical and formal aspects of the Art but was audacious enough to plunge into and develop the theology and mysticism of Lull, thereby raising Lullism to a new level.[1]

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[1] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 64.
[2] Peers, op. cit., pp. 381-382.

The strength and vigor of the fifteenth century Lullism of Mallorca stands out more clearly when it is realized that alongside of Dagui's institution there existed others. In 1485 a new school was established at Miramar by Bartholemew Caldentey and Francis Prats. In 1492 King Ferdinand granted Caldentey permission to teach publicly on the grounds which surrounded the Holy Trinity hermitage and which he could use for the support of the school. Another **Mallorcan** Humanist, Bartholomew Far also set up a school at Puig of Inca intended for instruction in the liberal arts according to the spirit and the methods of Lull.[2]

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[1] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 65-66. See also Peers, op. cit., p. 382.

[2] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 66.

At the end of the fifteenth century another school was also erected at Valencia by a privilege of the Catholic King Ferdinand. All that is known about it is that the Cistercian James Janer was in charge of it.[1]

Still more difficult it is to trace the literary productions and the particular systems of ideas among the early groups of Lullian thinkers. To Peter Rosello has been attributed a Super B. Raymundi Lulli Scriptis Commentaria of which nothing is known since no manuscripts of it have been found. The first original writing of the Barcelona group about which we know is a Lectura Artis Generalis, composed by John Bulons in 1433 during his visit to Italy. Fragments of the prologue exist in manuscripts at the Modena and Oxford Libraries.[2] In 1449 and 1450 John Ross wrote a Tractatus de Grammatica and an Artificium Arithmeticae. Of John Baro who lectured on theological questions no original writing of a Lullian nature is known. And of the other Barcelona teachers no literary compositions are known either, except for Gabriel Desclapes who in 1460 wrote about the virtues, wisdom and death of John Llovet.[3]

Better known and of greater importance are the publications of the Mallorca representatives. John Llovet left a Lullian Tabula and an Ars Notativa, both recently found. Mentioned as written by him are a De Logica and a De Metaphysica. At the time of Dagui Lullists

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1. Ibid., p. 67.
2. Ibid., pp. 67-68. Batllori, op. cit., Vol. 2 (1943), pp. 484-486.
3. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 68-69.

began to make extensive use of printing and as a result more is known about their writings. Dagui's best known book is the Janua Artis Magistri Raymundi Lulli which he completed in 1473 at Barcelona and which was printed nine years later. This book obtained a wide diffusion throughout Europe and at times was regarded as one of Lull's own works. In 1485 Dagui finished the Opus de Formalitatibus in which he tried to offer a systematic presentation of the philosophy of Lull. Two distinct incunabular editions of it are known to have been made. Dagui completed two more treatises: a Tractatus Brevis Formalitatum, and a Tractatus de Differentia. The second one of these books was completed in 1500 just a few months before Dagui's death.[1]

James Janer who taught at Valencia and Barcelona followed the example of his teacher. When he was in Barcelona he published there in 1489 and 1491 the Naturae Ordo Studentium Pauperum and the Ingressus Facilis Rerum Intelligibilium. And with the help, both intellectual and pecuniary, of Italian and Castillian Renaissance Lullists in 1506 he finished and edited an Ars Metaphysicalis at Valencia.[2]

Arnauld Descos, a Lullian humanist, composed Latin and Catalan poems and translated the apocryphal Benedicta tu. In addition to certain mystical and theological writings he prepared a Defensorium Doctrinae B. Raymundi Lulli. Of Caldentey and Prats at Valldemosa and Miramar no writings are known, although the introduction of printing in the island of Mallorca is attributed to them. To a disciple of Caldentey, John Valera, who at one time was secretary to Kings Alphonse the Fifth and John the Second, historians attribute certain Commentaria super Artem Raymundi Lulli after a glorious return from a Naples war. However there is no manuscript or printed edition of it known today.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 69. Batllori, op. cit., Vol. 2 (1943), pp. 491-500.
[2] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 69-70.

It is not an easy task to study the doctrinal positions of medieval Lullism because many writings have been lost and because they are often found only in manuscripts or extremely rare incunabula. But the study of some of them has shown that it was influenced frequently by the theological and philosophical positions of Franciscan teachers. This can be inferred from the titles of books by Dagui, some of which use the words 'formalities' and 'differences'. Lullism in medieval times appears as a particular direction of thought within the more general Franciscan tradition. It is differentiated of course by its devotion to the writings of Lull and by the more frequent consideration of logical questions inspired by the Ars Magna.[2]

Before proceeding further it should be added that the transmission of Lullism throughout Italy, where the memory of Lull's own teaching was not forgotten, was greatly favored by the presence of the Spanish Lullists: Bulons, Ross and Dagui. Of greater significance

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1. Ibid., p. 70.
2. Gilson, Etienne, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 350-353. Cf. Rossi, Paolo, "The Legacy of Ramon Lull in Sixteenth Century Thought," Medieval and Renaissance Studies, (ed. by R. Hunt, R. Klibanski and L. Labowski), Vol. 5, pp. 182-213; Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 70.

however is the fact that men of learning traveled to the schools of Mallorca and Barcelona. Mention has been made already of Fr. Mario de Passa. Before him Virgil Bornati, a friend of Pico de la Mirandola came to Spain *pro arte Raymundi Lulli habenda* and was present at some of the lectures of John Llovet.[1]

As an effect of these influences there was a vigorous fifteenth century Italian Lullism which accounts for the multiplication and diffusion of many manuscripts. To this period belongs a Tuscan version of *Felix* or *Book of Marvels*.[2] The cosmopolitan court of Alphonse the Fifth, the Magnanimous, encouraged the contact between the learned men from Catalonia, Mallorca, Aragon, Valencia, and Castille and those from Italy, as well as other nations. Through his court at Naples passed Caldentey, Valero, Pimentel, Ferdinand of Cordoba, Landulf of Columba and Cardinal Bessarion.[3]

B - Note on Anti-Lullism

Even as the Lullian movements of Mallorca and the Mediterranean Provinces of Spain continued to grow during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that of France followed an independent course. Although there is need of further investigation about its development it is known that its center was Paris. Its radiations were felt in Northern France and in neighboring Bravante. Doctrinally this movement developed a theology and mysticism along traditional

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1. Batllori, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2 (1943), pp. 484-488, 491-507.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 299-303.
3. Carreras y Artau, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 81-82.

ontological lines with the formal apparatus of the Art as one of their instruments. This way of thinking entered into a number of convents and monasteries and as a result the writings of Lull became the basis of expositions and commentaries, drawing attacks from Thomists and Nominalists.[1]

As noted before the original Paris group was made up of seculars, Carthusians, and Franciscans. One of the students of Le Myesier, Henry Pistor, became a teacher of theology at Lieges. At Paris also around the same period a *magister*, O. C., promised the solution of any question by the use of the Lullian figures. And in the fifteenth century *Liber Isagogicus*, Francis Samuel of Monte Casino introduced doctrines of Duns Scotus and sections of Aristotelian logic intermingled with the letters and figures taken from the *Great Art*.[2]

During this time also there was in Bravante a flourishing mystical movement which enjoyed a great popular favor. Some of its leading spirits, Eckhart, Tauler, Suso and Ruysbroek disregarded subtle doctrinal distinctions and proposed a religiousness based on the affective nature of man. It is not known whether the mystical writings of Lull influenced some of these mystics. But at the convent of Groendal, founded by Ruysbroek there existed a magnificent copy of the *Book of Contemplation*. Just like Lull had done, so now Ruysbroek adopted the language of the people for the composition of mystical

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1. *Ibid.*, p. 87. See Colomer, Eusebio, "Doctrinas Lulianas en Emmerich van den Velde," *Estudios Lulianos*, Vol. 3 (1959), pp. 117-136.
2. Carreras y Artau, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 89.

writings written in a beautiful style with brilliant and bold imagery.[1]

Les Noces Spirituelles, one of John Ruybroek's books was read at the Chartreuse which may be remembered for its kind reception of Lull. One of the monks there presented a copy of it to Gerson who had had once before an occasion to observe personally the new mystical movement during a sojourn at Bruges. The affective and popular mysticism of the devotio moderna did not please the intellectual and aristocratic mind of Gerson. Although he praised sections of the work presented to him he took the occasion in a letter to criticize the book for some of its daring expressions and obscure concepts. In a second letter written in 1410 he extended his condemnation to the writings of other mystics expressly mentioning Lull. In that letter he referred to a University statute which prohibited the teaching of the writings of Lull on account of its new terminology. This Parisian Anti-Lullism was given official status by the official repudiation of Lullian doctrine in a University condemnation of 1390 and in the attitude which Gerson showed in several works. The 1390 condemnation was an edict of the theology faculty which prohibited the teaching of Lullian doctrines and asked the Chartreuse of Vauvert to avoid further dissemination of Lull's works.[2]

The writings of Gerson reveal a very high minded opposition. While recognizing many points of merit at the same time he criticized the writings of Lull because of their new terminology, certain doctrinal innovations and the application of the *Art* methods to questions concerning God and the Trinity. The attacks by Gerson are contained particularly in these books: *Lectio Altera contra Vanam Curiositatem in Negotio Fidei*, written in 1402; *De Examinatione Doctrinarum* and *De Libris Caute Legendis propter Errores*, written respectively in 1423 and 1425. In this third work Gerson asserted that the doctrines of Lull ought not to be taught because they are useless, they overstep the traditional bounds of the Schools, and they are couched in new and unfamiliar terms. The *Art* serves only to inflame one's head and to render false judgments.[1]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 89-90. Cf. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 438-446.
[2] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 90-91.

III - *The Renaissance Age*

A - *Renaissance Lullism*

Space does not permit an examination of the *Liber Creaturarum* of Ramon Sibiuda or the writings of Nicholas of Cusa. There are however, abundant indications that the thought of these men was influenced in no small measure by that of Ramon Lull. Allusion was made before to the role of Nicholas de Cusa[2] in the diffusion of Lullian manuscripts and to his interest in the writings of Lull, some of which were in his library. During the years that Nicholas of Cusa endeavored to construct a mystical theology with the aid of some

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 91-99.

[2] For a study and analysis of the *Liber Creaturarum* of Sibiuda, and of the doctrines in certain writings of Nicholas of Cusa which show Lullian influences see Carreras y Artau, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 101-175, 177-196.

Elements of the Lullian Art, Lullism began to infiltrate some of the influential Renaissance currents of thought. The communication was aided by certain affinities, as for example with Platonism.[1]

The first Renaissance Platonist to be in some way linked with Lullism was Cardinal Bessarrion (1403-1472). He had come to the West in the interest of union with Rome and after his conversion he became Patriarch of Constantinople. One of his friends, Fernando of Córdoba, states that he was acquainted with the Art. A more important representative of the early Renaissance period is the Florentine Pico de la Mirandola. Vernon, after stating his belief that Lull had authored four thousand books, maintained that the Library of Pico de la Mirandola possessed two thousand five hundred of them. Two of these volumes were entitled Ars Raymundi. Pico himself compared the Art to the Cabbala and looked upon it as a method or art of combinations. He in turn proposed a system of logic, that would, like the Art and the Cabbala, make use of combinations of letters and revolving figures.[2]

The apparent kinship and the similarity, more or less real according to some observers, between the Art of Lull and the Cabbala gave rise to a group of Lullian Cabbalists. Probably theirs was a De Auditu Cabbalistico which has also been attributed to Pico de la Mirandola's followers. In the explanation of the Art this book retained the main ideas of Lull.[1]

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[1] Rossi, op. cit., Vol. 5 (1961), pp. 182-183. See also Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 197.

[2] Carreras y Artau, ibid., pp. 197-200. See also Batllori, op. cit., Vol. 2 (1943), pp. 496-498; Rossi, op. cit., Vol. 5 (1961), pp. 190-191.

A vigorous movement of Florentine inspiration was initiated in France during the last few years of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth. James Lefevre d'Etaples (1455-1537) was the soul of the movement. He transformed a literary renascence into a philosophico-theological one. Under his direction and through his inspiration out of the printing presses of John Petit and Josse Bade came several editions of the books by Lull and his followers. The reading of the Book of Contemplation in 1491 caused him to conceive the plan, never realized before or since, of publishing every writing by Lull. The Paris 1494 printing of the Liber de Laudibus B Mariae Virginis inaugurates in almost the whole of France the publication of Lull's books. Assisting Lefevre in the editorial task and sharing his devotion to Lull were others, among whom may be mentioned Josse Clichtowe and Blessed Bild of Rhynow. To Lefevre's group of Lull's admirers belonged also Charles Bouvelles (1480-1553) who traveled to Spain and kept in close communication with Spanish Lullists. At the time when he was in Spain he read the Vita Coetanea and after his return to Paris he wrote a biography of Lull which later became the first printed life of Lull.[2]

In this regard let us also indicate the principal places in which the printing of books by Lull was initiated. Venice appears to be the city from which came out the first printed edition of a work by Lull. In 1480 Peter Petio edited the *Ars Generalis Ultima* and the *Logica Brevis et Nova*. Five years later the *Ars Brevis* of Lull and the *Janua Artis Raymundi Lulli* of Dagui were printed at Rome, probably by Silver. These are the only four Italian incunabula of writings by Lull or about his doctrine.[1] During the years between 1481 and 1490 the publishing house of Peter Posa in Barcelona, Spain, published two editions of the *Ars Brevis*, one of the *Arbor Scientiae* and one of the *Logica Brevis et Nova*. The same house also printed at this time four editions of Dagui's writings. During the years between 1501 and 1505 Peter Posa edited the *Ars Generalis Ultima*, the *Arbor Scientiae* and the *Liber de Articulis Fidei*. In 1491 and 1492 Pedro Miguel printed at Barcelona the *Naturae Ordo Studentium Pauperum* and the *Ingressus Facilis Rerum Intelligibilium* of James Janer. Before 1500 he had also published the *Liber Proverbiorum* of Lull. At Valencia, between 1506 and 1515, Alphonse of Proaza published four volumes containing nine authentic Latin writings of Lull, two translations from his Catalan works and the *Ars Metaphysicalis* of Janer.[2]

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[1] Batllori, op. cit., Vol. 2 (1943), p. 511. See also Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 200-201.

[2] Batllori, op. cit., Vol. 2 (1943), pp. 507-508. Also Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 201-209.

A very significant accomplishment by the Lullian group formed under the inspiration of Lefevre was the reintroduction of the teaching of the *Art* of Lull to the University. The task had become easier when Nominalism was replaced there with a Renaissance Neoplatonic metaphysics. The man who taught the *Art* at the

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[1] Batllori, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2 (1943), pp. 491-495.
[2] Carreras y Artau, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 250-251, 255.

University was Bernard of Lavinhetta, a Scripture scholar educated according to the Scotistic tradition. As a result of his teaching the Ars Magna he gained for it the prestige of the University. During the years between 1514 and 1517 he secured the printing in Paris, Cologne and Lyons of the Ars Brevis, the Ars Generalis Ultima and of other writings by Lull and Dagui. In 1523 he published his own Explanatio Compendiosaque Applicatio Artis Raymundi Lulli in which he insisted on the need of a universal Art whose principles demonstrate those of more specialized sciences. And in the epilogue he proposed the Art of Lull as a logical mnemonics. On the whole the Explanatio shows little originality either in philosophy or theology but it contributed greatly to a renewal of interest in the Lullian Art, particularly because of Lavinhetta's notion of the Art as an ideal method with which to construct an encyclopedia of knowledge. This seems to have been Lull's idea in the Arbor Scientiae.[1]

Related to the French Lullism we find a Renaissance group of German thinkers who were interested in developing and improving the Art of Lull. The first representative of this group was the eccentric Henry Aggripa von Nettesheim (1486-1535). In the last year of his life he wrote De Incertidumbre et Vanitate Scientiarum in which he was very critical of the Art and he compared it with the attempts by the Sophists to speak on all matters. However during his early years his interest in the same Art prompted his Commentaria in Artem Brevem

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[1] Ibid., pp. 209-214. See also Rossi, op. cit., Vol. 5 (1961), pp. 207-210.

Raymundi Lulli. These commentaries were so well received that they were edited six times in less than seven years and fifteen times in less than one century. The new exposition increased the number of terms and figures contained in the Art by introducing other terms which are related by opposition, causality, or in some other way. Through the mingling of the terms Aggripa proposed a Combinatoria which would also prove to be an Art of discovery.[1]

The influence of Lull was also felt by the father of German medicine, Paracelsus (1493-1541). According to the testimony of Giordano Bruno, Paracelsus learned all of his ideas from the books of Lull and all he did was to use different words. The German alchemists also, as for example Francis Patizzi, continued to draw inspiration from spurious and some genuine writings of Lull. Other thinkers appeared to be mainly interested in the Art as a memory scheme so that it is not incorrect to speak of a mnemonic logical direction during the Renaissance. Thomas C. Murner (1475-1536) through the use of cards developed a system for learning and retaining abstract ideas. His success with this system brought accusations of magic against him. Campanella and Giordano Bruno among others spoke of Murner's prodigious memory, not as a preternatural gift but as one based on and acquired by means of the Lullian Art.[2]

Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) stands out as one of the chief exponents of philosophic thought during the Renaissance. An original

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1. Batllori, op. cit., Vol. 2 (1943), pp. 508-509. See also Rossi, op. cit., Vol. 5 (1961), pp. 183-185; Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 216-222.
2. Carreras y Artau, ibid., pp. 223-225. Also Rossi, op. cit., Vol. 5 (1961), pp. 197-206, 209-212.

thinker in his own right Bruno had learned much from Lull. The titles of some of his writings are indicative of the importance that he attached to the thought of Ramon Lull: *De Umbris Idearum et Arte Memoriae*, *De Compendiosa Architectura*, *De Lampade Combinatoria Lulliana*, *De Lulliano Specierum Scrutinio*, *Animadversiones circa Lampadem Lullianam*. In these and in other writings Bruno made use of combinatory schemes and proposed them as an art of discovery which could also become a mnemonics. The philosophic thought of Bruno was largely Neoplatonic. According to it the perfections of God flow forth as nature by way of ideas and there is a parallelism between the logical and the ontological orders. Since all things are reflections of the divine reality they are inter-related. Through a knowledge of visible objects one may, therefore, rise to the knowledge of spiritual realities until the Supreme Unity is seized. As a consequence there must be a universal science which reconstructs rationally the unity of all beings and which can be obtained by considering the relations between concepts. When the horizons of the Lullian *Art* are extended it can become the mechanism needed for the discovery of these relations. By a further development of the *Art* Bruno sought the basic and primary notions of the universal science. These were the letters which then must be joined in syllables, words and phrases. The basic notions were given partially in four columns of the Lullian alphabet, but others had to be added from the first two figures. After its development by Bruno the third figure of the *Art* of Lull resulted in 81 (9 x 9) binary combinations. The fourth figure was of particular use in the quest for demonstrations and sound arguments. But it might also be used in the composition of propositions. From the fourth figure Bruno derived an enormous number of combinations at the same time showing that he was more interested in the lines and structure of the *Art* as a combinatory scheme, than in the content of the chambers and meaning of the terms which will be considered in the next section with an exposition of the *Ars Brevis*.[1]

There were others who cultivated the *Art* as an encyclopedic ideal. This had been suggested by Lavinhetta and Aggripa. Among them were Peter Gregoire (1540-1597) who wrote *Sýntaxes Artis Mirabilis*, and the Italian Julius Pace (1550-1635) who wrote an *Ars Lulliana Emendata*. None of the encyclopedic efforts of these two men display a great deal of originality. Another encyclopedic attempt was made by Valerio de Valeriis in the *Aureum sane Opus in Quo ea Omnia breviter Explicantur quae Scientiarum Omnium Parens Raymundus Lullus, tam in Scientiarum Arbore quam Arte Generali Tradit*. This book was published in 1589, and in the explanation of the *Art* it follows in general the notion of it which Aggripa had had. The new presentation of the four figures as logical tools is more ambitious than had been that of Lull.[2]

The last great figure of the Renaissance Lullian movement outside of Spain is that of the Protestant humanist John Henry Alsted

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[1] Carreras y Artau, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 225-233. See also Rossi, *op. cit.*, Vol. 5 (1961), p. 211; Batllori, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2 (1943), pp. 521-523.

[2] Carreras y Artau, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 233-237. See also Batllori, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2 (1943), pp. 523-524; Rossi, *op. cit.*, Vol. 5 (1961), pp. 192, 195-197.

(1588-1638). In addition to original publications he edited books written by others and prepared commentaries on the Art of Lull. There are three main writings which manifest his lifelong Lullian interest: Clavis Artis Lullianae, Criticus de Infinito Harmonico Philosophiae Aristotelicae, Lullianae et Rameae, and Trigae Canonicae. A fourth writing Idea Brevissima Artis Lullianae which in printed editions follows the Clavis Artis is a faithful presentation of the Art of Lull. The title of one of Alsted's books shows how the Art has now become a purely logical tool. To Lull it had been a logico-metaphysico-theological instrument which was intended to be used by everyone. By the time of Alsted it had been transformed to such a degree that a clavis was required to comprehend it even though once it had been acquired learning other things would be facilitated immeasurably.[1]

With all the interest in Lull throughout much of Europe it was impossible that Spain should diminish its affection for his thought at this time. Probably at the insistence of Dagui, Cardinal Cisneros erected the University of Alcalá de Henares in 1508 and inaugurated there the instruction of both Lullian theology and philosophy. These were to be taught by Nicholas de Pax. In addition to his lectures and the preparation of several translations of some writings of Lull Pax wrote a Vita Divi Raymundi Lulli. His Commentaria super Artem Divi Raymundi Lulli has not been found.[2]

The Valencian Alphonse of Proaza, referred to before, in

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1. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 239-249.
2. Ibid., pp. 251-254. See also Peers, op.cit., p. 385.

addition to the four volumes of writings by Lull published for the first time in Spain a catalogue of Lull's writings. A Castillian Arte de Raimundo Lulio, unknown today, has also been attributed to him. John Bonlabi who prepared a Valencian version of the Blanquerna belongs also to the Valencia group of Lull's followers.[1]

King Philip the Second exhibited an untiring allegiance to the cause of Lull particularly in connection with the defense of his orthodoxy at Rome. Among his friends were included John Segui who at the request of the king wrote a biography of Lull. King Philip was also responsible for an increase in the Lullian holdings at the library in the recently constructed Escorial. The suggestion to request the Barcelona and Mallorca libraries to send copies of their manuscripts to the Escorial came apparently from Miguel de Dimas who had seen the manuscripts in the possession of Dr. John Luis Vileta at Barcelona and of Anthony Velber in Mallorca. Velber had taught the Art and occupied the Chair of Lullian studies at Mallorca after Anthony Serra.[2]

Vileta was a central figure in Spanish Lullism during the second half of the sixteenth century. It was due to his efforts that the Council of Trent made the decision to exclude the writings of Lull from the Index of Forbidden Books which was being revised. As a reward Vileta was accorded for as long as he lived the Chair of Lullian studies at the University of Barcelona. In 1565 he edited with commentaries the *Ars Brevis* under the title *Scholae et Universae Academiae Barcinonensis Rector*. At Vileta's suggestion a theologian, Juan Arce de Herrera, forwarded to the Congregation of the Index a new *Apologia* defending the orthodoxy of Lull. Both Vileta and Arce de Herrera, whom we referred to in connection with the Italian manuscripts, had magnificent Lullian book collections. Arce de Herrera authored a catalogue of his holdings which listed three hundred titles. Vileta prepared twelve tables, of which one still exists and has a hundred and ten titles.[1]

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[1] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 254-257.
[2] Ibid., pp. 257-259.

Philip the Second also authorized the architect Juan de Herrera to establish in Madrid an academy for the study of mathematics and philosophy. Lessons on the *Art* of Lull were to be given there. And for a text the writings of Pedro de Guevara were to be used. De Guevara had published in 1554 *El Arte General y Breve, en Dos Instrumentos, para Todas las Ciencias*, and in 1586 *La Breve y Sumaria Declaracion de la Arte General*. Both follow and explain the teaching on the *Art* by Lull very closely. A third book in 1593, *Escuela del Entendimiento, en la cual se Declara el Arte Universal para Todas las Ciencias*, is an explanation of the *Arbor Scientiae*. A different treatise, *Tratado del Cuerpo Cubico*, written by Juan de Herrera, shows that its author relied on the doctrines of the *Ars Brevis* and the *Ars Generalis Ultima*.[2]

Pedro Jeronimo Sanchez de Lizarazu, attached to the

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1. *Ibid.*, pp. 260-263, See also Peers, *op. cit.*, p. 384; Batllori, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2 (1943), pp. 284-285.
2. Carreras y Artau, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 264-267.

Tarragona Cathedral, wrote unedited commentaries on the Ars Magna and the Arbor Scientiae. But in 1613 and again in 1614 was printed his Generalis et Admirabilis Methodus ad Omnes Scientias Facilius et Citius Addiscendas in quo Explicatur Ars Brevis Raymundi Lulli.[1]

One of the bright stars of the Castillian movement was a Carmelite from Cordoba, Agustín Núñez Delgadillo. His career as a teacher brought him to Alcalá, Córdoba, Granada, Valencia and Zaragoza. At least from the standpoint of the history of Lullism his principal writing is the Breve y Facil Declaracion del Artificio Luliano.[2] Due to the presence of the Spaniards in the Low Countries several of the books by Lull were published at Brussels between 1661 and 1666, as well as two expositions of the Art by Pedro Guevara.[3]

B - Note on Anti-Lullism

The outstanding opponents of the continued influence by Ramon Lull on the speculative thought during the sixteenth century were the Platonist Ferdinand of Cordoba and Peter Ciruelo. The latter very carefully denied the universal character of the Art. Its principles, he declared, are too general and not sufficiently clear and distinct. Moreover all demonstration ought to proceed from principles proper to each science, and not from common or general ones. Hence should the Art be effective in dialectical argumentation it cannot lead to true and certain knowledge.[4]

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1. Ibid., pp. 268-269.
2. Ibid., pp. 269-270.
3. Ibid., p. 270
4. Ibid., pp. 283-285. See also Batllori, op. cit., Vol. 2 (1943), pp. 497-498.

IV - Modern Age: Seventeenth & Eighteenth Centuries

A - Seventeenth Century

The successors of King Philip the Second continued to favor the Lullian cause but they did not share the personal involvement and zeal that animated their predecessor. With other causes, this led to the weakening of Lullism in the Spanish peninsula. But on the other hand Mallorca's Lullian Chair at the university rose to the point of rivalling other Chairs in philosophy and theology. It was in order to strengthen this Chair that a descendant of Lull, Bartholemew Lull, created early in the seventeenth century the Colegio de Ntra. Sra. de la Sapiencia. Poor students would learn the Art and hear it explained there. At the present time this small school possesses a magnificent library collection of Lullian manuscripts and printed editions as already suggested. Other Lullists at Mallorca during the reign of Philip the Third were: Anthony Busquets, John Riera and Gaspar Vidal. Vidal taught at the Estudio General of Mallorca and in 1606 published an Expositio Artificii Lulliani.[1]

The return of Lullian thought to the Scholastic metaphysical interests away from the purely logico-encyclopedic concern of Renaissance thinkers, was undertaken by Francis Marzal (1591-1688). He taught at Araceli in Rome and at St. Francis in Mallorca. In 1642 he prepared an edition of the Ars Brevis which was printed later in 1669. As a result of lectures and commentaries on the Ars Ultima in 1643 he also prepared an edition of the Ars Generalis Ultima. According to a judgment expressed by Marzal the Renaissance commentators had done nothing but to disfigure the Art of Lull. And in accordance with that position he recommended going directly to the texts and writings of Lull. In other writings Marzal undertook the defense of the doctrines of Lull and the composition of a quasi Summa outlining the teaching by Lull on the questions of Peter Lombard.[1]

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[1] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 268, 271-272.

The most gratifying event of the seventeenth century Mallorcan movement was the pontifical recognition of the Estudio General which had been originally instituted by Ferdinand the Catholic. After that proclamation its rank would equal that of Lerida, Salamanca and Paris.[2]

Among French students the popularity of Lull continued throughout most of the seventeenth century along lines which are not always easy to separate. Publications of Lull's writings either in Latin or in translation came out in several cities and by different printers. Francisc Marcial du Mans published the Book of the Lover and the Beloved at Rouen just before the end of the sixteenth century. Some spurious writings on alchemy were published in Lyons. In 1635 and 1637 John Pillehotte published the Introductorium Artis Generalis and the Arbor Scientiae. The Benedictines of St. Mauro, Martene y Durand published three letters of Lull.[3]

Translations were undertaken at Paris and Rouen. Among the translators known are Robert le Toul and Mssr. du Vassy. The latter

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1. Ibid., pp. 273-276.
2. Ibid., pp. 277-278.
3. Ibid., pp. 289-290. See also Peers, op. cit., p. 385.

set about translating certain logical writings which were included in the Strasbourg or Zetzner edition. The 1632 and 1634 collections of French translations by de Vassy included the Ars Brevis and the Ars Generalis Ultima.

Rather uncritical were the biographies written or reprinted in France during this period. Benedict Gonon in 1625 reprinted the Life which had been written by Boubelles. M. Colletet's Vie de Raymond Lulle witnessed three printings in less than ten years. A better biography was written by Perroquet at Vendome in 1667. And more valuable because of the extensive sources of information used is John Marie de Vernon's L'Histoire Veritable du B. Raymond Lulle. Nicholas de Hauteville's catalogue of the works by Lull published in 1666 is the best up to that time on account of its bibliographic material.[1]

Doctrinally the seventeenth century French Lullism had interests which were either rhetorico-utilitarian or logico-encyclopedic. In the rhetorical interest was included the use of the Art as a memory technique or scheme. Its main representatives were: Hugo Carbonel with a Secretum Explicitum Artis Lullianae which was edited three times between 1620 and 1621; and Jean Belot with La Rhetorique par Laquelle on Peut Discourir de ce qui est propre en l'Oraison which was printed at Rouen, Lyons and Liege a total of seven times.

The logico-encyclopedic direction was stronger and was represented by Basil of Poligny's Commentaria in Artem Atque in

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[1] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 291-292.

Metaphysicam, seu de Ente Universalissimo secundum Raymundum Lullum. Several writings of Peter Morestell, Peter Baudouin of Montarcis, and Ivo of Paris belong to it also.[1]

In Germany there was a parallel flowering of interest which continued into the eighteenth century. The concern however, was not literary, biographical or bibliographical, but rather almost exclusively philosophical; and it bore on the content of Lullism, particularly on the doctrines of the Ars Generalis and on matters of alchemy. The movement manifested a desire and a search for an inventive logic of discovery which might remedy some of the powerlessness of Aristotelian Logic. The Strasbourg Zetzner publication of two collections, one of logical writings and one of alchemy treatises, is a good example. The impression created by these modern students of the Art of Lull is that they were trying to improve, alter or reform it until it became a method that might yield universal knowledge. Even the founders of Modern Philosophy, Rene Descartes and Francis Bacon, who apparently did not know the Art of Lull directly yet opposed it, contributed in their own way towards this search for both an improved method and an infallible universal science. The symbol of the tree which Descartes used to describe the unity of wisdom cannot but bring to the mind of the reader of Lull the constant use of that image by the man who gave to one of his encyclopedic writings the title Arbor Scientiae.[2]

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1. Ibid., pp. 294-297.
2. Ibid., pp. 298-303. See also Rossi, op. cit., Vol. 5 (1961), pp. 183, 194.

Peter Gassendi in the Syntagma Philosophicum devoted an entire chapter to an extensive exposition of the Art. According to him Lull was looking for a new logic in the Ars Brevis. In so doing however, Gassendi, unlike Lull, failed to distinguish between logic and the Art. Gassendi in his criticism of the Art asserted that he could not get much out of the letters and figures in it. The only acceptable elements within the Ars Brevis were those of the ordinary logic which it retained. More criticisms were made by Renato Rapin and the Benedictine John Camillon. And as the criticisms increased more efforts were made to reform Lull's Art. The Spanish Jesuit Sebastian Izquierdo, not strictly a Lullist, published in 1659 a Pharus Scientiarum. In this book his announced aim was to erect an encyclopedic science and a metaphysics which would possess demonstrations of mathematical precision. Others who wrote along the same lines but not as well were: Janus Cecil Frey, Cornelius Gemma, W. Ch. Kriegsmann, Gaspar Knittel, John Schupp and Daniel Richter.[1]

Because of the lively interest in the Art shown by Lullists, anti-Lullists, and reformers of the Art, the Austrian emperor requested a wise man in his country, Athanasius Kircher, to examine the value of the Art of Lull. After long study Kircher concluded that the Art was indeed valuable but required certain modifications in order to facilitate the learning of it. In an Ars Magna Sciendi published in 1669 Kircher gave a good exposition of the Art. He also tried to refine the Lullian Combinatoria by making it more mathematical.[1] While Kircher went about preparing his Ars Magna Sciendi a young student of philosophy, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646-1716) anticipated his project with the Dissertatio de Arte Combinatoria. This work was the result of long years of reading and thinking about Aristotle's logic and it signified an attempt to transform logic into an instrument of discovery. To Leibnitz the best approach had to be mathematical, one which involved the combination of the most basic terms and truths. According to Leibnitz, after he had studied the Ars Generalis Ultima, the merit of Lull consisted in his attempt to discover the most universal principles. The number of the binary, ternary and quaternary combinations became almost astronomical by the application of the calculus used by Leibnitz in his Combinatoria. In this way Leibnitz was not merely correcting Lull but endeavoring to create a new logic of discovery. The Dissertatio de Arte Combinatoria was only the outline of a work which Leibnitz was to continue for many years but which he never completed.[2]

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[1] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 302-309.

B - The Eighteenth Century

In eighteenth century Germany with its fever for mathematical and physical discoveries, as well as for idealistic philosophies there arose the idea of producing a complete edition of the writings of Ramon Lull. The promoter of the plan was Ivo Salzinger. Among others favoring the project were the prince elector John William who, as noted before, was a palatine count in the Rhine Valley. The

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1. Ibid., pp. 309-313.
2. Ibid., pp. 313-322. See Gilson, op. cit., p. 352.

preparatory work had begun as early as 1698 but it was not until 1721 that the first three volumes appeared. Of the other seven projected volumes only five more were published, the last two appearing as volumes IX and X in 1740 and 1742. Both John Baptist Sollier and James Custurer were invited to come to Düsseldorf to participate in the work but they hesitated or were unable perhaps because of their assurance, noted before, about the spuriousness of writings on alchemy attributed to Lull and accepted as authentic by Salzinger. In spite of these differences both of them contributed erudite counsel and forwarded copies of manuscripts and other writings. They also encouraged other Mallorcans to contribute to the success of the tremendous task. Soon after the death of Salzinger and others who had originated the plan the Mainz edition of the Opera of Lull was discontinued.[1]

During the eighteenth century Lullism was geographically reduced to Mainz and Mallorca. Its development at Mallorca was influenced by two factors: the stimulus of the editorial task at Mainz and the turning away of Spanish intellectuals from the doctrines of Lull. The results accordingly took two directions: 1) a critical constructive one engaged in biographical and bibliographical studies, and 2) a polemico-vindictive one which defended Lullian doctrinal positions. The best representatives were James Custurer and the Cistercian Anthony Raymond Pascual, both of whom engaged in the two directions very successfully. Custurer was born in 1657 at Mallorca

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1. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 323-348.

and joined the Jesuit Society. His only published work is Disertaciones Historicas in which he presented and defended the history of the cult and the orthodoxy of Lull. In addition to the first Spanish version of the Vita Coetanea, the book has an excellent catalogue of the writings of Lull and it contains valuable information about the manuscripts at Rome and in Mallorca. So impressive was Custurer's presentation of Lull's case that the Bollandist J. B. Sollier in 1708 published at Amberes the Acta B. Raymundi Lulli. In these Acts were included the original Latin text of the Vita Coetanea and a letter of Custurer attesting to its authenticity.[1]

Anthony Raymond Pascual (1708-1791) was a very erudite Lullian scholar. He studied at the Colegio de la Sapiencia and at the university. A promising student of the thought of Lull he was sent to Mainz where he studied under Salzinger. After his return to Mallorca, Pascual taught Lullian theology and philosophy at the university. His most accomplished works, the results of long and painstaking years of study and research, were the Examen de la Crisis del P. Feijoo, in two volumes published in 1749-1750, and Vindiciae Lullianae in four volumes published in 1778. In both of these scholarly works he explained and defended the teaching of Lull against the violent anti-Lullism of Feijoo and against the censures of Cardinal Lambertine who became Pope Benedict Fourteenth. The four volumes of the Vindiciae Lullianae went beyond a sound defense to a constructive synthesis of the logic, metaphysics and theology of

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1. Ibid., pp. 354-357. See Peers, op. cit., p. 390.

Lull.[1]

Of some importance, although not of the stature of either Custurer or Raymond Pascual, were Raphael Barcelo, Michael Fornes and Bartholemew Fornes. After studies at Mainz the latter returned to teach in Mallorca and there in 1759 he prepared an Introductio ad Lullianam Artem.[2]

V - Contemporary Period

The last few decades of the eighteenth century witnessed the gradual disappearance of a living doctrinal Lullian movement. After 1789, the year in which Pascual published his last writing no book by or about Lull of any real significance appeared for nearly a century. It was not until the latter part of the nineteenth century that the beginning of a renascence in the Lullian movement occurred. Three events signaled the approach of a resurgence of Lullian studies. These were: 1) An extensive study on Lull by Littre and Haureau in the twenty-ninth volume of the Histoire Litteraire de la France in 1885. This study is still an indispensable instrument for Lullian students in spite of its unfavorable attitude towards the philosophy of Lull and his School. The judgment which Littre expressed that the Art was forever dead has not proved true. In this judgment Littre was following Prantl who had identified the Great Art with logic.

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[1] Peers, ibid., pp. 391-392. See also Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 364-368.

[2] Peers, op. cit., p. 391. Also Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 358-364.

According to Prantl the Art, like Aristotle's logic, is ineffectual in obtaining knowledge about real things, and hence it has little scientific value. 2) The second important event was the printing in Catalan of certain writings of Lull by Jeronimo Rosello in 1859. 3) The third event was a lecture series delivered by Anthony Rubio y Lluch during the years between 1906 and 1910 at the Estudiis Universitaris Catalans. There have been, of course, other factors and persons contributing to the revival of interest in the teaching and the writings of Lull, as for example, the zeal and inspiration of John Maura y Gelabert and Salvador Bove, and the writings of Marcelino Menendez y Pelayo.[1]

As the result of the lectures of Rubio y Lluch a group of serious and brilliant students dedicated to scholarly research was formed. Among the members of this group may be counted: J. Masso Torrents, George Rubio y Balaguer, Ramon de Alos-Moner, Elias Rogent, Stanislas Duran y Reynals, Jose Ma. Millas Vallicrosa, Pedro Bohigas Balaguer, J. M. Batista y Roca, Thomas Carreras y Artau, Joaquin Carreras y Artau, and others. Their studies cover many aspects of the thought and history of Lull and his School, that is biographical, bibliographical, historical, and doctrinal investigations.[2]

The 1859 edition of some Catalan writings of Lull was not the first collection of Lull's writings undertaken in Mallorca. More than a century earlier, perhaps at the suggestions of Pascual, and

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1. Carreras y Artau, ibid., pp. 383, 394-397, 404, 409.
2. Ibid., pp. 422-423.

in order to emulate the efforts of the Mainz group, three volumes of a projected series of five containing some Opera Parva Latina had been published during the years 1744-1746. But the new edition by Rosello, Obras Rimadas, included only Catalan compositions written in verse form. Gradually was revived the idea of larger and more complete editions of the known authentic works of Lull. In 1901 and 1903 Rosello himself edited a new three volume edition, Obras de Ramon Lull, which again consisted only of Catalan texts.[1] The greatest fruit of this was the plan to publish a more extensive critical edition which would have all the known Catalan writings. The first two volumes appeared in 1906 and the twenty-first and last volume in 1950. The editors of this tremendous undertaking were Mateo Obrador y Bennassar (Vols. 1-3); Miguel Ferra (Vol. 4); Salvador Galmes (Vols. 5-20); Tous Goya and Ginard Bauca (Vol. 21). There can be no doubt that up to the present day this edition of the Obres Authentiques de Ramon Lull constitutes the greatest living monument to the memory and genius of Lull. New horizons have been opened for the investigation of Lullian philosophy, whose character may sometimes appear more clearly in the Catalan writings than in some of the Latin versions.[2]

Great and monumental as the Catalan edition of the works of Lull is it does not mark the end of the Lullian renascence in the twentieth century. Under the direction of Dr. Friedrich Stegmuller of the Lullistiche Institut at the University of Freiburg i Bresgau, the Schola Lullistica Maioricensis in Palma, Mallorca, has begun the publication of the Latin writings in another gigantic enterprise. After many years of laborious preparation during which an extensive amount of material and data on manuscripts and printed editions known to be still in existence has been collected, carefully evaluated and collated, the first volumes of a new Latin edition have already appeared. The volumes of this new edition will number thirty. Of these the first five volumes were published in 1959, 1960, 1961, 1963 and 1964. Very significant of this new Latin undertaking is the fact that it will be the collective result of Lullian students from many nations. Dr. Stegmuller is German, as is Johannes Stohr, the editor of the first two volumes. Fr. Abraham Soria Flores, editor of volumes three, four and five is a Central American priest from Guatemala. The remaining volumes continue to be prepared under the direction of Friedrich Stegmuller by students from Brazil, Japan, Spain, Germany and the United States.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 360-361, 397, 399.
[2] Ibid., pp. 399-400.

With all of these signs today of a renewed Lullian movement studies and publications about the person, teaching and followers of Lull cannot but be numerous. Among the major works these can be listed: Ephrem Longpre, "Raymond Lulle," Dictionaire de Theologie Catholique, Vol. IX, pp. 1072-1141, Paris, 1926; Elies Rogent and Estanislau Duran, Bibliografia de los Impressions Lul-lianes, Barcelona, 1927; Edgar Allison Peers, Ramon Lull, a Biography, London, 1929; Thomas y Joaquin Carreras y Artau, Historia de la

Filosofia Espanola, Filosofia Cristiana de los Siglos XIII al XV, Vols. 1 & 2, Madrid, 1939-1943; Armand Llinares, Raymond Lulle, Philosophe de l'Action, Grenoble, 1964; Erhard Wolfram Platzeck, Raimund Lull, 2 Vols., Dusseldorf, 1964.

Large also is the number of periodicals in which appear the scholarly articles and monographs by the contemporary students of the writings and ideas of Lull and his School. Among the periodicals let us mention: Estudios Franciscanos, Verdad y Vida, Criterion, Analecta Sacra Tarraconensia, Revista de Filosofia, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, Revista Luliana (1901-1905), and in a very particular manner Estudios Lulianos which was begun at Mallorca in 1957. In addition to the scholars already mentioned in other connections the following are some of the principal learned contributors: Miguel Batllori, Raphael Bausa, F. da Gama Caeiro, Eusebio Colomer, Jocelyn Hillgarth, Eugene Kamar, Antonio Oliver, Carmelo Ottaviano, S. Garcias Palau, Lorenzo Martinez Perez, Robert D. F. Pring-Mill, Jean Henry Probst, Antonio Reyes, Paolo Rossi, Mario Ruffini, Francisco Sureda Blanes, Gabriel Segui Vidal, F. Van Steenberghen, and Frances A. Yates. The list is more than sufficient to show that there is indeed a renascence of Lullism and that the ideals and doctrinal messages of Lull have not passed into oblivion but are of interest and significance in the modern world.

CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS OF THE *ARS BREVIS*

"Thy grace, wisdom and love, o God, aid me to begin the *Ars Brevis*, an authentic replica of the *Great Art* as it appears in the book entitled the *Ars Ultima*." A long established Christian tradition, that goes back to writers of patristic and medieval times, was continued by Lull in his numerous writings: most of his works, literary, mystical, philosophical, or those bearing on the *Great Art*, begin with a short address to the Creator.[1] In this practice are revealed the spirit and purpose of his numerous books, indeed of long years of life, after a sudden, dramatic and complete conversion to the interests of God. To arouse a greater love for God through a greater diffusion of Truth was the overriding purpose of his changed existence. In a somewhat technical vocabulary he would say that knowledge and love of God constitute the "first intention" to which all of reality must be directed if it is to fulfill the reason for which it was brought forth into existence. For beings endowed with intelligence this entails an advancement in the art of love aided tremendously by progress in knowledge. *Scientia* should be a helpful companion for

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[1] Deus, cum tua gratia, sapientia, et amore, incipit *Ars Brevis*, quae est imago *Artis Generalis*, quae sic intitulatur. (Lull, Ramon, *Ars Brevis* (Palma ed.), p. 1). See Saint Augustine, "The Confessions," *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine* (ed. by W. J. Oates), Vol. 1, p. 3. Also Saint Bonaventure, "Breviloquium," in *Opera Omnia Sancti Bonaventurae*, prol. (Quaracchi ed.), Vol. 5, p. 201.

Amantia, a term he coined to indicate the habit of love; just as the word scientia signifies a virtue perfective of the intellect.[1]

The title of the book is Ars Brevis, as it is clear in the introductory prayer quoted above. It is not only difficult but well-nigh impossible to suggest an adequate English version of the title because of the similarity of title of some other expositions of the Art written by Ramon Lull himself. This more than suffices to recommend that the Latin title be retained.

In content the Ars Brevis was not entirely new with its author. It was meant as a concise but authoritative introduction to Lull's Great Art, particularly as explained in the Ars Generalis Ultima. Both, the longer and the shorter books, were completed at Pisa, Italy, in 1308, although the Ars Generalis Ultima had been begun three years earlier in the French city of Lyons. Both expositions of the Art were written to give a final and definitive exposition or form of the Great Art. Several versions or revisions had been made of the method and ideas proposed first in the Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi Veritatem written nearly thirty years earlier.[2] The new and compact Ars Brevis contains all the important elements of the longer version, the Ars Generalis Ultima, leaving out details and examples which tend sometimes to make for obscurity rather than to enlighten a person beginning his study of the Art.[3] Its value as

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1. Lull, Ramon, "Ars Amativa Boni," prol. Opera, (Mainz), Vol. 6, opus A, p. 1.
2. Lull, Ramon, "Ars Generalis Ultima," proemium, in Raymundi Lulli Opera ea quae ad Adinventam ab Ipso Artem Universalem (Strasbourg, 1609), p. 218; Ars Brevis, prol. p. 1a.
3. Carreras y Artau, Thomas and Joaquin, Historia de la Filosofia Espanola. Filosofia Cristiana de los Siglos XIII al XV, Vol. 1, p. 428.

an introduction to the Art is insisted on by Lull. He speaks of it as a faithful image or a genuine likeness, a restatement of the Ars Generalis Ultima. In the prologue, which delineates the nature and division of the Ars Brevis, it is explicitly asserted that the purpose of the book is to facilitate and to assure the understanding of the Great Art.[1] Once initiated in the use of its methods and of its principles the Art student can then acquire with almost no difficulty all the other arts and sciences which lead to the possession of more specialized and limited skills or areas of knowledge. The subject matter of the Art, or its object as Lull writes, is succintly described as to enable the Art student to discover for himself appropriate answers to questions on matters of all types, on the condition that the meaning of the terms occuring in the problem be well understood in advance.[2] An extraordinary, and as it stands an exaggerated, claim, its true meaning can be appreciated better if we bear in mind some of the other writings on the Art. From them it can be gathered that some of the solutions and the knowledge to which it is intended to lead refer to the contingent and singular events, not as such, but only in so far as there is in them a note of necessity and universality. Lull proposed the Art as a method to discover correct answers only where certainty can be obtained, i.e., in truly scientific matters. And the term science was understood by Lull as the Greeks had used it: an explanatory knowledge in terms of what is universal and

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1. Lull, Ars Brevis, prol., p. 1a.
2. Ibid., p. 1b.

necessary.[1]

Although it is necessary to be acquainted with the various methods and principles of the Art to understand its nature clearly it is not without value to give at the beginning a conception of the Great Art as expressed by Lull himself. From at least one of his writings on the Art it can be seen that he was familiar with the commonly accepted Platonic-Aristotelian distinction between science and art.[2] The latter relates to the operable, and therefore implies an intrinsic or essential reference to operations which it is ordered to guide and to determine. Science, on the other hand, even when it is of or about a work, considers its object in a theoretically detached manner, in a purely speculative pursuit of the truth about things for its own sake.[3] With this distinction between science and art Lull goes on to consider the necessity and possibility, the value and utility of the Great Art. From all of this it can be gathered that the Great Art transcends the distinction previously made: it both precedes and embraces science and art in a greater universality which extends to the principles of both. The necessity and possibility of the Art stand revealed when we compare the Great Art with the other universal sciences, logic and metaphysics. In a certain sense all

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1. Lull, Ramon, Compendium seu Commentum Artis Demonstrativae, prol. (Mainz), Vol. 3, opus E, p. 1. See Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics," bk. 6, ch. 6, The Basic Works of Aristotle (ed. by R. McKeon), p. 1027.
2. Lull, Ramon, Introductoria Artis Demonstrativae, ch. 1 (Mainz), Vol. 3, opus A, p. 2. See Aristotle, op. cit., pp. 1024-1026, Plato, "The Statesman," The Collected Dialogues of Plato (ed. by E. Hamilton and H. Cairns), p. 1021.
3. Lull, Introductoria, ch. 1, Vol. 3, opus A, p. 2.

three may be said to have the same object; for all three aim at the knowledge of everything. It is their mode of considering the object, as well as their principles, that distinguishes them. Metaphysics extends to all things under the aspect of extramental existence. Logic deals with that which exists only within the soul for it is agreed that its subject matter is the intentional being, the being of reason, which accompanies our understanding of the real, e.g., genus and species. Indifferent to either type of existence the Great Art considers all conceivable objects, and it transcends, as it were, the later distinction between intentional and real, extramental or intramental. It is on this account that in the order of cognition the Art necessitates that its priority be acknowledged and accepted.[1] These universal disciplines differ also in their principles. In metaphysics principles are discovered and laid down in order to demonstrate the properties and passiones of real subjects. Logic institutes principles and rules for the construction of syllogistic, and other types of, arguments. But it cannot be said that the Art posits its principles in either of these ways. For it teaches rather how we may discover the principles common to the more particular sciences, on condition that we understand well the meaning of the basic terms of these sciences.[2]

Some sciences study substances and accidents because these agree in being real. At least one science, logic, considers that

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1. Loc. cit.
2. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

which has existence within the intellect. If all of these sciences are to be unified (in order to reduce their plurality to unity) we must allow for a new type of knowledge which takes in things both within and without the soul, because it sees them only under their most common and universal aspect of being. This is another way in which Lull attempted to show that the Great Art comes first. Reference was made before to the difference between science and art. Now there must be a certain order between the sciences and the arts. For an indication as to which is first all that is required is to recall that we do not arrive at science immediately or intuitively, but through a painstaking discourse of reason. In order to proceed well in our reasoning, as we ought to, it is needed that we master the correct procedures of thought. It is on this account that it is argued legitimately that logic, the science and art which determines the mode of reasoning through syllogisms, belongs at the beginning in the pedagogic order. Now logic is both a science and an art, and it seems that we have not yet established whether science or art comes first. This may be resolved if we note something that needs to be attended to in all discourse, its principles. The understanding of them comes easily to some, while to others in a difficult way. The task of finding and considering principles and their relevance to given problems is therefore different in individuals. There is need to render this task easier and more effective through the determinations of an art, for it is proper to both science and art to facilitate the exercise of the powers they perfect. The Art may, therefore, be said to come as a gift of nature to those who possess good intellects and are not slothful. But others may with some effort develop it as an acquired habit.[1]

The value and utility of the Art may be grasped if we grasp its finality or purposes. Among others these are the main goals: to enable those desiring scientific knowledge to acquire it more firmly and easily while still remaining strong in their knowledge and love of God; to strengthen faith and remove doubt through demonstrations by necessary reasons in certain matters held by Faith; to perfect the Art of disputation with appropriate rules, methods and questions; to discover and understand the particular and contingent through its universal and necessary characteristics, given that scientific knowledge can be had of the latter; to remove error, particularly in matters of religion, etc.[2]

The nature of the Art may be classified further by looking at it from the standpoint of its causes. The principal efficient cause is God, from whom is all grandeur. It was Lull's conviction that he had received the Art through some inspiration from heaven. As to the human author, his contribution was insignificant in his own mind. The final cause or the expected result is the discovery of necessary truths in the sciences. The matter or material cause is provided in the words and the various figures used in the Art. As to the form this consists mainly in the descent from universal to particular principles and truths through intermediate ones, as

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1. Ibid., p. 2.
2. Lull, Ramon, Lectura super Artem Inventivam et Tabulam Generalem, prol. (Mainz), Vol. 5, opus E, p. 2; Tabula Generalis ad Omnes Scientias Applicabilis, prol. (Mainz), Vol. 5, opus B, p. 2.

determined by the triangles of the figure T or of significations.[1]

From what has been said it appears that the accepted distinction between science and art does not extend to the Great Art. This Art is conceived as a method, or set of methods, general in their application to the whole of knowledge and of life. It is an Art of truth and of life. Lull can speak of it as a General Science or a General Art, for he sees it both as a scientific discipline or ordered knowledge and as a systematic body of logical procedures to establish true and infallibly certain conclusions.[2] It is on this account that modern scholars see the Art as a type of logic, though not a formal one; but rather as a material, natural and instrumental logic. The categories of thought are dealt with not for their own intrinsic importance but as instrumental in furthering our knowledge of the real. Its principles and rules are of an ontological order and are of value to the extent that they lead to the scientific knowledge of reality or to norms whereby we may order our lives.[3]

The prologue of the Ars Brevis concludes with an outline of the various sections of the book. These constitute thirteen chapters, in the same order and dealing with the same topics found in the Ars Generalis Ultima. 1) The alphabet, 2) The figures, 3) Definitions, 4) Rules, 5) The Table, 6) Unfolding (=evacuatio) of the third figure, 7) Multiplication of the fourth figure, 8) Mingling of principles and rules, 9) The nine Subjects, 10) Application (of the *Art*), 11) Questions, 12) On learning and mastering (=habituatio) the *Art*, 13) Manner of instructing on the *Art*.[1]

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[1] Lull, Ramon, Lectura super Figuras Artis Demonstrativae, prol. (Mainz), Vol. 3, opus c, pp. 1-2.

[2] Lull, Ars Generalis, proemium and part 1, pp. 218-219. See Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 402.

[3] Yates, Frances A., "Ramon Lull and Scotus Erigena," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, Vol. 23 (1960), p. 2. Platzeck, Erhard Wolfram, "La Combinatoria Luliana," Revista de Filosofia, Vol. 12 (1953), p. 579. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 465.

It need not come as a surprise that not **all thirteen** chapters are of equal length or value for the *Art*. The last three, or even four, add well-nigh nothing to understanding the operations of the *Art*.[2] In order to give as faithful an interpretation of the *Art*, as it is outlined in the *Ars Brevis*, we shall first follow it, very closely, with whatever explanations are in order drawn only from other versions bearing directly on the *Art*. Afterwards a review of the main elements of the *Art*, more in detail, will add to our understanding of the nature of the *Art* as understood by Lullian scholars. In doing this we shall bring together elements which for pedagogic reasons are dealt with as distinct chapters in the *Ars Brevis*.

I - The Alphabet: Part One of the Ars Brevis

The art of grammar yields a certain number of letters wherewith syllables, words, sentences, paragraphs, etc. are composed. In a like manner the *Great Art* begins with certain general notions and terms. The mingling of these notions and terms is intended to result in constructions which will be the particular and universal truths constituting scientific knowledge. This collection, representing the most general intelligible objects and the principles through which they are known, is designated as the alphabet which is given at the beginning of the Ars Brevis.[1] The name is appropriately chosen because the group of objects and principles is introduced in the form of nine letters, each one standing for or signifying six different conceptions. In the order in which they appear these conceptions are two principles, one rule or question, one subject, and two ethical terms. The nine letters used as the alphabet are B through K. The very early writings on the Art had utilized sixteen basic letters with more than one meaning for each letter, in addition to seven other distinct letters which were meant to represent the figures wherein the first letters were placed for the purpose of being combined. In the Ars Brevis, as in other late forms, only two other letters are used to designate two distinct figures, or the relations to these figures. The nine letters of the basic alphabet were chosen to facilitate the use of the fundamental notions within the figures, and the mingling of the principles and rules of the Art, for the avowed purpose of searching for truth. Through these procedures our intellect is well equipped to receive scientific knowledge particularly as the understanding becomes less rigid and limited on account of the rich and manifold meaning of a single letter. A greater flexibility is an indication of universality, a condition of scientific knowledge, possible only through an equally all-embracing intellect. When the understanding is not limited to the details of the individual and singular object it can gaze as far as the horizons of science will permit.[1] As it can be surmised, Lull's idea of science had been received through association with traditions that go back to the giants of Greek philosophy. Although his education was undertaken far from Oxford, Paris, and Cologne, we have only to recall that it was in his native Spain, still partially occupied by the Moors, that Averroes, the Commentator, and M. Maimonides had lived. The thought of Greece had come to Spain, at least in some degree, with the learned Moors and Jews.[2] That Lull was more than just aware of Averroes' thought cannot be doubted and is beyond question. Many of his writings, indeed a whole series of his late works were directed against the revived teachings of Averroes at Paris. From the University of Paris, from the French king, and from the pope he requested open war against the errors of Averroes.[3]

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[1] Lull, *Ars Brevis,* prol., pp. 1b-2a.

[2] Carreras y Artau, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 451. Avinyo, Joan, *Beat Ramon Llull - Art Breu*, p. 18.

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[1] Lull, Tabula Generalis, prol., Vol. 5, opus B, pp. 1-2; Ars Inventiva, prol., Vol. 5, opus A, p. 1. See also Sanchez de Lizarazu, Pedro Hieronimo, Generalis et Admirabilis Methodus ad Omnes Scientias facilius et Citius Addiscendas, in quo explicatur Ars Brevis Raymundi Lulli, p. 13.

As the value and role of each of the notions contained in

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1. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 1, ch. 1, p. 2a; Ars Generalis, part 1, p. 219; Introductoria, ch. 1, Vol. 3, opus A, pp. 2-3.
2. Gilson, Etienne, History of Christian Philosophy, pp. 226-240. Also Copleston, Frederick, History of Philosophy (Rev. Edition), Vol. 1, pp. 186-211.
3. Peers, Edgar Allison, Ramon Lull-A Biography, pp. 345-352. For a complete list and titles of, and additional data on the anti-Averroistic writings see Carreras y Artau, op. cit., pp. 317-320.

the Art are developed throughout it, only their listing is given at the beginning as follows:

B stands for goodness; difference; whether?; God; justice; and avarice.

C stands for grandeur; concordance; what?; angel; prudence; and gluttony.

D stands for duration; opposition; whereof?; heaven; fortitude; and lust.

E stands for power; source (beginning); why?; man; temperance; and pride.

F stands for wisdom; middle; how much or large?; imaginary being; Faith; and sloth.

G stands for will; end; of what kind or quality?; sense nature; hope; and envy.

H stands for virtue; superiority; when?; elemental nature; patience; and false-speaking.

K stands for glory; minority; how? and wherewith?; instruments; piety; and inconstancy.

There is an order to, and there are reasons for, the choice of meanings. The first concept signified by each letter suggests a principle, called absolute, because it is at the heart of all reality. As a principle it is a source and basis of what is real in any way. As absolute it refers only to itself without any explicit and necessary involvement of other principles. In the second meaning of each letter we uncover a principle which implies a reference of one to other (or more) realities. Accordingly all of the nine meanings listed as the second meanings are designated as relative principles. A series of ten questions makes up the third meaning of each letter in the alphabet. These questions are also known as rules because they are suggestive of procedures which are useful and perhaps necessary in the resolution of problems. In a fourth series of nine concepts, the Ars Brevis proposes an orderly arrangement of reality, with a hierarchy that descends from God, Supreme Perfection, through the less perfect orders of being down to the elemental natures which seem merely to exist. The ninth order consists of instrumental beings, that is, all those things which are deemed means to an end or to perfection rather than substantial and accidental realities considered in themselves for what they are. The fifth and sixth meaning assigned to the basic nine letters designate a virtue and a vice. These two series of meanings are a reminder that the Great Art is meant to be of use for, and application to, not only questions and problems of a purely speculative character, but also in a very definite way matters that will provide a basis on which men may establish a sound pattern on which to model their lives. The Art as originally conceived is an Art for finding truth and also for regulating life according to ethical standards which will bring man to his final purpose, the 'prima intentio' of his existence.[1] As indicated before there is a close link between knowledge and love, scientia et amantia; true understanding can and ought to lead man to virtue and to exclude evil and vice from his life. Lull does not identify knowledge and virtue as Socrates and Plato may have done, but he is very conscious of the unity of man's life wherein speculation and life are very intimately intertwined.

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[1] Lull, Ramon, Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi Veritatem seu Ars Magna et Maior, d. 2, part 1 (Mainz), Vol. 1, opus A, p. 11. In order not to mistake this writing with another book by Lull with the title Ars Compendiosa the present book will be referred to hereafter as Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi. See Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 369.

The alphabet is graphically presented by way of a six columns table preceded by the nine letters B through K at the left of the first column and on nine different lines. At the head of each column is indicated the name of the series of basic conceptions that constitute each column. Each column has nine members or basic conceptions, with the exception of that of the rules. As indicated before, the tenth rule is made up of two related questions.

THE ALPHABET

	Absolute Principles	Relative Principles	Rules	Subjects	Virtues	Vices
B	Goodness	Difference	Whether	God	Justice	Avarice
C	Grandeur	Concordance	What	Angel	Prudence	Gluttony
D	Duration	Opposition	Whereof	Heaven	Fortitude	Lust
E	Power	Source (beginning)	Why	Man	Temperance	Pride
F	Wisdom	Middle	How much How large	Imaginary Being	Faith	Sloth
G	Will	End	Of what kind Of what quality	Sense Nature	Hope	Envy
H	Virtue	Superiority	When	Vegetable-life	Charity	Anger
I	Truth	Equality	Where	Elemental Nature	Patience	False-Speaking
K	Glory	Minority	How Wherewith	Instruments	Piety	Inconstancy

FIGURE A


I
VERITAS
VERUS
K
GLORIA
GLORIOSUM
B
BONITAS
BONUM
C
MAGNITUDO
MAGNUM
D
DURATIO
DURANS
E
POTESTAS
POTENS
F
SAPIENTIA
SAPIENS
G
VOLUNTAS
VOLENS
H
VIRTUS
VIRTUOSUS
A

II - The Figures: Part Two of the Ars Brevis

A - Figure A: The Absolute Principles

1) Figure A Itself

Circular in design the first figure is designated as A. The area on the circumference is divided into nine equal sections, referred to as chambers.[1] Within these chambers there are placed, as elements constituting figure A, the nine absolute principles, goodness, grandeur, etc. The symbols B through K are also contained within the chambers on the circumference of the first figure. The circular pattern is used to indicate that the absolute principles may be reciprocally interchanged as subjects and predicates within a proposition. This is also suggested by lines which link each chamber with all others. In the language of logic these principles when placed within a proposition allow for their simple conversion: e.g., goodness is great, grandeur is good. Each principle is somehow mirrored by the others in such a fashion that we can speak of an interpenetration and solidarity among the absolute principles.[2] Thus goodness is present not only within itself but its reflection and influence penetrate the other principles and as a result one can say that grandeur, duration, etc., are good and lovable. It is through this intermingling and mutual **presence** that substances arise or are formed. Substances are therefore in some way composite[1] unless through an absolute simplicity, as in God, it can be said that the principles are one and identical with the essence, and consequently do not introduce any real diversity among the principles.[2] As divine attributes the principles are very often designated as dignitates.[3]

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[1] Lull, Lectura super Artem, d. 2, fig. 1, part 1, Vol. 5, opus E, p. 12.

[2] Lull, Ramon, Lectura Artis quae Brevis Practica Tabulae Generalis intitulata est, d. 2, ch. 1 (Mainz), Vol. 5, opus C, p. 1. In the Mainz edition the title is given incorrectly as Brevis Practica Tabulae Generalis.

By means of the first figure, the artista seeks to discover the natural link between a subject and its predicates, the reciprocal proportion and disposition between them, in order to establish as a conclusion a given proposition, by finding the appropriate middle term. This will be understood if we bear in mind that each principle considered by itself is completely general or universal, as when we consider goodness or grandeur separately. If a principle is linked with one of the others, for example if we consider goodness in greatness or immense goodness, then it is no longer completely general but rather a subalternate principle. Finally if we think of the goodness of Peter, the principle is now a very special one because it has been contracted to a singular substance. Accordingly there is given an ascending and descending ladder. It allows for a descent from a most general principle to one not entirely universal or singular, and to a most specific one. A corresponding ascent is likewise possible.

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[1] Lull, Tabula Generalis, d. 1, fig. 1, Vol. 5, opus B, p. 2.
[2] Lull, Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi, d. 3, fig. T, Vol. 1, opus A, p. 45.
[3] Pring-Mill, Robert D. F., "El Número Primitivo de las Dignidades," Estudios Lulianos, Vol. 1 (1957), p. 309. See Carreras y Artau, opus, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 309, 496; and Yates, op. cit., p. 18.

Because of the general or universal nature of the absolute principles, whatever is in existence is in some way contained in them. It can also be reduced to them, as its ultimate constituent principles. We can thus state that God is good, the angels are good and great, etc.[1] This does not introduce composition in the Divine Being because God's _dignitates_ are identical.

Although the importance of figure A may be indicated by the fact that it is considered first in every major version of the _Art_, we can be more certain and convinced that it is the principal figure[2] after we have studied its manifold significance. Figure A was originally conceived as a theological instrument in order to enkindle the flames of love for God by increasing and deepening man's knowledge of divine truth.[3] With the reduction of the number of figures to four beginning with the _Ars Inventiva Veritatis_ and retained through all the later forms of the _Art_, this first figure was extended and became a kind of transcendental figure, or better, a logico-metaphysical instrument. Through its logical procedures we may penetrate and seek out the secrets of all reality, including the Cause of all existence.[4] It is well to pause and to consider in detail the salient features of the first figure.

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1. Lull, _Ars Brevis_, part 2, ch. 2, fig. 1, p. 4a.
2. Platzeck, Erhard-Wolfram, "La Figura 'A' del Arte Luliano y la Espera Inteligible de Plotino," _Miscellanea Lulliana_, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 57.
3. Lull, _Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi_ d. 1, part 1, fig. A, Vol. 1, _opus_ A, p. 2. See Carreras y Artau, _op. cit._, Vol. 1, p. 371; Yates, _op. cit._, p. 27.
4. Lull, Ramon, "Ars Infusa," _Miscellanea Lulliana_, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 46.

If we look at the circular diagram, as it appears in most printed editions of the Ars Brevis, the letter A designating the first figure, is in the center of the circle. It is not without significance that it is the first letter of the word Absolute. We have seen that this figure is a universal one made up of the absolute principles. God is often-times referred to as the Absolute. Again A may stand for Anarchos, the Nameless One, the Formless One of negative theology.[1] It is on this account that it has been argued that the historical antecedents of the Lullian circle in the A figure are not to be found either in Jewish or in Arabian literature. Neither the Arabians nor the Jews ever attributed to God the symbolic figure of the circle or of the sphere.[2] Within Christian thought the comparison was not unknown. In the anonymous book Liber XXIV Philosophorum we read: "God is an infinite sphere, whose center is everywhere, and whose circumference is in no place."[3] This proposition is usually interpreted as an element of a symbolic theology which brings together into a synthesis the truths of both a positive and a negative theology.[4] The spiritual founder of this threefold theology is Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagite. Though we do not find the quoted proposition in his writings all its elements are found in them, and were undoubtedly drawn from Plotinus by way of Proclus.[5] To the Christian Neo-Platonic tradition which goes back to Pseudo-Dionysius belongs Scotus Erigena. In the latter's De Divisione Naturae the Master advises one of his disciples to imagine and think of a circle when he desires to meditate with profit on the Primordial Causes which are identified with the Logos or Verbum Dei.[1]

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[1] Yates, op. cit., p. 28.
[2] Platzeck, La Figura A, Vol. 1 (1955), pp. 64-67.
[3] "Deus est Sphaera infinita, cuius centrum est ubique, circumferentia nusquam," cited by Platzeck, La Figura A, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 71.
[4] Platzeck, La Figura A, p. 58.
[5] Loc. cit. See Plotinus, The Enneads, V 1, 6, 18 (tr. S. McKenna, 3rd ed.), pp. 610-611.

It is both interesting and illuminating to delve into the thought that looks at the Supremely Excellent with the help of the analogy of a sphere or of a circle. First of all we must remember that a symbol, although it is imposed on something by a free spirit or knower, is not altogether lacking in a measure of likeness to that to which it is assigned as a symbol. Mingled with a certain amount of difference and diversity, the element of likeness or similitude remains the ontological basis for any predication made on its account. A predication of this type is known as one of analogy.[2] If similitude or resemblance is between God and limited real objects the analogy with them is known as one of being. In the instance under consideration there projects from God, the first analogate as it were, a likeness or species onto an apparently ideal object, the second analogate: an infinite circle or a sphere of mathematically impossible conditions. A sphere with its center everywhere and its circumference in no place is a flagrant contradiction of the mathematical definition of a sphere, whether infinitely small or extended indefinitely.[3]

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[1] Scotus Erigena, John, "Periphiseon id est De Divisione Naturae," Bk. 3, Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina (Migne), Vol. 122, cols. 624-625.

[2] Platzeck, La Figura A, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 58.

[3] Loc. cit.

The historical interpretation of the circle or of a sphere, as symbols for God, shows that it is not a question of a purely mathematical notion. By the center, the interpretation states, one is to understand the essence of an existent being; and by the circumference the limits or reaches of its influence, powers and operations.[1] With these modifications or additions both the sphere and circle have been symbolically attributed to God. Very often the sphere (and the circle *mutatis mutandis*) has been designated the most perfect figure because it displays a more perfect degree of unity and equality in all of its parts than that of all other mathematical patterns. In accordance with this conception it may be stated that God is the reality with the most perfect ontological unity. His being is so equal in its perfection throughout its infinity that an identity in the highest degree allows no distinctions or diversity which may in the least way diminish or imperil the absolute simplicity of his Essence and Being. The *Tertium comparationis* or *ratio* of the analogy permitting the comparison between God and the circle is this conception of unity and intrinsic equality or identity. These are of course taken in the most abstract sense to account for the likeness that exists in some form between a symbol and what is signified by it. The concepts of unity and equality are attributed to entirely distinct objects, indeed to different orders of objects: one ideal-mathematical, a circle; the other real and divine, God.[2]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 59.
[2] *Loc. cit.*

The analogy which speaks of God as the circle and the consequent analysis of the conditions which result from the definition of this mathematical figure allow for a knowledge of God that may be designated as an affirmative theology. But as soon as we inquire about the fundamental reason of why God exists in the most perfect degree of unity and the highest degree of equality the affirmative conception yields to, or must be transformed into, a negative theology.[1] And in reply it has to be stated that God's essence or center is omnipresent and that no boundaries can be assigned to His Omnipotent power. Moreover God's essence is one with, and the same as, his power and operation. The center is identical with the circumference, as posited in the analogy. If by the center we understand the divine Being in its omnipresence, which is signified in its entirety by whatever Name is attributed to God, and if by circumference we mean the limitless reaches of Its creative power, then the divine Being is identical with the Creative power. We cannot introduce any distinctions of substance and accidents in God's nature because there is in the divine essence the supreme degree of unity and identity. This is the Christian interpretation of the pseudo-hermetic statement which speaks of God as an infinite sphere with an omnipresent center and a circumference to be found in no single place. If mathematically impossible conditions are ascribed to the symbolic figure one is then leaving the area of mathematics. Only the notions of unity and equality are retained in order that linked with omnipotence and omnipresence they may be said of God.[1]

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[1] Loc. cit.

Within a Platonic conception the omnipresence of Absolute Goodness, or of the Supreme Idea, does not bear on the physical universe mainly. For it is first realized in the intelligible world of the Ideas. Participation does not mean principally a correspondence between physical and intelligible realities, but rather a communication amongst the Ideas, each penetrated by an all-encompassing and Supreme Idea, the Good. Nearest to this highest Idea, the source of Essence and being,[2] are the Form-Ideas of unity, being, truth or intelligibility. In the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus these still remain fundamental ideas, particularly in his vision of an Intelligible Sphere. It is important to note that these basic Ideas are Transcendental conceptions. Plato's *TO KOINON*, "the common," does not mean universal as much as transcendental. An ascent from common aspects in sense objects to the highest common or transcendental Ideas is possible because the Platonic conception introduces no distinction between common substances and accidents.[3] Beings and values of both the physico-real and the ideal orders, never clearly distinguished by Platonism, are subsumed under the transcendentals. And just as values cannot be defined according to Aristotelian proximate genera and specific differences, so also the transcendentals allow descriptive definitions only, in terms of their reciprocal relations.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 60.
[2] Plato, "The Republic," Bk. 6, *The Collected Dia Logues of Plato* (ed. by E. Hamilton and H. Cairns), pp. 744-745. See Copleston, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 163-206.
[3] Platzeck, *La Figura A*, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 60.

If we bear in mind the co-penetration and intimate link amongst the highest transcendental Ideas we can understand better Plotinus' conception of a universal Intelligible Sphere. Within Plotinus' thought or system the universe is distinguished into four segments according to the unitive virtue obtaining within each area. First and foremost is the Supreme Principle of the One which may be compared to the sun, or rather to a point without any relations to introduce distinctions. It is on this account that the One is ineffable and there are no appropriate names to designate his Uniqueness of Nature. Around the One, as an immediate emanation from It, there is given a Sphera Intelligibilis penetrated with the presence and influence of the One. This influence is so immediate and efficatious that the Transcendetal Good, Being, Truth, Unity, which comprise the sphere, are truly indistinguishable in their being. There reigns nothing but total and complete identity, and as a result it is incorrect to speak of a place, definition and term which belong only to, are limited to, the good, or to the true, etc.[1]

It must be noted that the transcendental aspects of the Intelligible Sphere are not purely logical categories. They belong in the order of the genuinely real essences understood according to a Platonic meaning. Surrounding the immutable and unmoving Intelligible Sphere is the sphere of the moving world-soul. In it one may now clearly distinguish the previously indistinct transcendental Ideas, as well as those which come after them, both logically and ontologically according to the Neo-Platonist equation of thought and reality. Within the area of the soul's sphere there is still an interpenetration or intercommunion within the Ideas. Theirs is now a still recognizable unity by virtue of the intelligible influence reaching out to the Soul-sphere from the Ineffable One. When we finally come to a fourth and less perfect sphere, that of the visible universe, separation is now greater than unity. Instead of a continuous circumference, the distinct objects are as fragments of a mirror, each reflecting rather weakly the unifying and life-giving light emanating from the One.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 61. See also Copleston, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 464-469.

It is not difficult to discover some of the principal features of the Plotiniam system, but in a Christian setting and form, in the first figure (A) of Lull's Art. Verification may be had through a comparison of the doctrine of the dignities with what in other versions of the Art Lull speaks of as "transcendent points."[2] These points are two, a superior and an inferior one, and they account for a major division of all existents into three very distinct orders or degrees: 1) visible objects, 2) rational creatures or men, 3) invisible spirits and God. It is interesting to note that the Liber de Causis has a similar conception, for it speaks of the soul gazing upwards to eternal, immutable being, while its attention is also directed downward, to the temporal world.[3] St. Bonaventure also divides reality from a

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1. Platzeck, op. cit., p. 61.
2. Lull, Ramon, Ars Inventiva Veritatis, d. 3 (Mainz), Vol. 5, opus A, p. 47. See Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 545-546.
3. Thomas Aquinas, Saint, Sancti Thomae de Aquino super Librum de Causis Expositio (ed. H. D. Saffrey), p. 10.

human standpoint when he distinguishes things below man, things within him, and things above man.[1]

Of greater value, however, is the direct comparison of figure A with the Intelligible Sphere. The dignities are not merely names or praises of God's attributes. As will be shown immediately, Lull sees them as transcendental perfections present throughout, in a manner not unlike that of the Intelligible perfections that are the basis for the Intelligible Sphere. As transcendental perfections the dignities or principles come before any Aristotelian division into substance and accidents. The non-Aristotelian definitions for the principles, given in a later section of the Ars Brevis (and of this study), do not explicitly state their transcendental univocal abstract basis which permits us to predicate them of all reality. Nevertheless it is very clear that the principles are the roots of every existent and it is through their presence within things that anything is in existence. Because of the infinitely distinct natures between God and created being the realization of the principles is only an analogous one.

In accordance with this ontological analogy the dignities or principles are present in the three distinct orders allowed by the transcendent points. God and the angels are given as the first order. It is only with the divine reality, however, that we can compare Plotinus' Intelligible Sphere. For the Lullian dignities are no other than divine attributes, excluding anything which would be accidental in nature. The divine perfections are in the order of substance, identical with each other through their infinite perfection, and one with God's Being and essence. There is, therefore, an absolute identity, for example, among goodness, grandeur, eternity and the other dignities in the uniquely simple being of God.[1]

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[1] Bonaventure, Saint, Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, ch. 1 (Quaracchi), Vol. 5, p. 297. See Gilson, op. cit., pp. 336-337.

Perhaps a more exact comparison between some of the characteristics or properties of the absolute principles which explain the symbolic circular nature of figure A and those of the Sphera Intelligibilis can be given now in summary form. Both Lull and Plotinus posit as a principle and rule the absolute ontological identity of the transcendentals in realms higher than man's. Neither thinker may have used the word "transcendental" for the perfections described, but the descriptions both of them give indicate that these perfections are found at the heart of whatever is real in any way. The substantiality of the transcendent principles is asserted of the appropriate sphere, the divine Being for Lull and the Intelligible Sphere for Plotinus. There is, however, an unambiguously clear difference between their thoughts and it cannot be ignored. Plotinus draws a dividing line which separates or distinguishes the Absolute and Nameless One from its first emanation. Lull, on the other hand, does not in the least hesitate to declare that there exists a perfect identity between the divine Being and the supreme dignities or divine attributes.[2]

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[1] Lull, Ramon, Arbor Scientiae, part 13 (Peter Posa edition), fol. 97-105; "Liber Quaestionum Thomae Attrebatensis," q. 6, Opera Parva, Vol. 5, opus D, p. 9. See also Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 496.

[2] Platzeck, La Figura A, Vol. 1 (1955), pp. 63-64.

The absolute identity of the divine perfections seems to have been one of the reasons why Scotus Erigena was led also to imagine a circle as an aid to his meditations on the Divine Names, or the Primordial Causes as he called them. Infinite in number the Primordial Causes are perfectly one in the Word that contains them, as the monas includes all numbers. No given point of the circumference may be taken as the real starting point, because of the continuity of the figure. In a like fashion no Primordial Cause can be chosen as preceding or as following others. As infinite, they are present in, and identical with, each other. Any series of them is an arbitrary arrangement chosen for the purpose of contemplation and of constructing theories based on them.[1] Scotus Erigena's thoughts on this matter are very important because his system is a Christian interpretation of Plotinian ideas received in great part through the writings of Denis the Pseudo-Areopagite.

The explanation of the geometric pattern of figure A may be concluded with a final and quick glance at the second sentence of the Liber XXIV Philosophorum. In this Neo-Platonic sentence, not found in Plotinus, it is explicitly stated that God is a sphere with a center everywhere and with a circumference in no place. Two interpretations can and have been given. One, totally spiritual, applies to the intelligible order. According to this first interpretation the most perfect and complete identity between the divine attributes and God's essence and Being is explicitly affirmed. Although the Neo-Platonic sentence is not explicitly found in Lull's writings its application to the intelligible and divine order is clear as it has been shown by the comparison with the Sphera Intelligibilis. A second interpretation, a cosmological one, is the one given by Nicholas of Cusa, who was influenced by certain Lullian conceptions and who concluded that theology is circular. According to Nicholas of Cusa's understanding of the second sentence of the Liber XXIV Philosophorum, the universe is infinite in extension since the divine creative power is not bounded by any limits. Lull did not have the slightest doubt about God's infinity of power, but he is in agreement with all the great medieval Christian thinkers who denied without qualifications that the universe is infinite. The limitation on the side of the divine free will was accepted simply as a given fact.[1] This does not mean that Figure A is not universal as a symbol of all that is real, whether of an intelligible or a physical universe. Its principles, as indicated above, are transcendental. And within the first figure are included the Supreme Cause and all Its effects, which are imitations of the divine patterns and dignities. The great likeness of Figure A to the Plotinian intelligible sphere does not remove or diminish their differences. These differences are the result of a Christian symbolism according to which the Pseudo-Dionysian circle stands for God, even though there are those who think that there is little, if any, of a negative theology in the Great Art and in the writings where the Art is explicitly dealt with by Lull.[1]

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[1] Scotus Erigena, op. cit., Vol. 122, p. 624. See Yates, op. cit., p. 26.

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[1] Lull, Ramon, Quaestiones per Artem Demonstrativam seu Inventivam Solubiles, q. 31 (Mainz), Vol. 5, opus C, pp. 53-54. See Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 504-505; Platzeck, La Figura A, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 69.

2) The Absolute Principles of Figure A - Origin of the Doctrine

Before discussing more in detail the nature of the absolute principles we may approach the question concerning the sources of Lull's thought in this area. An answer to the question may very well prove of great help in understanding the importance and meaning of the principles. Certain scholars have thought that the roots may be discovered in Arabic theology. In support of such a thesis the words of Lull in one of his writings are appealed to: "nos attribuimus Deo undecim qualitates quae sunt haec: videlicet bonitas, magnitudo, potestas . . ."[2] Without much difficulty one might be able to go back to the Koran in which some of the divine attributes are mentioned. But the most that would be shown is that Lull was not averse, indeed the very opposite, to the use of what provided some kind of common ground where non-Christians could be met in disputations on theological matters. In De Acquisitione Terrae Sanctae the impression given is that Lull considered the Arabian doctrine to be imperfectly developed. The Arabians are but scarcely aware of the immanent activity that characterizes the principles, as the divine attributes or dignitates. Particularly:

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[1] Platzeck, op. cit., p. 70-71. Cf. Yates, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

[2] Lull, Ramon, Disputatio Raymundi et Hamar Saraceni, part 1, positio (Mainz), Vol. 4, opus G, p. 2.

> Saraceni sunt aliqui in philosophia bene litterati et homines bene rationabiles, sed de essentia Dei et dignitatibus suis parum sciunt; idcirco catholicus in disputatione disponit ipsos ad intelligendum Deum et actus suarum dignitatum intrinsecos.[1]

There are stronger reasons which seem to indicate that the sources of Lull's absolute principles are Christian ones. It may be noted first that the Art was originally conceived as a method of contemplation whereby God could be reached through meditation on divine verities. It was only a short time later that because of a desire to convert the non-Christians to Catholic truth that the method was slightly transformed so that it became also a logic of conversion. For the purpose of converting the minds of men what better way than to be an expert in a propositional logic of conversion which would enable the Artista to discover real middle terms that would make possible demonstrations even in matters that were also matters of Faith?[2]

St. Augustine had written of certain divine names or attributes which are in perfect concordance. These divine names are decidedly distinct but in no way contradict the explicit assertion of

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1. Among the Saracens there are some who are very reasonable and well-instructed in philosophy. However about the essence and attributes of God they know very little. And as a result in his disputations with them the Catholic teacher is preparing them to know God through an understanding of the immanent activity proper to the attributes. (Lull, Ramon, Liber de Acquisitione Terrae Sanctae, cited by Longpre, op. cit., Vol. 9, col. 1113). Cf. Lull, Ramon "Declaratio Raymundi per Modum Dialogui Edita" (ed. by O. Keicher), Beitrage Zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Vol. 7, fasc. 4-5, p. 205.
2. Platzeck, La Combinatoria, Vol. 12 (1953), pp. 583-584. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 345.

their reciprocal identity in the Divine Being.[1] That Lull had direct access to St. Augustine's writings when he began to write can only be shown by an investigation of the bibliographic materials available in the libraries and monasteries of Mallorca in which Lull could have studied during the nearly nine years which followed his sudden and complete change of life.[2] It is not difficult to imagine that his first contact with St. Augustine's thought was through the psalters and breviaries which Lull used in his many hours of prayer and meditation.[3] It can be established also that he was acquainted with and inspired by the Augustinian tradition represented by St. Anselm and Richard of St. Victor. Indeed it may be from the Monologium that the basic conception leading to the theory of the dignities may be derived.[4] In his De Trinitate Richard of St. Victor speaks of Goodness as the first divine attribute.[5] In this there is no suggestion, however, that either St. Anselm or Richard of St. Victor had a clear conception of the perfections signified by the divine names, as also embracing all created being, and therefore as transcendental principles. A slightly different situation is encountered with John of Salisbury whose Polycraticus was written during the early part of the second half of the twelfth century. But again there is no conception of the divine names as transcendental principles, although John of Salisbury speaks of them as the supreme principles of a very definite science, theology.[1]

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[1] Augustine, Saint, "De Trinitate," bk. 6, ch. 7, Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Latina (Migne), Vol. 42, col. 929. See Platzeck, La Combinatoria, Vol. 12 (1953), p. 585; Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine, p. 217.

[2] See Hillgarth, Jocelyn N., "La Biblioteca de la Real: Fuentes Posibles de Llull," Estudios Lulianos, Vol. 7 (1963), pp. 5-17. Also Segui Vidal, Gabriel, "La Influencia Cisterciense en el Beato Ramon Llull," Estudios Lulianos, Vol. 1 (1957), pp. 351-370, Vol. 2 (1958), pp. 245-272.

[3] Platzeck, La Combinatoria, Vol. 12 (1953), p. 583.

[4] Longpre, Ephrem "Raymond Lulle," Dictionaire de Theologie Catholique, Vol. 9, cols. 1113-1114. See St. Anselm, "Monologium," ch. 15, Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Latina (Migne), Vol. 158, col. 165.

[5] Richard of Saint Victor, "De Trinitate,' bk. 2, ch. 16-19, Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina (Migne), Vol. 196, Cols. 910-912.

The passage on this reveals a certain medieval tendency of thought which goes back to Boethius. It concerns the problem of establishing a solid basis for science using axiomatic mathematics as a model. Philosophy should be developed along similar lines and with an almost identical method. Even the science of God, or theology, calls for solidly founded principles if we are to consider it a science deserving of the name.[2] Analyses of some of the medieval Theoremata show how they begin with supposedly self-evident principles from which all the other propositions are deduced as in mathematics. Euclid had spoken of his initial axioms as KOINAI ENNOIAI. Boethius translated the phrase as communes animi conceptus or conceptiones. Commenting on Euclid Proclus speaks of axiomas. Certain twelfth century authors who used Boethian terms sometimes speak of common notions, as well as of principles.[1]

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[1] John of Salisbury, "Polycraticus," bk. 7, ch. 7, Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina (Migne), Vol. 199, col. 650. See Platzeck, La Combinatoria, Vol. 12 (1953), p. 587.

[2] See Boethius, "Quomodo, Substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint" (De Hebdomadibus), Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina (Migne), Vol. 64, cols. 1311-1314. Cf. Alan de Lille, "Regulae de Sacra Theologia," Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina (Migne), Vol. 210, cols. 621-623. See Gilson, op. cit., pp.173, 176, 177.

We know that Lull spoke of the fundamental concepts of the Art as principles. He also used the term dignitas, a term related in meaning to the Greek axioma. It is known, however, that up to the beginning of the thirteenth century other Latin writers were not familiar with the term dignitas. Since Lull had no knowledge of Greek, or access to Greek sources it is interesting to speculate whether he received the term through his use of Arabic writings. From his life as told by the Contemporary Biography it is certain that he studied Arabic for years immediately after his conversion. For this purpose he made use of the learning of a Moorish slave.[2] This leads to the probable conclusion that he became acquainted with a great deal of Arabian thought at the same time. Indeed it would appear almost impossible that Lull's thought should have remained uninfluenced by Arabian ideas. Until very recently before the time of his birth Mallorca had been occupied by the Moors, many of whom continued to inhabit parts of the island after the victory of the Christians. Perhaps the best indication of the early Arabian influences on Lull's philosophical thought, particularly logic, may be obtained by glancing quickly at what may be called the prehistory of the Art, the period of Lull's life which preceded the composition of the first version of the Art, the Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi Veritatem. This can be accomplished by considering the Compendium Logicae Algazelis. With the exception of Probst, Lullian scholars agree about the authenticity of this work and place its composition by Lull before 1290. This is the year when Lull initiated his practice of noting down the date and place of the writing of his books. Many outstanding Lullian scholars hold that the Compendium of Logic was written in all probability in 1276 and that it was one of the earliest books written by Lull. Originally composed in Arabian, it was subsequently translated into Latin, and from the Latin version Lull finally prepared a Catalan version in verse form. Of these three versions by Lull both the Latin and Catalan versions are still in existence. The original Arabian composition appears to have been lost.

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[1] Platzeck, La Combinatoria, Vol. 12 (1953), p. 588.
[2] Vita Coetanea, ch. 1, n. 7, p. 30.

A comparison of the Latin and Catalan versions with the section on logic contained in Gundissalvinus' translation of the Logica et Philosophia Algazelis Arabis leads to at least these conclusions:

i) Lull had not merely translated, or extracted parts from, the original writing by Algazel. A rather original summary, the Compendium shows a very distinct ordering of its materials.

ii) The rhymed Catalan version is to some extent an abbreviation of the Latin version but orders its material in the same sequence with the exception of certain metaphysical and theological questions. The new style and language did not prove a major obstacle to Lull who succeeded very well in expressing abstract scientific demonstrations in a compact form and replaced Latin names with more familiar Catalan names in the examples used. In view of these factors it may be presumed that the initial Arabian version was longer and probably quite close to the original writing of Algazel.

iii) Some of the metaphysical and theological questions which appear in the two extant versions do not do so in the section on logic by Algazel, but rather in the philosophia part. Some new questions are also treated, for example the relation of faith and reason, creation ex nihilo, the demonstrability of Christian dogmas, three types of proof which remind the reader of the three kinds of knowledge distinguished by Saint Bonaventure, and the doctrine of two intentions. Lull sought a logic of first intentions rather than a purely formal logic with no direct reference to a salvific truth.

iv) An important point is that it is correct to assert that Lull's logic was originally, at least partially, inspired by that of Aristotle, as known and interpreted by thinkers of the Arabian and Oriental world, particularly Algazel. This initial inspiration remained only partial because it was not long before Lull came across the dialectical thinking of the West, at places such as Montpellier, Paris, etc. If he wished to be understood he had to adopt the Latin logical vocabulary. As a result Latin expressions, such as genus, utrum, etc. appear in both extant versions.

v) Despite many similarites Lullian logic differs considerably from that of other Western thinkers, such as the logic expressed in the Summulae Logicalae of Peter of Spain. In the Latin West, logic, one of the liberal arts, seems to have acquired the status of an autonomous discipline. The understanding of logic by Lull was opposed to a dialectic directed exclusively to disputation and argument. To him this would yield a logic of second intentions, one whose movement leads away from subordination to theology. Lull envisioned logic as totally instrumental: its principal function was to be of service in the acquisition of truth, particularly theological truth.

vi) Unsatisfied with the complex and specialized character of a logic perhaps too academic, Lull wished to develop an instrument which could be used by all, even a layman not acquainted with Latin, Arabian, or other foreign tongues. This explains his use of verse form to facilitate the learning and retention of logical rules. It also explains his repeated efforts to render the Art less complex and the almost continuous efforts at revising it.

vii) The Compendium shows Lull making early use of symbolic figures to aid in the understanding and expression of abstract and difficult concepts. Some of these figures are triangles, circles, and squares which continue to appear later in the Ars Brevis.

viii) Of particular interest for the history of logic, especially in view of Lull's later efforts, is an apparent intent to construct an algebraic logic. Lull did not hesitate to use letters frequently, instead of terms and expressions. By means of the letter symbols propositions could take an abbreviated form. The Art of converting propositions would then consist in establishing the possible logical equivalences between letters in groups which stood for entire propositions.[1]

From these and other facts it can be concluded that it is unlikely that Lull was completely unacquainted with the metaphysics of Algazel. In it many of the divine attributes are considered with a great deal of depth. Among others we find a mention of these: unity, life, knowledge, will, power, wisdom, generosity and divine bliss. They are not referred to as principles, but are understood clearly as divine perfections. Important in connection with Lull's Art is the recommendation of Algazel to philosophers that they ought to begin their speculations with the science about God, as the most necessary and fruitful one and because it is the end to which are to be directed all the other particular sciences and philosophic considerations. This, it is recognized, would differentiate the philosophers of the new age from the ancient Greeks who started with the science of the visible or physics.[1] The manner of proceeding in all science ought to be like that of geometry if we are to respect the requirements of scientific knowledge. Somehow we are back with the possible Arabian influences and in this case a mathematical attitude. Though the words "axiom" and "dignities" do not appear in the Arabian writings[2] clearly known to Lull, it cannot be denied that the universe of thought in which Algazel moved is not alien to that of Lull's. It must be admitted, it seems, that Lull was acquainted with the thought of St. Augustine and some of the doctrines of John of Salisbury, which had been diffused throughout the Christian West. The apparent kinship of some Arabian doctrines with those of more Christian sources was more than sufficient for him in his newly conceived plan to convert Moors to Catholic truth and dogma by means of a sound logic and argumentation made possible through the inspired Great Art.

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[1] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 348-356.

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[1] Algazel, Algazel's Metaphysics, A Medieval Translation (ed. by J. T. Muckle), pp. 1, 73.

[2] Platzeck, La Combinatoria, Vol.12, (1953), p. 589.

The influence of St. Augustine on the theory of the absolute principles or dignities appears undeniable. With an almost equal certainty it can be shown that Lull was familiar with and influenced by Pseudo-Dionysian literature. The primacy given to goodness within the framework of the Art is an indication of a greater or lesser knowledge of the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius, because in St. Augustine's works the listings of the divine attributes begin generally with the divine grandeur. Of course it may also be held that ultimately an analysis may show that the Lullian dignities are a development of Plato's supreme Idea of the Good. And as a matter of fact Plato's enumerations of the most basic concepts or Ideas contain some of the dignities.[1] The Platonic Forms, as we have seen before, are interconnected in a **KOINONIA - TON - IDEON**, and they are identical with an absolute unity in the Intelligible Sphere of Plotinus. As previously indicated there is no question of a sphere of a given definite magnitude, but of a univocal concept of a sphere considered purely as such and as non-spatial. Accordingly it is meant merely as an idea which conveys the understanding of the highest and most perfect unity, and of identity with a total absoluteness.

The strong influence of the Neo-Platonism of Pseudo-Dionysius on the thought of Lull has been discerned by scholars[2] so

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1. Ibid., p. 590.
2. See Probst, **Jean Henry**, Caractere et Origine des Idees du **Bienheureux** Raymond Lulle, pp. 269-272. Yates, op. cit., pp. 3, 33.

that it is now manifest that Neo-Platonism was received by Lull mainly from Christian, rather than from Arabian or Jewish sources. The latter had been suggested by some who saw a parallel to Lull's absolute principles in the Shephiroth of the Jewish Cabbala. It has been shown that the Cabbala was also a development in Spain at almost the same time that Lull received his inspired Art at Mount Randa. Instead of one influencing the other in its origins both appear to be simultaneous and independent developments of an earlier movement of thought.[1]

A frequently mentioned intermediary between Pseudo-Dionysius and Lull is John Scotus Erigena, "the loneliest figure in the history of European thought."[2] The presence of both Augustinian thought and Pseudo-Dionysian Neo-Platonism in Lull's writings supports the contention that Scotus Erigena provides the more immediate source of many Lullian doctrines, particularly that of the absolute principles or dignitates. In Scotus Erigena we meet a Christian writer who uses a great deal of both St. Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius in an attempt to bring about a synthesis of their different ways of thinking. This is true especially in his work De Divisione Naturae. In order to understand better the probable connection between Scotus Erigena's philosophical conception and Lull's absolute principles let us recall the fourfold division of the things that are, which is given in the De Divisione Naturae. This division follows a previous distinction of

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1. Yates, ibid., pp. 33-34.
2. Bett, Henry, Johannes Scotus Erigena. A Study in Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 1.

Nature into things that are and those which are not.

1) First we have that which creates and is uncreated, i.e., God as the beginning or source of all reality.
2) Nature as creating and itself created, i.e., the Primordial Causes. These are goodness, essence, life, wisdom, and the like. The primeval causes of everything in nature, they are uniquely one in the Logos, the instrument of God's creative power.
3) Created nature which does not create, i.e., the visible universe and all created objects existing in time and space. These objects result from the interrelations or intermingling of the original universal elements which in turn have derived immediately from the Primordial Causes.
4) The uncreated which does not create either: God as the end to which all creation must return. Man's dignity is here mentioned and it is through man, in the Second Divine Person who became a human being, that the whole creation rises again by means of an ascent which leads back to the Primordial Causes and through them to its primeval dignity and its end in God. Through a Redeeming Logos the entire created universe is reabsorbed into the unity of the Source of all reality.[1]

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[1] Copleston, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 116-135. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 115-117. Yates, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

Extremely suggestive is the identification of the Primordial Causes with the Logos, bringing to mind the identity of the absolute principles with the Being of God asserted by Lull. Also the mystical doctrine of a return and of an ascent back to their Causes may remind us of the power of ascending and descending promised to the students of the Art if they concentrate on its principles.[1]

Scotus Erigena does not hide the fact that the source of the doctrine of the Primordial Causes is the De Divinis Nominibus of the Pseudo-Areopagite. There is for instance a very particular passage in the De Divinis Nominibus in which it is stated that Bonitas, Essentia, Vita, Sapientia, et Ratio are optimas processiones from the One God.[2] The turning of the divine names into Primordial Causes by Erigena was due apparently to the creationist interpretation of the passage just referred to by Maximus the Confessor.[3]

Although the lists of the Primordial Causes given in the De Divisione Naturae are frequently different, nearly always they start with Bonitas. In the first book we read of "essence, goodness, virtue, truth, wisdom, and the others like them," the impression created being that the choice can be varied at will.[4] Another list

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1. Yates, ibid., pp. 12, 31.
2. Denis, The Areopagite, "De Divinis Nominibus," ch. 5 (tr. by J. Scotus Erigena), Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina (Migne), Vol. 122, col. 1147. See Yates, op. cit., p. 6.
3. Maximus of Chrysopolis, The Confessor, "Ambigua," ch. 2 (tr. by J. Scotus Erigena), Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina (Migne), Vol. 122, col. 1204. See Gilson, op. cit., p. 86; Yates, op. cit., p. 6.
4. Scotus Erigena, op. cit., bk. 2, Vol. 122, col. 463.

reads: goodness, essence, life, wisdom and all others.[1] A third reading has: goodness, essence, life, wisdom, truth, intelligence, reason, virtue, justice, etc.[2] One of the longer lists is: goodness, essence, life, reason, intelligence, wisdom, virtue, beatitude, truth eternity, magnitude, love, peace, unity, and perfection.[3] An interesting advice is given at the conclusion of this last list to the effect that the order in which the divine attributes are to be contemplated matters but little. The pious philosopher does well to turn them around at will until he discovers the arrangement best suited to base his theories or meditations.

Attention has been directed to the sometimes very close correspondence between Lull's Dignitates Dei and some of Erigena's lists of the Primordial Causes. Again the suggested practice of turning the order of the latter to fit the studies of the philosopher is not too far from what Lull does by placing his absolute principles on the periphery of a circle. In this manner we are permitted to begin our considerations with whatever dignity we please, as can be observed particularly if we reflect on the third and fourth figures, as well as the resulting tables. The variations in the order and number of the absolute principles has also been noted, particularly in those of Lull's writings which do not bear directly on the Great Art.[4]

The designation of the Divine Names found most often in the De Divisione Naturae is that of the Primordial Causes, but upon

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1. Ibid., bk. 3, col. 632.
2. Ibid., bk. 2, col. 616.
3. Ibid., bk. 3, cols. 622-623.
4. Pring-Mill, op. cit., Vol. 1 (1957), pp. 312-313.

occasion Scotus Erigena uses other terms. In one place he states that they are what the Greek thinkers had named as the Ideas.[1] They can be considered also as the "species vel formas aeternas et incommunicabiles rationes, secundum quas, et in quibus visibilis et invisibilis mundus formatur et regitur."[2] Again we read of the "principalia exempla" brought forth in the Son by the Father, and multiplied later in the effects of the creative power of the Holy Spirit.[3] Another designation used is praedestinationes in order to indicate that nothing is ever created which has not been predefined, prefigured and preordained through and in them.[4]

Of the Scotist designations the last one, principalia exempla, comes closest to that of "principles" used by Lull for the fundamental conceptions of the Ars Magna. As for the term "dignity" it is not applied to the Primordial Causes. Scotus Erigena speaks of man's dignity in order to stress man's unique position in the hierarchy within the universe. Man's end, as well as that of all created objects, will be fulfilled in a return to this original dignity by a reintegration in, almost a reabsorption into, the Primordial Causes, whence he has his origin. It is not too difficult to think of Erigena's causes as dignities if we look upon them as being in God, as the End, rather than the Source, of all that may be.[5]

Very significant is Erigena's position that the Primordial

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[1] Scotus Erigena, op. cit., bk. 2, Vol. 122, col. 615.
[2] Ibid., cols. 615-616.
[3] Ibid., col. 616.
[4] Loc. cit.
[5] Yates, op. cit., pp. 7-9.

Causes, constituting a unity, are the Logos or the creative Word of God. This was his interpretation of the first lines of the gospel of St. John: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God . . ."[1] Understanding the biblical text in this manner enabled Erigena to bring together the Platonic Ideas and Christian doctrine. Throughout the De Divisione Naturae he insists that the Primordial Causes are one in the Logos, although they are infinitely varied and complex in the plurality of their effects. It is the Primordial Causes which create whatever exists in the whole realm of visible and invisible creation. Indeed it is through participation in goodness, life, intelligence, reason, etc. that beings are, and may be called, good, living, intelligible, rational, etc. In the repetitions of this theme we cannot but recall the Lullian Art in which we are repeatedly asked to concentrate on goodness, grandeur, etc. if we hope to achieve a genuine and true understanding of things.[2]

Between God and the Primordial Causes nothing intervenes because they were created not in time but from eternity.

As the divine attributes the dignitates of Lull's Art are uncreated because they are one and identical with the divine essence according to figure A. But it is only through them that one can arrive at some knowledge that bears on God's inner life, and at some degree of understanding even of the highest Christian mystery, the Trinity. In this Lull is faithful to the Augustinian tradition that one believes to understand, and understands in order to believe more perfectly.[1]

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[1] Saint John, The Holy Gospel according to Saint John, ch. 1, v. 1.
[2] Yates, op. cit., p. 8.

These and other points of similarity are striking, but by themselves not sufficient to demonstrate that the immediate source of Lull's notion of the absolute principles was provided by Scotus' conception of the Divine Names as the Primordial Causes. The hypothesis is reinforced strongly when the history of the Scotistic writings is taken into account. In his own lifetime Scotus found himself in the midst of theological controversy and some of the views expressed in his books were condemned in some Church councils. His influence, however, was not diminished and it continued very strongly during the early part of the Middle Ages. Indications of this have been detected in the writings of St. Anselm and of Richard of St. Victor. These two figures have been named as men whose thought was, very certainly, studied carefully by Lull.[2] Throughout the twelfth century the Scotistic influence was on the increase and reached a high point in the early decades of the thirteenth century. This was due very probably to the writings of Honorius Augustodinensis, whose Clavis Physicae, written in the first half of the twelfth century, is partially a selection from the De Divisione Naturae.[3]

A few years after 1207, the De Divisione Naturae was ordered burned because of the use made of it by Amalric of Bena who proposed

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1. Ibid., pp. 8-9. On the relation of faith and reason according to Lull see Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 514-523.
2. Longpre, op. cit., Vol. 9, col. 1119; Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 269, 461; Yates, op. cit., p. 3.
3. Yates, op. cit., pp. 13, 34.

and spread heretical doctrines at the University of Paris. Again in 1225, an order from Pope Honorius the Third was sent to the bishops of France to confiscate and burn any and all copies of the Periphiseon because it had become a favorite book for the Albigensians in Southern France. The last stronghold of the Albigensian "Perfects" (an ascetic and contemplative person who had received some inspiration) was located at Montsegur, Southern France. Prince James, the ruler of Mallorca, whose playmate, tutor and friend Lull had been, married Lady Esclarmonde who bore the name of the most famous and aristocratic female "perfect." It is not hard to imagine that Lull learned of, and came across, Scotus' writings and followers in the early days of his life at court when he was still in the service of his sovereign, whose kingdom extended to Montpellier and Perpignan beyond the Pyrenees. It has been suggested that Lull may have developed his Art utilizing the instruments and methods familiar to those whom he expected to bring over to the knowledge of the Christian religion. The Art was intended, according to this view, not only to provide the basis and logic for a dialogue with the Jews and Saracens in the Mediterranean region, but also to show heretics within the Christian realm that their heresies were false, while the Catholic religion was true.[1]

More important than the question of the possible origins of Lull's doctrine of the absolute principles is the problem of understanding the character and nature of these cardinal principles which form the principal figure of the *Art*. Without stating at present the definitions of each of the principles (these are given in a later section of the *Ars Brevis* as it will be seen), it is not too difficult to introduce a valid notion of them in general by listing some of the main traits wherewith they are explained and described in earlier versions which had preceded the definitive and final form of the *Art* of which the *Ars Brevis* is the authentic summary. A series of these traits is given by the editor of the great Mainz edition of Lull's *Opera* in the *Precursor Introductoriae in Algebram* which is printed at the beginning of the third volume:

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[1] Yates, op. cit., pp. 35-38.

> First we must know that the principles of this Art are principles which are real, primitive, of the order of substance, necessary, natural, absolute, simple, mutually identical with each other, universal, highest, intelligible, infinite, perfect, and lastly self-evident.[1]

Because they are real the absolute principles are within the very objects which exist outside of our minds. Goodness and the other principles are real perfections wherewith real beings are constituted. In the order of the real they are the source, root and cause of all reality. They must possess that which they communicate and of which they are the origin. This communication does not entail a diminution of the reality they possess in God in the highest perfection and unity of identity. Their fundamental identity in the divine Being excludes any real plurality which may be due to the slightest real diversity and distinction of the dignities. It is on account of

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1. Salzinger, Ivo, *Praecursor Introductoriae in Algebram Speciosam Universalem vel Artem Magnam Universalem Sciendi et Demonstrandi B. Raymundi Lulli* in *Opera* of Ramon Lull (Mainz), Vol. 3, p. 6.

this unique identity of attributes within God's being that there is no risk in Lull's thought of doing away, or even reducing, the real distinction and distance which separate and distinguish God from all created beings. There is no trace of Pantheism in Lull's writings, even in those of an explicitly mystical character.[1]

As roots of real being the absolute principles are ontological values. And it is precisely because of their ontological status as principles of the real that they are also principles of knowledge, not in the sense that they are the first known conceptions, but in the sense that they are the only ones that can provide an adequate and definitive basis for all scientific knowledge. Real principles, they are present within and **throughout** the whole realm of being: in God as the eternal and uncreated dignities; in all created realities as similitudes and vestiges reflecting the divine attributes. But since human knowledge has its start in sense-experienced objects it is only through a gradual process of ascent that we arrive at a knowledge of these principles, first in the visible universe, and through the latter to the consideration of them as the divine perfections or dignities. "The _Art_ expert has to rise from the effect to the Supreme Cause."[2] The vision of God at the end of this noetic movement of ascent is not that of the Deity in Its own essence, but as known through the reflections It has imparted to its effects. There is no trace or semblance of ontologism that can be found in the Great Art.[1] On the other hand once they have been reached the divine dignities become ruling principles that make possible the elaboration of genuine science when we return or descend to the consideration of the contingent universe.[2] As divine radiations these principles communicate to our intellect a strength it did not possess before. Thenceforward its judgments are more certain and more accurate.[3] Our understanding may descend even to the singular and contingent object or event, not precisely as they are so, but in so far as they embody necessary and intelligible principles. This agrees with the Aristotelian position, followed by Lull and by most of the thirteenth century medieval philosophers, according to which science of the real is in terms of its universal elements.[4] It goes without saying that this understanding is not a haphazard affair for it follows the definite rules and axioms which constitute a great deal of the Art proposed by Lull.

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[1] Lull, Ramon, _Liber de Articulis Fidei seu Apostrophe_, art. 5 (Mainz), Vol. 4, _opus_ I, pp. 8, 36-37. See Longpre, _op. cit._, Vol. 9, col. 1117; Platzeck, _La Combinatoria_, Vol. 12 (1953), p. 608.

[2] Lull, _Compendium_, d. 2, Vol. 3, _opus_ E, p. 74. On the theory of knowledge according to Lull see Carreras y Artau, _op. cit._, Vol. 1, pp. 543-547; and Bove, Salvador, _El Sistema Cientifico Luliano, Ars Magna_, pp. 120-127.

Little needs to be said to explain the meaning of what remains of the description of characterization of the principles given by I. Salzinger. The term "primitive" should suggest that there are no prior or posterior elements on which the principles depend and out of which they may seem to be a resultant composition. Because substances owe their natures as substances to their presence, the substantial nature of the absolute principles is insisted by Lull. As of the order of substance, if we consider the principles in their very essence we may understand that there is no admixture of extrinsic accidents to mar their purity. The necessity of the principles is an unqualified one without the slightest trace of contingency. This unqualified necessity is made use of by Lull in order to demonstrate the existence of God in whom alone the principles realize their unbounded and absolute value. The necessity of the principles may also be interpreted to the effect that without them no object can truly exist. It is on this account that they are also natural, for they are the original and originative nature. The absolute principles are preceded by nothing. Nothing comes before them and all other essences follow from and after them. The fulness of perfection and the priority of existence argue for the absolute and perfect being of the principles. Of itself, each principle is a simple perfection designating only what its reality comprises. This does not mean that the principles become or form a composite being necessarily, even when they exist in perfect unity. In God, they are together and yet the divine simplicity remains as sublime as ever. And it follows from this that in the divine being they are identified with each other. They penetrate and, as it were, become each other in their infinity, and as a consequence no composition is established because they are truly identical in their being.[1]

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[1] Longpre, op. cit., Vol. 9, col. 1118. See also Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 495.

[2] Lull, Ramon, Duodecim Principia Philosophiae, prol. (Strasbourg, 1609), pp. 112-113. Cf. Bove, op. cit., pp. 75-84.

[3] Lull, Compendium, d. 2, part 1, Vol. 3, opus E, p. 74.

[4] Aristotle, "Metaphysics," bk. 10, ch. 1, The Basic Works of Aristotle (ed. by McKeon), pp. 851-852.

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[1] Salzinger, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 3.

The designation of the principles as universal, does not entail a denial of the separate existence of particular objects, but only that as entitative principles they are involved in all things. They are within all particular and singular realities by means of their essence, power and operation. Outside of God, it is to their presence and influence that each thing owes its being and existence. They are therefore the highest of all principles, transcending every other principle of created objects. Extending to the very roots of reality these principles are grasped not through sense, but through intelligence; accordingly they are not sensible but intellectual in their nature. Of themselves, they are unlimited and infinite so that we cannot discover a point at which they begin or end. Moreover, the infinite perfection of the absolute principles would be meaningless if they were not dynamic and active principles. In their total identity within God's **Being** they are all equally active and all of the principles concur both in the immanent life within the Deity itself and in its creative activity ad extra.[1]

The self evidence of the absolute principles is twofold: quoad se and quoad nos as created intellects. There is more revealed by them to the intellect than by any other principle in creatures, whether of sense or of intellect. The added intelligibility consists mainly in a greater power and influence given to our minds in order that we may understand more easily what is most intelligible in things. All science begins with principles which it has no need to prove.

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[1] Longpre, op. cit., Vol. 9. col. 1119.

They are the first principles of the given science. However there are needed other still more basic and universal principles with which we may establish those of the more particular sciences since no particular science establishes its own principles. Ultimately we must discover the principles of the Great Art and these are knowable to all normal and healthy intellects. As knowable through themselves and as the most basic principles they are the most universal self-evident principles.[1]

Is there perhaps a certain category of thought that may express more adequately the nature of the absolute principles or dignities? About goodness and truth the Schoolmen had spoken as transcendentals. From Lull's treatment throughout many of his writings it can be gathered that the other principles which make up figure A were intended and understood in a similar manner. It is true that in a very real sense the concepts are drawn from, and consequently bear directly on, our experience of visible created entities. But almost immediately it is possible to transfer them beyond their original sphere and can be said of the Supremely Excellent One as the Creative Cause. This transferral does not entail any alteration in the essential and abstract comprehension of the concepts representing the principles in our knowledge. Standing now for the divine attributes the concepts retain intact their proper conceptual meaning. The only difference is that now this meaning is predicated of God's absolute and simple infinity. As a consequence it must be maintained that no plurality and diversity in real relations correspond to the conceptual diversity and plurality. And after discovering that God is supremely One and Simple we must assert the total and actual identity of all His perfections.[1]

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[1] Salzinger, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 3-4.

A basis for the transition, from plurality to the unity of identity, may be found in the fact that all of the principles of Figure A point to a single Cause in Its varied modes of causation. This means that in a certain way our concepts of the principles are and always remain relations: they point to God with reference to the created universe. The divine goodness, grandeur, truth, wisdom, etc. have been manifested in the world. Our starting point has been an effect, and as a result our definition of each principle, when applied to God, is not indeed wholly adequate since it is no more than a description of the Cause in view of what It has effected. The affirmation of the total and mutual identification of the principles must follow a previous demonstration of the undivided and absolutely simple nature of the Divine Cause. Efforts to seize and to comprehend, through concepts, the secret of the Divine identity are bound to end in failure. For were one to leave out of consideration the relation of God to the world, which is the origin of our notions of the principles, the identity of these principles would lead immediately to the confusion of their conceptually distinct meanings.[2]

It is precisely because the absolute principles, established as the cornerstone of Lull's logic, portray God's relation to the universe that they can be considered transcendental conceptions, apt to be said of both God and Creation. Here we have Lull moving farther away from an Aristotelian logic of classes towards a philosophy of transcendental values.[1] According to the epistemological order of human cognition, knowledge originates with the particulars of sensation. But Lull's thought is not content to cling to the human *logos*. To gaze at the Divine *Logos*, the source of all existence symbolized by the letter A, is more in accordance with its inclination. According to this tendency, logic is legitimate to the extent that it reflects and represents the ontological movements proceeding from the creative *Logos*. The moments in thought correspond to the causative movements within the order of the real. In the descent of the absolute principles or principles throughout the hierarchy of being, from God in whom they are identical down to their distinct reality and presence in the most insignificant finite beings and values, the realization of these transcendental principles is one of a gradual diminution. Each rung of the ladder of reality is different from the others by the mode and fulness of its being. Without detailing his treatment Lull asserts the conceptual univocity of the dignities or absolute principles. What is signified by the definition of the principles is truly given in each entity. Whether they are attributed to God or to created being their value is an entitative one. But of course the degree of realization varies in accordance with the ontic powers of singular objects to receive or to realize the principles. As a result there obtains a likeness between the universe and its Author, and in this likeness the basis is provided for a predication by analogy from the standpoint of the dignities or principles which extend to and include both God and all other beings. The transcendental character of the absolute principles can be shown by means of metaphysical analogy. Being and its transcendent properties are realized in a progressive order: the visible material universe manifests them in what may be called their positive degree; the immaterial soul and separated intellects constitute a higher realm of perfection and may be compared to a comparative degree; as the necessary crowning superlative degree, required by the prior degrees, there **must** exist the Supreme **Being**, who possesses all possible perfections in the highest and most absolute unity and identity.[1]

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[1] Lull, Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi, d. 3, fig. T, Vol. 1, opus A, p. 45.

[2] Platzeck, La Combinatoria, Vol. 12, (1953), p. 594.

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[1] *Loc. cit.*

Since there is no ex professo treatment of the question of analogy in the writings of Lull it will be necessary to examine his notion of likeness in order to gather accurate ideas on this matter. Lull distinguishes four main types of likeness. First there is the fundamental likeness within the dignities implied by their reciprocal participation and interpenetration. Goodness exists in grandeur, and as a result the latter mirrors goodness and is good through the presence of goodness in it. Likewise it is the presence of grandeur in the good which accounts for the extending of goodness to the very boundaries of all that is or can possibly be. This mutual indwelling recalls the kinship among the Platonic Ideas (the KOINONIA TON IDEON), or the attribute of unity which was given no distinct mention in the first figure of the *Art* because it is rather the synthesis of all the divine dignities. Less important and very distinct from this important likeness at the heart of the principles of the *Art* is the accidental resemblance which one can discover in a series of causes and effects accidentally united as for example between a father and his son: the independent existence of father and son allows for only a rather extrinsic resemblance.

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[1] Lull, Compendium, d. 2, part 2, Vol. 3, opus E, pp. 80-81. Platzeck, La Combinatoria, Vol. 12 (1953), pp. 594-595.

A third and very distinctive likeness may be discovered if one considers the triadic correlatives which constitute the essential structure and pattern of each principle, absolute or relative. To understand the doctrine of the correlatives it is well to note that Lull did not conceive the principles of the *Art* as static ones. On the contrary they are dynamic principles. To the mind of a very energetic man, inertness, inactivity, *otiositas*, appeared as very undesirable imperfections. Consequently the efficaciousness, the effusiveness, the dynamism of whatever is good require an active and overflowing source of the diffusiveness which characterizes perfect goodness. And the flowing and outgoing is not the flowing and going out into a void. The efficaciousness of the active source can be complete and achieve its fulfilment only by giving itself to a corresponding dynamic principle, although as a receiving principle it may be considered as somehow passive also. In order for both the active source and the end-receiver to be brought into an actual union there is need of a linking medium:

an influence manifested in the acting whereby the active source overflows and is united to its receiving end. Only through this trinity can the dynamism of even the supreme principles be adequately understood. It is impossible to have correlatives without what is correlated, for then the perfection of the dignities in their own nature would be incomplete. The philosophical language of the schools lacked the terms which might express the doctrine of the correlatives and hence Lull was forced to coin new words. For this purpose he found a model in the language of the Moors and he was able to construct new words through suffixes or word-endings added to the adjective form of certain perfections.[1] As examples: from the word *bonum* he derived *bonificans*, *bonificabile* and *bonificare*; from *magnum*, *magnificans*, *magnificabile* and *magnificare*. The complementary relatedness and reciprocal fulfilment of the correlatives within the dignities or absolute principles are therefore another form of likeness whereby correlatives correspond and reflect what is related to them.[2]

The fourth kind of likeness is perhaps more to the purpose of understanding Lull's conception of a metaphysical analogy for it is the likeness found amongst the various orders of being. From the alphabet it can be gathered that Lull distinguished nine principal orders of which he speaks as the nine subjects. Oftentimes when the realization of the principles in the various levels is under consideration, the ninefold series is shortened into a threefold one with three distinct levels accounted for in terms of the doctrine of two transcendent points. As indicated before this doctrine does not appear explicitly in the definitive versions of the _Art_ but contributes greatly to its understanding. The three levels of being, as suggested before, may be connected with the grammatical doctrine of the degrees of the adjective. According to Lull's thought, there is also a close relation of the three types of demonstration with the positive, comparative and superlative degrees. It is not easy to state the sources whence this idea originated. It may have originated at the School of **Chartres**, where we find the beginnings of a speculative grammar. It may even go farther back to the Stoics' notion of a uniquely speculative grammar in the execution of which Neo-Platonic conceptions can be detected. According to Lull, the argument or demonstration _quia_ corresponds to the positive degree of the adjective and it depends on a legitimate passing from an effect to its cause. A Neo-Platonic presentation of the Aristotelian _propter quid_ demonstration is the proof in _gradu comparativo_, equivalent to the comparative degree. In this second type of argument we proceed from the superior or the more excellent, as a cause, to the inferior and less excellent, as an effect. The third type of argumentation is drawn from the superlative degree and it is designated an argument _per aequiparantiam_. It is not difficult to see this third type as an argument _per analogiam_, for its primary use is in theological questions. Lull makes frequent use of it to exhibit the manifold realization of the divine dignities in the

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[1] Lull, *Compendium*, d. 3, *de fine*, Vol. 3, *opus* E, p. 160. Carreras y Artau, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 359.

[2] Platzeck, *La Combinatoria*, Vol. 12, (1953), pp. 595-596.

Supremely Excellent Principle, as well as in Its effects by participation.[1]

The doctrine of the three degrees of realization of the principles within all that exists according to the theory of the transcendent points may at first appear somewhat akin to the Aristotelian doctrine of the three degrees of abstraction. But further analysis shows that there is in Lull a very definite Platonic and un-Aristotelian attitude, which looks upon sensible reality and knowledge through the senses and the imagination as possessing a rather prescientific, or even non-scientific, value. It is true that human knowledge is recognized ultimately as having its beginnings in sense experience. But it is not long before the intellect feels impelled to transcend what is of the senses in order to enter beyond into a realm of intelligible objects more in accordance with its own nature. There is no question here of abstraction as understood by those closer to the thought of the Peripatetic philosopher. In the universe of intelligible human concepts, individual objects are now seen as apt to be determined through their definitions but they still remain separate, without any strict connection. Only up to a certain degree can the intrinsic links be conjectured about. There seems to be present here a notion akin to the Platonic dianoia, a condition wherein reasoning advances by descending to ever-widening scientific connections.[2] Since the human intellect is still unsatisfied, according to

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[1] Platzeck, La Combinatoria, Vol.12, (1953), pp. 596-598. See Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 458-462.

[2] Plato, The Republic, bk. 6, p. 745. See Copleston, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 154-159.

Lull, it must attempt a second leap in order to go beyond its own nature, as it were. It is through this second and more important transcendence, this second point of transcendence, that man is able to catch a glimpse of a non-temporal and eternal truth. Now the mind is able to have some realization of how certain human concepts are apt to be said of both God and creatures and, when they are raised to the highest and most complete unity and identity, these concepts point to their superlative degree of realization within the Being of Him who is Goodness itself. In this manner the human mind comes near to the first originative principle and discovers the key to the unity of all scientific knowledge. It might be said that the human logos has come upon an ultimate knowledge which is capable of providing the solid foundation of both the knowledge and the being of all created objects.[1]

There are therefore three radically distinct and very important orders of reality and they correspond to the degrees which grammar and language assign to adjectives: first, one seized by sense and imagination, second a spiritual one, and thirdly a divine one. The solid basis for true, certain and perfect knowledge is reached only when we arrive at the highest order of the Principal Cause, the most perfect and necessary Being. Neither the theories of the transcendnent points, nor that of the kinds of demonstration which may well be linked with that of the adjectival degrees are developed in any of the final versions of the Art, as stated before. But neither is essential to manifest the strongly Platonic character of the Great Art. For as a logic of comparison it utilizes concepts of likeness, of degrees or levels of reality, of transcendental perfections, and other notions apparently stemming from the Academy. Also Platonic is the necessity to establish the unifying roots of all knowledge in the divine attributes. Lull's understanding of a definition can be noted here also. Lull declares vague and confusing the Aristotelian definition because it is expressed in terms of the immediate genus and difference.[1] Against it Lull chooses what he deems a Christian, although Platonic, definition. According to Plato, perhaps more exactly according to Espeussipus, the explicit expression of a given concept, and this is what a definition is intended to give, necessitates that the concept be reduced and related to the highest and first principle and that in addition a clear indication be given as to exactly how it is distinct from the other ideas within the same genus. A good definition should enable one to locate very precisely the point at which an idea falls in reference to other ideas. To the author of the Great Art this meant that an object is well defined only if we manifest the exact degree in which certain transcendental properties of divine origin are brought together to form this concrete object. Only by understanding their relation to the Divine First Principle can things be given their conceptually appropriate and therefore well defined place which is in

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[1] "Intellectus per suam virtutem transcendit ad intelligendum rerum veritates quas potentiae quae sub ipso sunt attingere non possunt" (Lull, Ramon, "Declaratio Raymundi per Modum Dialogui Edita" (ed. by O. Keicher), Beitrage Zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Vol. 7, fasc. 4-5, p. 99). Cf. Lull, Ramon, Arbor Philosophiae Desideratae, d. 1, part 3 (Mainz), Vol. 6, opus D, p. 6; Ars Inventiva, d. 3, Vol. 5, opus A, pp. 37-65.

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1. Lull, Ars Generalis, part 3, p. 228. Platzeck, La Combinatoria, Vol. 12 (1953), p. 600.

strict agreement with their ontological locus in the order of reality. Lullian definitions imply relation to the Absolute and they provide the explanation of the second transcending surge towards the absolute intelligibles of the divine essence inasmuch as they bear on the universe.[1]

We are now in a position to compare the absolute principles of figure A with one of the more common Scholastic teachings about the transcendentals. Very rarely does Lull write of the dignities as transcendental and then in not quite the ordinary Scholastic meaning. More often he speaks of them as being in God through their first intention, and it is only through a second intention that they exist in creatures. The meanings of the word 'intention' are several and sometimes Lull uses it in a very different one from the more customary ones. When Lull says that the dignities are in God in their first intention he means that the higher and divine perfections are in God as a necessary Being and as the End to which all else should be directed. The primary and most excellent realization of the dignities is God. For their part created beings with their perfections are not in as an excellent state and they are ordered to God in whom they are fulfilled. One of the purposes of the second figure, as it will be seen, is to establish the rules for the application of the absolute principles to creatures. For the moment all that is needed is to show the transcendental status of the dignities or principles because of their bearing on the whole realm of the real.

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[1] Platzeck, ibid., pp. 600-601. Cf. Copleston, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 150-161.

To the Schoolmen the transcendentals denoted the most general concepts which may be predicated validly of every being. The transcendentals are therefore said of God and all other entities. Some divided the transcendentals into simple ones or disjunctive ones. Certain transcendentals, e.g., finite-infinite, absolute-relative, were called disjunctive because they embrace God and the universe only when the members of the disjunction are considered together. One of the members, e.g., infinite, may be said of God, whereas the other member can only be said of things other than God. Although the principles of the second figure may be explained as disjunctive transcendentals, the dignities of figure A can be explained as simple transcendentals because each absolute principle may be said of whatever exists or can possibly exist. According to some writers the Scholastic simple transcendental perfections admit of a further division according to the extent of their applicability in the realm of created being. All of the transcendentals may be predicated of God, albeit analogously according to some. But only a few of them embrace the totality of created beings. Certain transcendental perfections, on the other hand, e.g., life and spirit, can be found only in the higher orders of created beings.[1]

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[1] Wolter, Allan Bernard, The Transcendentals and their Function in the Philosophy of Duns Scotus, pp. 7-12. Platzeck, Erhard Wolfram, Raymund Lull, Vol. 1, pp. 200-202; La Combinatoria, Vol. 12 (1953), pp. 601-602. Cf. Coppleston, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 500-501; Anderson, James F., Natural Theology, pp. 43-46; Owens, Joseph, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, pp. 111-127.

The traditional Scholastic doctrine presents being, unity, truth and goodness as absolutely general simple transcendental perfections. They are coextensive with whatever is. The beautiful was not considered as distinct from the good and the true by Lull and by some of the other Schoolmen. About the absolute principles of figure A Lull states that they are essential principles.[1] Since the distinction between substance and accidents does not occur within the Art until the second figure is introduced, the term "essential" ought to be taken in its widest extension. The dignities or absolute principles are meant as transcendental properties, passiones, of being in its universality.[2] Of the better known transcendentals, those of being and unity are not mentioned with the dignities that compose Figure A. But there should be no problem concerning them, for as soon as something exists it is a being and there is unity in its nature. Also by the very fact that a thing or being exists it is immediately the subject of the other transcendentals, goodness and truth, even before we determine whether it belongs to the order of substance or of accidents. For by its possession of existence any being is apt to be known as it is by some intellectual nature and to be the object of desire by some appetite or will. In other words, it is good and intelligible or true. In God these perfections, attributes or dignities are of necessity essential and substantial on account of the absolute subsistence and identity of them and of his Being. The first figure of the Art, it may be added,

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1. Lull, Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi, d. 1, part 1, fig. A, Vol. 1, opus A, p. 2.
2. Platzeck, La Combinatoria, Vol. 12, (1953), pp. 602-603.

takes it for granted and established that there exists a perfectly subsistent nature which must be identified as God.

Goodness and truth are explicitly mentioned as dignities or absolute principles. Is it possible to conceive the remaining principles of the first figure as also transcendental values, as passiones convertible and coextensive with universal Being? The manner in which Lull writes about these other principles suggests that he intended that they be understood as transcendental values. It is obvious that, as transcendental perfections, goodness and truth are realized analogically or in varying degrees according to the distinct gradations of reality. These varying and analogous degrees of realization are signified by means of abstract and univocal concepts, both of goodness and of truth, which we understand to be analogous in their ontological realization. Now the matter is not different with the other absolute principles. Of them also do we have uniform and univocal concepts which extend to all being and indicate a condition that characterizes their very existence. The realization is analogical, however, for it varies with each distinct order in the hierarchy of being.[1]

Since there is no question about the transcendental mode of the absolute principles of goodness and truth, there is need only of showing briefly how the other dignities can be understood in the same manner. Of grandeur or greatness, we form a concept which, when attributed to God in its superlative degree, is very far from being a strictly quantitative conception. It connotes rather an intensive magnitude, a qualitative fulness, with the proviso that quality is not to be taken as an accidental predicament but as determining the essence of that about which it is predicated. The integrity and fulness of a given reality is manifested through this qualitative intensity which may also be said to be the cause of that reality achieving its full measure of perfection. There ought to be no difficulties in conceiving duration as a transcendental property of being. The Ancients had wrestled with the idea of aeons in order to unfold their understanding of duration, and they understood it as diverse or distinct according to the different spheres of existence. For it may be either an element of time, or permanence in a quasi-temporal flow, or an immutable ever present eternity, depending on whether what endures is material, spiritual, or divine. Power and glory again offer no difficulty to their being understood as transcendentals for they are realized in the proportion and measure due to the nature of each and every being. The principle of glory ought to be understood as the self contentment and repose that each entity has when it exercises its proper operations and comes to the attainment of its ends. In the exceptional case when intellectual natures fail to obtain their ultimate goal, glory may be understood to mean its privation which gives rise to the contrary condition of unrest.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 603.

The absolute principle of will as a transcendental perfection ought to be interpreted very broadly so as to include not only the rational faculty of self determination and free choice but also the

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 603-604.

FIGURE T


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pondus naturalis whereby unconscious and unintellectual natures are drawn infallibly towards what is good and perfective of their being. Wisdom, in a strict sense a possession of spiritual natures, should be analogously understood to designate also the infallible direction whereby natural objects are capable of directing themselves to their particular goals or ends, be these considered as in the process of being achieved or as already secured. In order to distinguish the remaining absolute principle "virtue" from goodness it is desirable to conceive of the latter in terms of final causality; whereas virtue connotes more properly the innate inclination and acquired habit of acting well, with rectitude, in the pursuit of ends.[1]

B - Figure T - Of the Relative Principles

1) Figure T Itself

We read in the Ars Inventiva Veritatis[2] that this second figure was retained from the Ars Demonstrativa, although in a modified form. Indeed it goes back to Lull's first writing of the Art, the Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi Veritatis, as does also figure A. In the Contemporary Biography it is stated that a reduction and a modification both of the figures and of their principles had been made in the Ars Inventiva Veritatis in order to facilitate the comprehension and use of the Art by men,[3] many of whom did not have the acute mind that would render the Art very easy to learn. Originally designated as the figure of the principles and of significations,[1] in the Ars Brevis it is appropriately named the figure of the relative principles because, as it will be seen, it is made up of principles all of which imply and refer to others. These principles do not embrace the whole of reality separately, but in groups of three, and hence are not universal and transcendental in exactly the same manner as are the absolute principles of the first figure. The letter T was well chosen also as a name for the second figure. This is because the principles are so arranged and distributed as to result in a graphic diagram consisting of three[2] concentric triangles of equal size, with their angles equally distributed inside of a circle. As a result there correspond to the nine angles, nine equal sections, or chambers, of the circle's periphery. In most of the versions each triangle is of a different color. At the center of the figure there is appropriately placed the letter T, whence the designation of the figure, just as the first figure was called figure A from the symbolic A in the center of it. As mentioned before the three triangles with their nine angles account for nine partitions of equal size which are then occupied by the nine chambers, letters or groups of letters representative of the principles, of this new figure. To each angle a letter from the B - K alphabet is assigned. But the order in which the letters appear is this: letters B C D constitute the first triangle, E F G the second triangle, and H I K the third triangle. Because of the disposition of the triangles the order of the letters on the surface of the circle is B E H C F I D G K. Principles are also assigned to, and their names written inside of, the chamber and in perfect agreement with the angles and letters. As it can be readily seen the principles are those signified by the letters in the second column of the alphabet, the column of the relative principles. Within each chamber, we are instructed to notice other less universal terms standing for the "species" of these principles as it will be explained shortly.

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[1] Ibid., p. 604.
[2] Lull, Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 2, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 6.
[3] Vita Coetanea, ch. 2, n. 14, p. 31.

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[1] Lull, Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi, d. 3, fig. T, Vol. 1, opus A, p. 42. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 374.

[2] In earlier versions this figure was composed of five triangles. See Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 374-375.

Before proceeding with the description of the individual triangles, the Ars Brevis notes that each one is general and all embracing.[1] Each triad of principles extends to all that can possibly be, even though the individual principles, considered separately, are not universally extensive or simple transcendentals, as are the absolute principles of figure A. Taken together in groups of three, as given in the triangles, their extension is coextensive with universal being, and hence are disjunctive transcendentals in the sense that they apply before the division of the categories can be introduced and each triad includes principles which are said of the Creator or of created being. It is not difficult to understand why the principles of figure T may be spoken of as ternary and relative for the principles of each triangle require and imply the other two within the same triangle. Difference, for example, introduces the notion of plurality and of the many. But as soon as there is plurality there must be concordance in order that unity and order obtain in the opposition of its distinct elements. Opposition is not possible without distinction. Similar statements can be made concerning the other triangles.[1] Because the angles of each triangle, for instance, B C D, extend to all reality, the Art states that the investigation of particular objects will be fruitful if it is undertaken with a view to the universal aspects signified by B C D, either singly or intermingled.[2] Without denying the transcendental character of each triangle and the reduced universality of each relative principle it can be asserted that the circular design enclosing the triangles points to the mutual solidarity and intermingling of the relative principles. As a result the definition of each one is not totally extrinsic or alien to that of the others. Just as all of them may be called principles because they share in "principle," so we could speak of nine differences, etc. because they are reciprocally present to each other.[3]

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[1] Lull, Ars Brevis, part 2, ch. 3, fig. 2, p. 5.

The first triangle (assigned the color green in the longer versions of the Art) contains in its angles or chambers the first three letters of the nine letter alphabet - B C D - with the names of the principles which they signify: difference, concordance and contrariness (opposition). Whatever exists or may in some way exist is thereby comprehended under one of these three principles. Of it we must say that it is distinct from, other than, what is not itself;

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1. Lull, Lectura Artis quae Brevis, d. 1, ch. 1, fig. 2, Vol. 5, opus C, p. 2; Ars Generalis, ch. 2, pp. 223-224.
2. Lull, Tabula Generalis, d. 1, fig. 2, Vol. 5, opus B, p. 3.
3. Lull, Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 2, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 7.

that there is distinctness in the rich variety and pattern of its being; or that there is perfect order and agreement with other beings, as well as within the perfections of its being in accordance with its nature and the distinctive operations of its being; or (and) that it is opposed to whatever is contrary to its nature, aims, etc. Also written within the chambers or angles of the triangle B C D are three phrases standing for the most general modes or species to which each of the first ternary principles may be contracted in their application to more specific, but still general classes of beings. For difference may be given among objects each one of which is a sensible object; or between some objects which are sensible, and objects which are intelligible; or finally among objects which are intellectual in their nature. For example we distinguish between two physical material objects, as between the body of a horse and a stone. Or we may consider the distinction between a material and immaterial substance, as between a stone and a non-material soul. Finally there is the diversity that obtains between two intellectual natures, as that between an angel and God. This is also true of the correlative principles of concordance and opposition. Accordingly the three very general modes or species are signified by the statements: between one sensible and another sensible; between a sensible and an intelligible; between one intelligible and another sensible.[1]

The second triangle (red color) is the instrument for the investigation of whatever shares in the meaning of beginning, middle or end.[1] It may be designated E F G because of the letters that appear in its angles signifying the three relative principles of principle, middle, and end. This E F G triangle is likewise coextensive with universal being, and therefore whatever may be in existence falls within the triad of its principles. For it is clear that everything must be (or be in) a principle, a middle, or an end. As it was the case with the angles of the green triangle, so also the individual angles of this red triangle contain more specific types, or the species, in which these analogical principles are, as it were, contracted to less universal principles. The word "cause," given as the first mode of principle stands for the four substantial causes, material, formal, efficient and final. The species "quantity and time" are meant to include the nine predicamental accidents which are the non-substantial principles of being.[2] Over the angle of the middle the words written are: conjunction, measurement, and extremities in order to indicate the most general modes of middle that we can think of. The conjunctive middle indicates anything that links or joins two distinct elements. An example from logic may be given if we consider how the subject and predicate terms of the proposition "man is an animal" are capable of being linked on account of the intermediacy of body and life without which man could not be said to be an animal. The measuring middle stands for the halfway point, the center, or what is

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[1] Lull, Ars Brevis, part 2, ch. 3, fig. 2, pp. 5-7.

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1. Ibid., p. 7. See also Ars Generalis, part 2, ch. 2, fig. 2, p. 223; Tabula Generalis, d. 2, fig. 2, Vol. 5, opus B, p. 3.
2. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 2, ch. 3, fig. 2, pp. 7-8. See also Tabula Generalis, d. 2, fig. 2, Vol. 5, opus B, p. 3.

in some way midway between given boundaries joined ultimately through this middle. Thus we may conceive of an act as bridging the distance between the agent and the operabile or agibile, as the act of loving, or "to love" binds both the lover and the loved one. The middle of extremes suggests the entire area between two limits, e.g., a line between two points.[1] As the third angle, the end, is also analyzed into three less universal modes of application, or species. On the angle we see, therefore, the words "privation," "termination," and "perfection." All three modes are signified by the letter G, and the principle of end. A privative end denotes whatever is now in the past, or the absence of a perfection which normally ought to be had or possessed. It is in this sense that death is spoken of as the end of life. A termination "end" stands for the boundary lines or elements which enclose or limit what is within them as a line is limited by its ends. In this meaning we can look upon the agent and receiver as the terms in which an act is completed, as amare is completed between a lover and a loved one. The end "perfection" means a goal or final cause, in whose attainment a given reality is perfected and fulfilled. The ultimate final cause for the perfection of man is God, but there may be intermediate perfective ends. It is natural therefore for man to tend to know and love God, and it is also natural for him to strive towards the preservation and propagation of the race.[2]

The third anf final triangle (color yellow) of the Ars Brevis is made up of angles with the letters H I K and the principles *majoritas*, *aequalitas*, and *minoritas*. As was the case with the other triangles, the angles of this last triangle contain certain less universal modes of application or species in so far as these principles allow for comparisons between substances, between substances and accidents, and between accidents alone. Over each angle of this triangle it is written: between substances, between substance and accident, and between accidents. Outside of these three alternatives no comparison about being superior, equal, or inferior is possible because there is nothing that can exist except **in one of these** three modes.[1] There are substances which are greater or superior, more perfect, than others; e.g., man, as a substance surpasses the perfection of a stone. By definition every substance is of itself, or absolutely, superior to accidents, because accidents exist in the subsistent substance. If accidents are compared we see that some of them are of greater value than others, as for example the power to understand is superior to that of vision. Since minority is correlative of superiority whatever applies to the latter, can in its own way be said of *minoritas*. Examples would merely reverse the order and substitute the principle *minoritas* for *majoritas*. It may be noted that Lull uses minority to account for less perfect beings.[2]

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[1] Lull, Ars Brevis, part 2, ch. 3, fig. 2, pp. 9-10. See also Tabula Generalis, d. 2, fig. 2, Vol. 5, opus B. p. 3.

[2] Lull, Ars Brevis, part 2, ch. 3, fig. 2, pp. 9-10.

The angle of equality is particularly important because its principle provides an explanation of composite substances because through it all the substantial principles are adequately intermingled and transformed by the presence of the others.[1] Thus we have substantial equality which also may be observed when we compare two equal substances, e.g., Peter and Paul are equal in their substantial humanity. The second mode of equality obtains when we note that a substance is equal to its accidents because the latter are properly harmonized and in the proper measure possible to the substance, e.g., a body has a given size which is proportioned to its material nature. Finally two accidents may appear to be equal for the reason that their objects may be identical; e.g., knowledge and love may be completed in the same object.[2]

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[1] Lull, *Ars Brevis*, part 2, ch. 3, fig. 2, pp. 10-12. **See also** *Lectura super Artem*, d. 2, fig. 2, part 1, Vol. 5, ***opus*** **E**, p. 26.
[2] Lull, *Tabula Generalis*, d. 1, fig. 2, Vol. 5, *opus* B, p. 4.

It was indicated previously that each triangle of principles is coextensive with whatever exists. Hence the individual relative principles may be compared to what some Scholastics designated as disjunctive transcendentals. Each relative principle, therefore, is by its very nature universal and in its general character embraces a given area of reality, greater or lesser according to its value and importance which are manifested in the order of the triangles.

The importance of figure two lies in the fact that the triangles are the instruments we ought to use in a dialectical search for scientific conclusions. The success of this search depends upon a) intermingling the triads of principles, b) mingling the angles or principles with each other, c) applying the principles, singly or in combinations to the terms of the other three figures. All of this is

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1. *Loc. cit.*
2. Lull, *Ars Brevis*, part 2, ch. 3, fig. 2, p. 12. For additional examples see *Tabula Generalis*, d.1, fig.2, Vol.5, *opus* B, p. 4.

to be done in order to discover the middle term that will be used to support our conclusions.[1] It is on account of this also that it may be noted that each angle with its principle becomes through its general species a ladder for the intellect to ascend and to descend in its considerations of particular objects. One of its movements is a descent from universal principles to their contraction in particular objects. An opposite movement, one of ascent, occurs when it considers the universal principles in themselves and as universal causes. These two movements are verified with all of the relative principles, but in a very special manner with those of difference and concordance. Through the latter we are led more directly to that which is common and universal in things. Through the former we come to what is distinct and particular. It may, therefore, be said that through C the mind is drawn upwards to universal objects and principles; and that through B it is enabled to know particular objects. By means of these two principles the intellect is able to discover the universal laws governing the universe of particular objects and to analyze the latter under the aspects of universality and necessity which allow for a scientific knowledge of the particulars.[2] The purpose of both movements of the intellect is, again, to discover an appropriate and natural middle term wherewith the link between a subject and a predicate of a proposed conclusion may be legitimately established. A statement will ultimately be accepted as true if, after the investigations of the particulars have been completed, it agrees with and leaves intact the principles as defined and as mingled for their mutual support. A position which destroys or contradicts the principles or their definitions means that the opposite statement is the true one.[1]

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[1] Lull, Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 2, Vol. 5, opus A, pp. 6-7.

[2] Lull, Ars Brevis, part 2, ch. 3, fig. 2, pp. 7, 10-12. The importance of these two movements of the understanding was emphasized by Lull when he wrote the Liber de Ascensu et Descensu Intellectus. A spanish version of this book was edited by Eduardo Ovejero y Maury in 1928. See Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 296, 376-377.

Figure T is in a sense an instrumental figure for it is by the application of its principles to figure A, for example, that knowledge about God is increased. In addition figure T has a formal or formative character in regard to the soul:[2] just as water takes on the color and form of its container, so the powers of the soul are informed by the search within the chambers of figure two mingled with all other principles and applied to the matter of our search—the water in the case above. We may look upon the other figures as providing the objects which are actively considered with the aid of the triangles. It is on this account that Lull sees figure T as an active figure and refers to the others as passive or objective.[3] It is through the principle of difference, for example that we can distinguish the several absolute principles, as well as between the goodness of this kind of reality and the goodness of another kind of being. Indeed it is because of the same principle that the intellect can understand the distinct correlatives within the very structure of all the principles. Through the application of the principles of figure T to the first figure the mind can also acquire scientific knowledge. And it must be added that the intellect can enjoy a greater freedom from limiting obstacles and details, and the knowledge which it acquires become more universal on account of the universal character of this second figure.[1]

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[1] Lull, Ars Brevis, part 2, ch. 3, fig. 2, p. 7. See also Lectura super Artem, d. 2, fig. 2, part 1, Vol. 5, opus E, pp. 24-26, and Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 2, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 7.

[2] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 374, 376.

[3] Lull, Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi, d. 3, fig. S, Vol. 1, opus A, p. 41.

2) The Relative Principles within Medieval Thought

During much of the Middle Ages philosophy did not always occupy a distinct and separate place amongst the various disciplines taught at the several schools and universities. Oftentimes it was practiced and pursued by scholars associated with other faculties, particularly those of law, theology, and the arts. The *Artistae* traced their name back to the ancient liberal arts which were ordered into the trivium and the quadrivium. Not until questions began to be raised, methodically and regularly, concerning the most basic and fundamental rules and positions of the different arts did philosophy enter into its own, a distinct knowledge from that given by the liberal arts.

It was on this account that there appeared in the medieval scene two types of grammarians, the ordinary classical ones, and the philosophical ones. The latter, i.e., the philosopher-grammarians, referred to their teachings as speculative grammar or a theory on the modes of signifying.[2] According to these grammarians there are certain universal principles which are not of exclusive application to one or a few languages. There exist therefore particular grammars in order to determine the rules for ordering the words of a given language. But in addition one can speak of a universal grammar which is in the strictest sense scientific because it explains the nature of universal and necessary principles and rules.[1] Acting as a philosopher the grammarian **raises** questions about the functions of words in their role as signs. In so doing he repeats with language what thinkers of certain authentic Scholastic traditions were doing when they looked upon things and inquired not only about their own value as distinct beings, but also about their role as signs which denote, or point to, a deeper and more basic, and perhaps more perfect order of reality. To these philosophers the universe is a book full of symbols and it is the business of the philosopher and scientist to ponder on, and to decipher, their meanings. Later the investigation and teaching about words as signs was linked to considerations about concepts, and as a result it became a part of logic treatises. Modern logical developments tend to separate again the science of signs, semantics, from a more axiomatic and formal logic.[2]

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[1] Lull, *Ars Brevis*, part 2, ch. 3, fig. 2, p. 13.
[2] Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

The Stoic philosophers were among the first, if not the first ones, to undertake a philosophical quest concerning the basic nature of the rules which govern linguistic usages. It is not known with precision and with certainty what the connections may be that link Latin Medieval thought with Stoic teaching on these matters. One of the few items known with some certainty is the fact that during the twelfth century a renewal of the ancient trivium and of grammar was undertaken, especially at the School of Chartres. As a consequence grammar was transformed into a speculative and philosophical discipline. Instances noted down by John of Salisbury suggest, however, that the general tone of the teachings at that school was mainly Platonic.[1] But some very definite Stoic positions can also be detected. For example, an Augustinian doctrine of linguistic analogies, implicit in a philological question about vicinitas, can be traced back to Stoic doctrine. Abelard's solution to the problem of the universal may also be characterized as Stoic. Likewise Stoic, rather than Aristotelian, is the clear and definite distinction drawn between form as active in nature, and matter as totally passive. Touching more directly on questions of speculative grammar is the revival of the Stoic conception that the agent or active principle is masculine in its gender whereas the passive element, the receiver, is by nature feminine in its gender. Again the fundamental division of the parts of human discourse into names and verbs follows the Stoic's understanding of substance as a permanent state, somehow in flux on account of its variable and relational operations.[2] In this explanation one may glimpse an effort at bringing together a static conception of the world, very close to the more Idealist way of thinking of most of the Greek philosophers, and the contrary notion of a universe of constant and pure becoming. In the name the stress is on the state of a given form or substance, whereas in the verb the attention bears on the fleeting operational relations. It is the objective unity synthesizing these two antithetical conceptions which may be affirmed, denied, or remain unanswered and in doubt.[1]

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[1] Loc. cit.

[2] Platzeck, Erhard Wolfram, "La Figura T del Arte Luliano y la Doctrina de las Significaciones," Miscellanea Lulliana, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 73.

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[1] Gilson, op. cit., pp. 139, 159, 619.

[2] Platzeck, La Figura T, p. 74. See Mates, Benson, Stoic Logic, p. 17; and Zeller, Edward, Stoics and Epicureans and Sceptics, p. 104.

Now, although the triangles of the second figure of the Art present us with an adequate division of the modes of signifying, it does not provide the speculative basis for Lull's doctrine on signification. For this basis it is best to consider the two hundred and thirty-fifth chapter of Lull's earliest literary and mystical encyclopaedic masterpiece, The Book of Contemplation, and his theory of the Correlatives.

In The Book of Contemplation four types of sign-relations are listed. First there is the case of two object-signs pointing to each other in a reciprocal, or bilateral manner. Or between the two objects there may be a unilateral, non-reciprocal relation because one is a sign directing the observer to the other object, but not vice versa. A third type of sign-relation is given if one sign is compared or referred to several objects. The fourth kind of signification exists when there are many object-signs which refer to or signify one common thing. Consequently there may be 1) an equal number of terms in a sign relation, or 2) an unequal number of related terms; and both

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1. Platzeck, La Figura T, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 74.

instances, numerical equality and inequality of terms, may be considered as modes of signifying which are 3) reciprocal or bilateral, or 4) non-reciprocal one-way significations.[1] Equality of number combined with equality or non-equality in comprehension or conceptual content leads immediately to the meanings or concepts of identity and non-identity, likeness and diversity, difference, distinction, etc.[2] On the other hand, the notion of inequality in the number of the terms which enter the comparison and which are related by these modes of signifying may bear some distant resemblance to Aristotle's problem of the EN EPI POLLON, the subsuming of many concepts under a more universal or superior concept.[3] Finally the condition of reciprocity, or its absence, among the terms which form part of a sign-relation in both grammar and logic, may be interpreted as a conception of the convertibility or non-convertibility by the subject and predicate terms that form the proposition.

In addition to this fourfold mode of signifying, which may be considered the departure point for Lull's theory of natural and artistic signification in general and of grammatical meaning in particular, there is also the doctrine of the correlatives to be taken into account.[4] For it also yields, in part, the speculative basis for Lull's teaching on grammatical signification. This is most

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1. Lull, Ramon, Liber Contemplationis, ch. 235 (Mainz), Vol. 10, p. 30.
2. Platzeck, La Figura T, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 75.
3. Aristotle, "Metaphysics," bk. 7, ch. 13; bk. 13, ch. 4, The Basic Works of Aristotle (ed. by R. McKeon), pp. 706, 895.
4. Platzeck, La Figura T, Vol. 1 (1955), pp. 75-77; La Combinatoria, Vol. 13 (1954), pp. 136-140.

easily seen if we analyze an extremely simple sentence in which is present, in its barest form, the pattern present in signification. This simple sentence is:

Some (one) thing signifies (denotes) some (other) thing.

In this statement, in addition to the act of denoting, we find two terms or extremes which are related in the composition brought about in a judgment. The subject, the some (one) thing or the denotans, may be deemed a sign which denotes or points towards the other term. It is therefore an active principle, and it stands for an agent as indicated by the ending ans of the Latin verb. There is an efficient efficaciousness in the denotans as the active source that leads to the act itself, and through it to the other term. The act itself is not to be conceived as a static condition of the agent, but as an activity which is tending to and is completed only when it encounters its object or end, namely, that which is signified, the some (other) thing which receives the act deriving from the denotans. This some (other) thing, as a receiver, may be considered passive, rather than active as the agent-source has been conceived. Hence it is well to speak of it as "what is signified or denoted," denotatum. The passive or past participle designates it as the beneficiary, the receiver, of the influence emanating from the active source. In addition to the ending tum of the past participle one could use the ending bile (as in operabile) to designate the object or term required as the receiver of what flows from the agent-source. Finally the act itself, expressible through the infinitive form of a verb (in an actual proposition a non-infinitive form must be used), e.g., denotare, to signify, may be understood as a bridge, a link, which mediates and allows the efficaciousness emanating from the active denotans to reach, and to be received by, the other or passive term, the denotatum.[1]

According to the Art the denotans, the active source, that which does the signifying, should be considered as in the masculine gender because of a comparison with the act of signifying which signifies through itself. On the other hand the second term, as the passive element which receives the influence of the signification from the active source, is, because passive, feminine in character. This is, of course, in accordance with the principles and rules not of any particular grammar, but with those of the universal grammar which the Art contains and exemplifies in the mind of its author.[2]

With an expression, perhaps less rigid, it may be stated also that the formal principle of a mode of signifying is active whereas the material one is passive, bearing in mind that, according to the Stoics, form is an active and dynamic principle and therefore the exact opposite of matter which is total or sheer passivity and receptivity. This may help to explain certain ambiguous, almost equivocal, positions taken by some of the great Scholastics who look upon matter, now as pure potency and passivity, now as a phenomenal development of form and as the principle of individuation.[3]

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1. Platzeck, La Combinatoria, Vol. 13 (1954), p. 136. Cf. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 472-473.
2. Lull, Ars Generalis, part 2, ch. 102, p. 539.
3. Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Sain Thomas Aquinas, pp. 32, 153. Cf. Platzeck, La Figura T, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 76.

In the case of transitive verbs, e.g., to denote and to signify, the root-part of the verb may be used, Lull instructs his readers, for the purpose of expressing in substantive form both the action as coming from the agent, and the receptivity of the passive receiver, in addition to the act itself. The Latin ending of these forms correspond to those of the present and past participle of the verb. As a result we can have three "nominal" or substantive forms with verbs of a transitive type, the infinitive, the past and the present participles. These three agree with the ternary correlatives of the Great Art. Accordingly the endings of these three substantive forms will be used to express the correlatives which constitute the intrinsic being of the Lullian principles and other fundamental elements of reality. Lull could therefore, speak of a bonificans (or bonificativum) which points to, signifies, leads to, through the act — bonificare, both to the act itself and to its receiver, the bonificatum. Likewise a principians (or principiativum) carries, through its act of principiare, to its principiatum or principiabile. This process could be continued to include all the principles, absolute and relative. It goes without saying that the passive element, the receiver, expressed through the ending of the past participle form of the verb, reflects, mirrors, and signifies the active source whose influence it receives. Thus there is a reciprocal relation of likeness which may be interpreted as a form of exemplarism and a mode of signifying at the very center of the roots of what is real.[1]

A rather general Stoic notion of the proposition is that, without exception, it consists of the name of a substance, thing, subject, or supposit and of a predicate-verb. Later it will be noted that in order for a statement to constitute a judgment, the subject-predicate conception of the proposition is an account of its extrinsic structure only, and hence insufficient. But for the present purpose the Stoic understanding that a proposition has as its components a name and a verb suffices. The name stands for an agent which signifies or points to something other than itself, whereas the predicate functions in order to reveal the very acting of the agent designated by the name. With intransitive verbs the proposition is now complete and needs no further parts. But with transitive verbs, e.g., _principiare_, _bonificare_, the need arises for a second name or object. This second term also signifies, and completes, the efficacy of the agent by receiving and mirroring its act. It is in this manner that we find the doctrine of the correlatives explained in the _Ars Ultima_. There the structure of a proposition is described, moreover, in terms of one of the triangles of figure T. The _bonificans_ or the subject is a principle. The act of _bonificare_, a verb, signifies the flowing from and into and is, therefore, a middle which unifies or brings together. The _bonificatum_, the object of the overflowing, terminates, or is the end which, as its title suggests, completes a proposition.[2]

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1. Lull, _Compendium_, d. 3, de fine, Vol. 3, _opus_ E, p. 60. See Carreras y Artau, _op. cit._, Vol. 1, pp. 500-503, 510-511.
3. Lull, _Ars Generalis_, part 2, ch. 2, pp. 223-224.

In the earlier and more primitive versions of the Art the Stoic division of the proposition into a name-subject and a verb-predicate is still noticeable in another triangle that was not included in the later revised forms of the Art. The angles of this triangle symbolize and name God, creatures, and operations according to the rules of the Art. Both God and creatures may stand as propositional subjects, and as sources and causes that they are they signify or point to the activities that they give rise to. On the other hand the angle 'operation' stands for any and all acts that may be expressed by means of a verb form.[1]

One of the modes of signifying, it has been seen, is the reciprocal mode which exists among the three elements we have spoken of as correlatives. A bonificans through an act of bonificare leads to a bonificatum which in turn mirrors back the act of the bonificans. Both, that which signifies actively, e.g., bonificans, and that which, as the receiver, signifies passively, e.g., bonificabile (tum), are expressed, it has been stated, in participle forms of the verb. Now it may be asked what is the relation in which these substantive verb forms stand to the corresponding abstract substantive noun, e.g., bonitas, goodness. An explanation may be provided by the speculative grammar of Thomas of Erfurt:

> The most general and essential mode of signification characteristic of the participle is the mode which signifies a manner of existence which is indistinct from that implied in a substantial existence. On this point it must be noted that the mode of exis-

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[1] Platzeck, La Combinatoria, Vol. 13 (1954), p. 130.

> tence signified in both the participle and verb forms has its origin in the same property of reality, the characteristic of flowing succession. In this respect there is no difference between a participle and a verb.[1]

As a substantive form and because of the indistinct proximity to a substantial existence signified by the participle it may substitute validly for a perfection which has been conceived after the manner of a substance. For example in its act of bonificare goodness may be spoken of as bonificans; or in the act of principiare a principle is a principians.

It was stated that the identification of both, what signifies and what is signified, with the agent (agens) or with the receiver (patiens), facilitates the philosophico-speculative consideration of the grammatical genders. The explanation for this comparison lies in the traditional way of conceiving an active principle as in nature closer to the male of the species, and at the same time looking upon passivity as a characteristic of the female and hence easily associated with the feminine gender. It is also very interesting to note how this active-passive account has provided the philosophical basis for a speculative doctrine about the meaning and nature of the grammatical cases. In the Greek language, "ptosis" (case) means a fall or

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1. Modus significandi essentialis generalissimus participii est modus significandi per modum esse indistantis a substantia. Circa quod notandum, quod modus esse in participio et in verbo ab eadem rei proprietate oritur, quae est proprietas fluxus et successionis; et in hoc modo participium a verbo non discrepat (Thomas of Erfurt, Grammatica Speculativa in John Duns Scotus, Lexicon Scholasticum (ed. by M. Fernandez Garcia), p. 32). For the attribution of this work to Duns Scotus see Vol. 1, p. 141 of the Vatican edition of Duns Scotus Opera.

a descent. Originally this word was used to designate the inflections of both the noun and the verb indistinctly. According to this interpretation, the pure, undefiled and underived reality of the nature signified by a word, e.g., goodness, descends, or even falls, from its sublime state of unmingled perfection by an act whereby it imparts goodness in a bonificare to anything capable of receiving the influence from a bonifier or bonificans. Hence the receiver of the good, the bonificatum, cannot but operate as a sign or an indication of that fall or descent. In other words the oblique case, as is bonificatum, shares or participates in goodness because as the declension and the cases demonstrate it has received from the primitive and originative goodness. By itself or in its fulness and purity of essence, goodness does not indicate a case because it has not yet descended or begun to do so. Hence the grammar of the Stoics treats it as neither a pure case nor as an oblique one. The nominative case (not an oblique but a pure case) of our example, therefore, is not goodness in the abstract, but like the concrete bonificans, i.e., as related to the bonificatum, for now the descent has been initiated. The remaining cases continue to express in a greater or lesser degree this descent which begins with the bonificans and is completed with the reception by the bonificatum. According to Medieval grammar the genitive, dative and accusative cases of common nouns are called oblique cases because the attention is not directed first to a pure idea, e.g., goodness itself, but rather to that which has in some way received, and partakes of, the influence and nature of the pure idea. Only afterwards does one go from the recipient to the idea itself. And in this manner speculative grammar goes beyond Stoicism and merges with Platonic thought as it occurs with Bernard of Chartres' interpretation about the origin of both the noun and the adjective.[1]

We can now undertake a more direct and precise treatment of the content of the second figure, i.e., figure T, or the figure of significations, as it was also designated in the earlier versions of the Art, linking it with the medieval doctrines on the modes of signifying. First of all, it is very important to keep in mind that the Lullian principles were conceived in accordance with a realistic frame of mind. In those principles one is thinking of real entities and of real relations. In order to be well aware of this it is advisable to recall the first of the five triangles which originally made up this figure.[2] That first triangle was formed by three angles which contained the words, God, creature, and operations. The content of all human knowledge is ultimately reducible to the two distinct orders signified by "God" and "creature;" to what and how they are in themselves, and to how they may act and interact. In order to reinterpret this triangle according to the tenets of speculative grammar it may be necessary to recall a very basic principle within the doctrine on the modes of signifying: God causes the world, and as a result the latter, as the effect, mirrors God and directs the observer's attention back to God. This means that things are effective signs which point to God because they were produced in the totality of their being by the same God. Within this conception we may find the authentic foundation for a legitimate Exemplarist metaphysics, as are those of Plato and St. Bonaventure. Lull's metaphysical system may also be termed Exemplarist, rather than Aristotelian.[1]

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[1] Gilson, History, p. 620; Platzeck, La Figura T, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 78. Cf. Lull, Ars Generalis, part 10, ch. 103, p. 540.

[2] As indicated before this triangle was not included in the versions of the Art written after the reduction of principles and figures initiated with the Ars Inventiva Veritatis.

The intimate connections with speculative grammar may be perceived more clearly if we again consider the trinity given by the above mentioned triangle, God, creature, and operation, and see how these three terms stand in relation to the principal parts of the proposition, the substantive noun and the verb. Of these two, the noun, or name, is intended as the subject of the proposition more naturally, whereas the predicate role is more appropriately fulfilled by a verb. Likewise we know that, of the two, the noun stands as a name for objects or things. In their being creatures are substantial; and by analogy or extension we may refer to God as a substance in so far as he is the absolute cause of the existence of all finite substances. In the terminology of grammar the noun is the name for substances. On the other hand the verb indicates actions and operations and it may be said to reveal the influence that links a subject with the objects and area of its action. The name, or noun, may therefore be identified with the designations of real substances, namely God and creatures, and the verb with the relational influence, implied in

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1. Gilson, History, pp. 352-353. See also Gilson, Etienne, La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventure, pp. 173-177.

operation.[1]

At first the name and the verb may appear sufficient to give us all of the elements of a proposition. But if a proposition is to be truly the product or expression of a judgment there is need of another conceptual element. Also left out of the definitive version of the *Art* was another triangle which appeared in the original *Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi Veritatis* and which contained these three correlative notions: affirmation, denial, and doubt. There is present in these concepts what transforms a grammatical composition of a noun and a verb into the expression of an authentic judgment. For in a genuine judgment one either gives an assent, or denies what is proposed, or refrains from doing either because one remains unconvinced and still remains in doubt about the relation between a subject and its predicates. It is only natural that before an investigation of the problem has been undertaken, the state of doubt precede the other two states of mind. The triangle representing these three states was not altogether out of place in an *Art* and in a figure intended as logical expressions of the very comprehensive and ontological doctrine on the modes of signifying. Every genuine judgment consists therefore of a *nomen* and a verb, as well as of the logical link or *nexus* connecting both of them.

By the term "God," Lull intended to designate all of the divine names also, as for example the Trinity, the attributes or *dignitates*, i.e., goodness, grandeur, etc. On the other hand the term "creature" should embrace all the other entities, intellectual, animal, and sensible. What precise distinction ought to be drawn between the last two orders is not explicitly developed by the Art. But since the threefold division was intended to embrace the whole of creation,we may understand that the simply sensible stands for the visible world of material inanimate things. Within the order of intellectual creature-being we may place all the angelic natures, leaving the term "animal" to refer to the intermediate realm where we find souls or psyches which impart life to the whole of which they are the formal principle. There are traces here of a Neo-Platonic understanding and division of reality, particularly that of the Liber de Causis.[1] According to the Art the operations of the various orders of created being, as well as those of God, are intellectual, natural, or artificial.[2]

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[1] Platzeck, *La Figura T*, Vol. 1 (1955), pp. 78-79.

It goes without saying that the most basic names of the Art, and which are accordingly common to all the sciences and to theology, are those of the absolute principles of figure A. Ontologically real in God these perfections constitute in the Divine Being but one simple and single substance. Because they are identical with the divine Substance the absolute principles belong to the order of substance. When on the other hand we look upon them as they are present in, and are causative of, all the other realities, the principles of figure A must be of a substantial nature whenever what arises from them is a substance. But they must be accidental when they

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1. Thomas Aquinas, Saint, op. cit., p. 10.
2. Lull, Ars Universalis, d. 1, fig. T, Vol. 1, opus B, p. 4.

account for accidental realities. We have seen before that when the content of the first figure is considered in a most abstract manner, its principles become transcendental perfections, which, as such, have their ontological realization in degrees which are distinctly analogical.

In connection with what has been said about the noun and the verb as some of the constituent parts of the proposition it is interesting to note that in the enumeration of the various grammatical kinds of words Lull does not distinguish explicitly the noun and the adjective. This becomes very noteworthy when we recall the efforts of John Salisbury to differentiate between a pure unalloyed Idea, and its representation or participation by individual objects. In order to explain the difference between a noun and an adjective, John of Salisbury states that the latter somehow is a derivative of the former.[1] This explanation is nothing but a logical conclusion which follows from a Platonic metaphysics. Accordingly the position of some of the speculative grammarians was that the abstract noun, e.g., goodness or duration, precedes the concrete adjective term, e.g., good or durable. This supposition and view appears to be in antithetical opposition to that of modern philology which holds that the reverse is actually the case: it is rather the abstract term, e.g., goodness, that begins to be used only after the concrete adjective, good, has been known.[2] In a

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[1] John of Salisbury, "Metalogicus," bk. 1, ch. 25-26, bk. 2, ch. 30, Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina (Migne), Vol. 199, cols. 842-847, 877-887.

[2] Gilson, History, p. 781. See Platzeck, La Figura T, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 80. Cf. Whitney, William Dwight, Language and the Study of Language, pp. 112, 270, 275 and 424.

Platonic universe however the good itself means and is simply absolute goodness, whereas singular concrete good objects are good because they somehow partake or imitate the exalted essence of the Idea of unalloyed goodness. It is not totally unexpected to find that Bernard of Chartres writes that "whiteness" stands for, as it were, an uncorrupted virgin and that "white" signifies the idea of whiteness somehow corrupted because it is now clad in, and shrouded by, matter.[1]

What, it may be asked, was Lull's position on this question? Since there is no explicit treatment of the problem in his extant writings we may look for an answer by returning briefly to the figure A, with its circular design. Lull states very clearly that the circularity signifies that the dignities or absolute principles are mutually convertible. In the language of logic we are advised that each principle may occupy indistinctly the subject or the predicate position within a given proposition that utilizes them as its extremes. The example given is that one may say or write "goodness is grand" or "grandeur is good." In the first statement the term "grand" is an adjective and designates a quality which determines or informs goodness. It is referred to correctly as the "predicate" by Lull[2] because in the judgment made, "grand" is what is said or predicated of goodness. Without denying what has been said about "grand" as a predicate when a proposition entails a predication concerning the Divine Being, the term "grand" signifies the total fulness and perfection of grandeur. Of this total essence of magnitude or grandeur one can in turn state

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1. Gilson, History, p. 620.
2. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 2, ch. 2, fig. 1, p. 4.

that it is good, as asserted by the second formulation given before in which the same terms "good" and "grand" were used as the extremes of a second proposition. Accordingly when a proposition bears on the divine attributes or dignities the distinction between a noun and an adjective seems to disappear, and it is at most an extrinsic and apparent one. Of themselves and as divine attributes the absolute principles are indifferent to whether they are expressed in a substantive or an adjective form. The same thing can also be said whenever within the proposition we are linking the name "God" and one of the dignities: "God is good," "The Good is God." All of this is indicated by figure A with its circular form.[1]

When we consider the absolute principles in created beings, their convertibility ceases to apply. The statement "Angels are good" does not allow a simple conversion into "good beings are angels," because it is at least possible that the statement "some angels are bad" be true. Nor is it permissible to convert simply the proposition "Angelic goodness is great" because the limited goodness of a created being, as is the angelic nature, is not identical with a grandeur equally limited. The problem which had been raised by Bernard of Chartres in an almost artificial way, concerning the grammatical relation between nouns and adjectives, reappears when, dealing with created perfections, we encounter the non-convertibility of the principles of figure A.[2]

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[1] Lull, Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi, d. 3, Vol. 1, opus A, p. 45. See Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 372.

[2] Platzeck, La Figura T, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 81.

Relative to the adjective,there is another doctrine of Lull which may owe its origin to Medieval speculative grammars. The doctrine has to do with the degrees of comparison and it is linked to both the theory of the transcendent points and the series of three types of reasoning and demonstration. There can be little doubt that this doctrine of the comparative degrees goes back to Neo-Platonist philosophy, although it is very probable that Lull had no direct contact with authentic Neo-Platonist writings. The impression created by the doctrine of degrees is that Lull knew Plotinian thought in a somewhat mutilated form because it is more than apparent that the doctrine of the three degrees of the adjective is best understood against the Neo-Platonic threefold division of the reality which could not be accepted without extensive alterations by a Christian. In the Neo-Platonic universe the superior regions were directly causative of whatever being and events obtained in the region immediately inferior to them. It is not difficult to associate one of the degrees of the grammatical adjective with each one of these ontological regions.[1] In the face of the Neo-Platonic division Lull proposes his theory of the transcendent points. These coincide roughly with the Neo-Platonic conception for the points stand out as the boundaries between ontologically distinct orders of being as seen by the mind of man and from his particular situation in the hierarchy of reality. Lull's interpretation however, is thoroughly Christian and it denies effective creativity in the strict sense to all save the Divine Sphere. In this he does nothing more than adhere to the example of other great Christians who had preceded him in this way of thinking, particularly Hugh of St. Victor in his Didascalion and St. Bonaventure in his Itinerarium Mentis in Deum. If we look downward to what is inferior to the rational human soul we meet there the visible, material world of non-rational beings. If our gaze is turned upwards in the direction of what is more excellent in perfection than our own souls, it discovers the realm of pure intellects, understood by most of the Christian Scholastics to be both Angels and God.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 82. Cf. St. Thomas, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

When one attends to the presence of the transcendental absolute principles in the material world one cannot fail to recognize that the universe is good, great, enduring, etc. If then our attention is turned inward to within ourselves and our souls are compared with the visible universe, we cannot but see that our souls are better, greater, more able to endure. Finally when the attempt is made to establish a comparison between God and all other entities, both living and non-living, God must needs be seen as the best, greatest, most wise, etc. It is not very difficult to associate the adjective degrees with this hierarchical arrangement of reality and to notice a close correspondence with the orders of the material, the natural, and the divine.

Lull rejected the thesis that a superior order is the total cause of its immediate inferiors and in this manner he avoided the heretical position that the universe is not the effect of an immediate

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1. Gilson, History, pp. 611 and 634. Also La Philosophie, p. 159.

creation by the supreme First Cause. In spite of this rejection Lull managed to retain something that may be deemed a consequence of the doctrine he rejected. What he retained was a series of three types of demonstrations wherein the degrees of comparison play an important role. These three types are the quia, the propter quid, and the per aequiparantiam demonstrations.[1]

First, the argument quia is one which simply shows that the fact is so; its value is for matters of fact which occur in the visible world. Something is asserted, or may be so asserted because it is shown how it occurs within a causal series of a physical order. Of greater force than this first type of argument is the propter quid demonstration which proceeds through deductive reasoning from what is more universal to that which is less universal and particularly by means of causes ontologically higher than those which are operative within the material universe only. This type of reasoning and demonstration is appropriate and very adequate for questions about the rational soul, and even those concerning the intelligible world of separate intellects, with the exception of God. The most comprehensive and perfect demonstration would seem to be the third type, the argument per aequiparantiam, the modes of which are founded, not so much upon some superior form of causality, as upon the unity of identity which obtains amongst the divine virtues and the perfections of the supreme intelligible sphere. According to Neo-Platonism this supreme intelligible sphere included not only the first and highest principle of supreme unity, inaccessible and unknowable in itself, but also the region of the soul. For Lull, faithful to the Augustinian tradition, the highest order is uniquely one and it is totally identified with the Divine Nature.[1]

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[1] Lull, Ars Generalis, part 7, ch. 3, p. 304.

The rejection of the soul-sphere as a total cause of whatever occurs in the inferior visible world obscures the correspondence between the *propter quid* type of demonstration and one of the degrees of the adjective (the strict comparative degree) as an ontological expression in a Neo-Platonic universe. As a consequence we face certain difficulties and obscurities when we endeavor to understand the relationship between the doctrine of the degrees and that of the modes of demonstration as explained by Lull in his extant writings. This may also account for the fact that the doctrine of the degrees was not included explicitly in the final version of the *Art*. Instead it seems that the functions of the three degrees were attached to those of the third triangle of the *Ars Brevis*, *majoritas*, *aequalitas* and *minoritas*.[2]

Both of the triangles on which we have so far elaborated manifest clearly their connections with speculative grammar. The triad "God," "creature," and "operation" refer to the basic elements of a simple proposition, its subject and predicate. The second triangle which we have studied and which was not included either in the simplified revisions of the *Art* concerns the quality of judgments

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1. Platzeck, *La Figura T*, Vol. 1 (1955), pp. 82-83. *Cf.* Pistorius, Philip Villiers, *Plotinus and Neoplatonism*, pp. 2, 53.
2. Platzeck, *La Figura T*, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 83.

as the individual angles and their species show. These species or modes are: affirmation, denial, and doubt concerning what exists and what does not exist, and about what is possible or impossible.[1] Because these two triangles were not retained one may have the impression that they had lost their value for the author of the Art and were hence completely abandoned. But soon it becomes apparent that they had been only somewhat relegated and that their authentic role is to provide the general doctrinal background of necessary axioms and suppositions. What we are seeking to discover by means of an ontological theory of meanings is not the facts of multiplicity and variety but rather how this variety and manifoldness may be expressed according to ordered categories and how the human mind is able to seize and appreciate the complexity of multiplicity in an ordered unity. The basic norms for this **ordination** are what Lull aimed to establish by means of figure T,[2] particularly through the triangles that were retained.

First, there stands out an elemental group of conditions or aspects bearing on the modes of signifying. These conditions are given expression in the triangle composed of "difference," "concordance," and "contrariness" ("opposition") in general. It may be asserted that one of the most evident truths about human thought, and so basic that thought is not possible if it is ignored completely or denied, is the undeniable fact that there exist many things or beings, none of which are completely identical with others and as a consequence it would be false to assert that any one was one of the others. Within an existentially real universe, as ours is, it is impossible that two existing objects be identical altogether and in every respect. Ordinarily this is stated as a Leibnitzian principle, but it was already a Lullian thesis, and goes even further back to Neo-Platonic thought.[1] Accordingly the principle of difference is included in one of the triangles of the second figure as the most general and universal of the relative principles. It would not be incorrect to think of the principle of difference, as conceived within the Art, as the reverse side of the principle of identity. For if a reality or thing is identical with itself, then it cannot but be other than those realities which are not identical with it.

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[1] Lull, Ars Universalis, d. 1, fig. T, Vol. 1, opus B, p. 6.

[2] Platzeck, La Figura T, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 83; La Combinatoria, Vol. 13 (1954), p. 131.

But even though, therefore, we must assert that all objects, whether known by sense or intellect, are distinct from one another, the conclusion is not thereby warranted that reality is so heterogeneous as to be altogether different in every object. For there exists a kinship, a relatedness, by virtue of the fact that things are somewhat similar, some more, some less. Or at the very least, there is between things a reciprocally conditioning opposition. To account for this absence of total heterogeneity the triangle adds a second relative principle, "concordance." This new principle is not as universal as is that of difference, but it is very general and of greater extension than the third principle of the triangle, contrariness or opposition. The all-embracing universality of these triadic principles is noted by the Art for it declares that all things are revealed distinctly through difference or otherness, or in a harmonious likeness of concordance, or as opposite in some way.[1] There is no question of a strict disjunction being implied by the triangle of difference because another thesis of the Great Art is that there are no two things, unequal and distinct in **every** conceivable manner. This position may also be seen as the basis for Leibnitz' explanation about the gradually diversified character of reality in a perfect ascending continuity. Neither Lull nor Leibnitz would have agreed with those thinkers in our day who stand for an absolute heterogeneity in the universe and consequently assert that there is no sound basis for a meaningful doctrine of the analogy of being.[2]

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[1] Platzeck, La Figura T, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 84.

The principle of concordance may be associated legitimately with Plato's concept of the Koinon, something which is common to several, without being quite the same as the Aristotelian universal which is present in several numerically distinct objects. It would, therefore, not be an exaggeration to look upon the two relative principles, heretofore considered, of difference and of harmony (concordance) as the bases for a meaningful understanding of the continuous hierarchy of being. It might prove very advantageous also to assimilate both principles with the basic constants of formal logic, conjunction and disjunction. When difference and concordance, or

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1. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 2, ch. 3, fig. 2, pp. 5-6.
2. Platzeck, La Figura T, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 84. See Copleston, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 183.

conjunction and disjunction are rejected and consequently lose all their value, there is then no possible attainment of unity within the universe of extramental objects, or in that of objects as known within the mind.[1]

Less universal in extension than both the principles of difference and concordance is that of opposition. Strictly speaking opposition could be ultimately reduced to the angle of difference. However opposition merits a special mention because of its particular value for the objectives of the *Art* and because it is the foundation of later developments within the modes of signifying associated with figure T. It is very likely that just as difference and concordance retain the conditions or aspects of the Platonic notions of the *Heteron* and the *Koinon*, so now the angle of contrariety and opposition corresponds quite closely to the ancient doctrine of *enantia*, i.e., of the degrees of opposition expressed in the traditional square of opposition. Both the nature and types of opposition had been gone into and elaborated on by Aristotle; and Lull did not do anything in this area but pass the traditional exposition he had made his own. If we leave out subalternation (for it may be considered opposition only in a very wide sense) there are three kinds of opposition: contradictory, contrary, and polar opposition. What accounts for this threefold division is the presence, quality and value of a middle ground or of a term and idea which intervene between the opposed extremes. This problem was not examined in any detail by the author of the Art. First, there is the opposition of contradiction which altogether excludes any middle ground because the two opposite notions simply and absolutely deny one another. The opposition of contrariness does not entirely exclude a third alternative or intermediary idea because the opposition is not as absolute and total, as is that of contradictoriness. The third type of opposition is characterized by a third mediating idea or term wherein are combined and merged the values of two polarly opposed positions.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 86.

The next triangle is the red E F G triangle of the Ars Brevis. Its angles are constituted by the relative principles of "source," middle," and "end" which might be located and found within the region occupied by the various types of opposition. These ternary principles presuppose, therefore, the more general doctrine on opposition, and they are of use not only in emphasizing and bringing out the general structure of a proposition, but also in considering, because somehow included in them, whatever is opposed in a temporal, causal or spatial sequence, as it may be noted through the species or modes of the first angle, that of "principle."[2] The grammatical value of these distinct relative principles is explicitly stated in the Ars Ultima by Lull who, upon examining the structure of the proposition, asserts that it is to be judged and measured by the triangle E F G. And in order to explain his meaning he gives the example that the bonificans as the subject of the action is a "principle;" the bonificare as a verb manifesting the act or action is a "middle;" and finally the bonificatum, the term, accounts for the completion and hence is the "end" of

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1. Ibid., p. 84.
2. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 2, ch. 3, fig. 2, pp. 7-8.

the proposition.[1]

Mention has been already made of the last three relative principles which constitute the final (yellow in color) triangle of the Great Art; namely majoritas, aequalitas and minoritas. It was seen before also that this triangular pattern and its principles are a substitute for the speculative doctrine of the degrees of comparison of the adjective. To all of this it may be added that the last triad of the relative principles presupposes also the more general doctrine on opposition, for it develops in a particular manner the opposition of contrariness in the strict sense, and in this wise at least the H I K triangle is linked with the theory on the modes of signifying.

As its historical setting the doctrine behind this last triangle may have its roots in a two-valued metaphysical principle enunciated by Plato in his old age. This twofold principle is that of the tauto and the aoriotosduas, i.e., unity-in-itself and the undefined or indefinite duality of the greater and of the lesser. The fact suggesting this historical tie is that the area of objects to which the H I K triangle extends is that of substances and accidents. The expression "substance and accidents" is Aristotelian in its terms. But it is clear that the Platonic essences were characterized and defined by the unity and identity which constitute the reality of their being. And on the other hand the relations (Platonic accidents) of and between subsistent beings were distinguished through the greater or lesser ontological fulness of the same essences.[1] This greater or lesser participation of being is the principle of undetermined duality which rules the Ideas as their commonness, their communitas (Koinonia-ton-ideon), as long as it is linked to the principle of the One and the Same, that is, to an identity and sameness between the Ideas. According to Plato's thinking the identity of the Eleatic One remains a sterile notion unless it be combined with the second principle of the undetermined or indefinite duality, and in this wise with the relations obtaining within and amongst the many. Thus it occurs that in both the Parmenides and the Timaeus from the mingled principles of the One and of the undefined duality there arises a new concept, namely that of proportional unity.[2]

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[1] Lull, Ars Generalis, part 2, ch. 2, pp. 223-224; part 10, ch. 102, p. 539.

From these Platonic antecedents the spontaneous consequence is a logic of comparison, and it is this type of logic that is made possible by the alphabet with which the Great Art begins. The comparison may be of a quantitative nature, or it may be based on qualitative characteristics, be they essential or accidental to those things which are compared. Through a quantitative comparison the modes of signifying which become manifest are the relations, alluded to before, which yield the equal or unequal number of terms referred to, or connected, in a unilateral or bilateral relation. This quantitative approach can be linked likewise, without much difficulty, to the speculative doctrine of the degrees of comparison of the adjectives great, greater, greatest, and small, lesser and least. In a like manner a consideration in terms of essential or accidental qualities facilitates the recognition of the same degrees of the adjective, in the varied levels and orders wherewith the dignities or principles are realized in each and every being.[1]

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[1] Gilson, Etienne, Being and Some Philosophers, (2nd. edition), pp. 13-20. Platzeck, La Combinatoria, Vol. 13 (1954), pp. 133-134. Lynch, William F., An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato Through the Parmenides, pp. 97-102.

[2] Platzeck, La Figura T, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 85. Cf. Copleston, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 185-188, 193; Lynch, op. cit., pp. 107-113, 124-125, 126-133, 165-170. See Plato, "Parmenides," The Collected Dialogues of Plato (ed. by E. Hamilton and H. Cairns), pp. 948-950; "Timaeus," in the same The Collected Dialogues, pp. 1163, 1207. See also Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 13, ch. 7, pp. 899-902; ch. 9, p. 908; bk. 14, ch. 2, pp. 915-916; ch. 3, p. 920.

From the standpoint of the medieval speculative grammar, what is of utmost importance in the analysis of the figure T, or of the modes of signifying, is the rather general manner in which Lull discourses about matters of grammar. His aim was not to enter into any philological investigations in those cases in which he wrote about the noun, pronoun, participle, verb, etc. Very clearly his purpose was merely to gather the general notions held in his day and age on these questions and to integrate them within the synthesis of his _Art_. There is for example the general distinction between objects and operations in one of the later discarded triangles. This distinction corresponds to that between a noun and a verb. Again the participle was understood after the manner of a Platonic participation and reflection on the part of both that which acts and that which receives. A conjunction is of interest within the _Art_, not as a special kind of word, but as a symbol in its most general function of linking and joining. This _medium conjunctionis_ is best seen in the infinitive form of a verb, if understood as standing for an act which synthesizes the agent-source and the passive- or receiver-term. The preposition interested the author of the Art because it helps to reveal the nature of instruments which cooperate in bringing an action to its natural end and fulfilment.[1] Lull spoke of instrumental reality as a separate category of being, its chief characteristic being that an instrumental nature is nothing but a means to something higher. Equally general is the way in which Lull referred to the meaning and value of the genders and cases. It is not difficult to conclude that:

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[1] Platzeck, _La Figura T_, Vol. 1 (1955), pp. 83-85.

> All that has been said results in what appears to be a philosophy of grammar. But it is truly a general theory of the most abstract modes of signifying proper to the human spirit, precisely from the standpoint of the reciprocal relations of these modes.[2]

The fundamental laws of this theory are rooted in the two principles of difference and concordance which may, as suggested before and with profit and justification, be compared with the logical constants of a disjunction and conjunction. According to the Great Art the former are not merely logical principles. They are also ontological, and indeed their capital value and importance are due to their realization within a universe of analogical being. As previously noted this metaphysical analogy implies, and is explained by, the absolute and relative degrees of being and adjectival comparison, and the hierarchical arrangement of the various orders of

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1. Lull, Ars Generalis, part 10, ch. 103, pp. 540-541.
2. Todo lo dicho aparece como una especie de filosofia de la gramatica; pero es en verdad una teoria general de las mas abstractas significaciones del espiritu humano en sus relaciones mutuas. (Platzeck, La Figura T, Vol. 1 (1955), p. 86, (Tr. by the writer.)

THE THIRD FIGURE

BC	CD	DE	EF	FG	CH	HI	IK
BD	CE	DF	EG	FH	GI	HK	
BE	CF	DG	EH	FI	GK		
BF	CG	DH	EI	FK			
BG	CH	DI	EK				
BH	CI	DK					
BI	CK						
BK							

reality. All of these orders and beings are turned and directed upward so that they gaze towards absolute Being, i.e., towards the Divine Reality, even if they are not conscious of this. Men can now have a glimpse of their finitude which is the distance which separates all created objects from God. At the same time **man is** also able to seize, although feebly, the manner in which the created principles bear the likeness of, and participate in, the divine dignities. It is in this way that the absolute principles may be understood analogically as the ontological roots of all created being.[1]

C - The Third Figure

Neither the third nor the fourth figure are identified with a definite name or a letter symbol in the *Ars Brevis*. The third figure is, in a sense, a composite figure for it results from the combination of the principles of the first two figures of the *Art*. Accordingly the letters within its chambers will sometimes stand for the principles of the first column, and at other times for those of the second column, of the alphabet.[2] The *Ars Brevis* explains this by saying that the letters within the chambers of the third figure will have the meaning and value now as in the first figure, now as in the second figure. As a consequence of this twofold nature the questions which may be resolved by means of the third figure are sometimes resolved by a recourse to, and the use of, the principles of the first figure, sometimes by means of the principles of the second figure alone, and at other times through a mingling of the principles in these two figures. Other versions of the Art will refer to these various possible approaches to the question as circular and triangular solutions which remind the reader of the circular and triangular patterns characteristic of figures A and T.[1] The solution which has mingled and utilized the principles of both of the first two figures is more characteristically that of the present third figure and it involves circularity and triangularity, i.e., absolute principles and relative principles. On account of its twofold or composite nature in which are included the principles of the first two figures the Ars Brevis sees the third figure as possessed of a more universal character. By means of this new figure the human intellect can resolve a greater number of, and more difficult, questions and is therefore better equipped to proceed in the acquisition of scientific knowledge.[2]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 86.

[2] Lull, *Ars Brevis*, part 2, ch. 4, fig. 3, pp. 13-14; *Tabula Generalis*, d. 1, fig. 3, Vol. 5, *opus* B, pp. 4 and 5.

Before proceeding to describe the geometric pattern characteristic of this new figure it may be noted that the third figure, as found in the Ars Brevis, made its first appearance in the Ars Inventiva Veritatis. According to the contemporary biography of Lull it was in this version of the Art that a reduction and simplification of the figures and principles was undertaken for the sake of those who found the Art still too difficult to master. When one looks at the general and external design of the third figure one receives the

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1. Lull, Lectura Artis quae Brevis, d. 2, ch. 1, fig. 3, Vol. 5, opus C, p. 2.
2. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 2, ch. 4, fig. 3, p. 16; Ars Generalis, part 2, ch. 3, p. 225.

impression that it is a compact and abbreviated form of most of the auxiliary or secondary figures, and of the elemental figures, which are frequently encountered in the original versions of the Art.[1]

In most of the manuscripts and printed editions the explanation of the third figure is accompanied by a graphic, visual, or geometric design which has roughly a triangular shape with two lines forming a right angle on the upper left hand corner and the third side, opposite the right angle, is an uneven line. Actually the third figure has the shape it exhibits because it is constituted by thirty-six squares of equal size, designated as chambers. These thirty-six squares or chambers are arranged in a very definite order in a series of lines and columns because each chamber is directly to the side of, and (or) below or above,another **square** or chamber. The first horizontal and vertical lines have, each one, a number of eight chambers. The second lines, or rows of squares, are made up of seven chambers, either horizontally or vertically. This is continued until we come to both the eighth horizontal and vertical series of chambers, each one containing only one square or chamber. The decreasing number of chambers in each horizontal and vertical line accounts for the uneven side opposite the right angle formed by the upper and the left sides of figure three. As indicated before all the chambers are squares of an equal size and the first square of each horizontal line is directly below the first square of the line above it, with the exception of the square of the first horizontal line. The net result is a figure somewhat like a triangle containing thirty-six chambers.

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[1] Lull, Ars Universalis, prol. Vol. 1, opus B, p. 2; Ars Demonstrativa, d. 1, Vol. 3, opus B, pp. 3-7. See Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 399.

Another feature of the geometric pattern which constitutes the third figure is the presence, within each chamber or square, of two of the letters taken from the alphabet placed at the beginning of the Art. These letters are arranged in suchwise that we never find two letters which are the same in a given square. Moreover the letters appear in such an order that the second letter within a given chamber never comes before the first one in the order of the alphabet. In other words the first letter is one which always precedes the second one in the alphabet, although it need not necessarily be immediately before it. The first letter of all the chambers in any vertical line or series is identical. That of the chambers in a horizontal row is never the same, but rather follows immediately in alphabetical order that of the chamber immediately before it. On the other hand the second letter within each chamber is never the same as, or prior in alphabetical order to, the second letter of the squares immediately above or before it. Rather it immediately follows in the alphabet the letter of the preceding chamber. As a consequence of this nottoo intricate but well ordered arrangement we have an ordered series or collection of thirty-six chambers with two letter-symbols in each one, and with no two of the squares exactly the same.[1] As an example the first line **reads BC, CD, DE, EF**, FG, GH, HI, IK; the second line reads

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[1] This is a departure from the practice in earlier versions of allowing duplication of letters.

BD, CE, DF, EG, FH, GI, HK; the last or eighth line has only one chamber BK. The first vertical line or column reads BC, BD, BE, BF, BG, BH, BI, BK; the second column reads CD, CE, CF, CG, CH, CI, CK; the last or eighth column has only one chamber IK.

It is, therefore, more than evident to any student of figure three that each of its chambers contains two letters. Since these letters have more than one signification according to the alphabet, each set of two letters allows for several interpretations. The first chamber BC, for example, includes in these two letters the several meanings which attach to B and C in the alphabet. Each letter stands for at least two principles and one rule or question, one subject, and two ethical terms.[1] In a later chapter of the Ars Brevis, that of the evacuatio of the third figure this is made explicit, as we will see presently. When first introducing the figure it is sufficient to emphasize that the letters stand for the principles which we discover in the first two figures or the first two columns of the alphabet. It is on this account that the third figure is described as a composite figure.

In addition each square has a particular logical significance because the Ars Brevis indicates that the two letters within each chamber may be understood as suggesting the subject and predicate terms of a proposition which may be intended as a conclusion of a demonstration. One of the principal tasks of the Artista is to seek out the middle term which may be utilized to link the two extremes of our intended conclusion. It is on this account that the chambers are of great importance to the student of the Art.[1] A composition of ideas and terms can be soundly established only if we discover the middle term required in all but self-evident and analytical propositions. As an example the Ars Brevis states that between good and grandeur, between BC, we discover that it is concordance, C, that accounts for their union. The discovery of the middle term is important for it enables the artista to draw a conclusion, to defend given propositions as conclusions, and to attempt to clarify and explain them as much as possible.[2]

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[1] Lull, Tabula Generalis, d. 1, fig. 3, Vol. 5, opus B, pp. 4-5; Lectura super Artem, d. 2, fig. 3, part 1, Vol. 5, opus E, pp. 43-44.

Considered in its entirety the third figure may be seen also as suggesting that each of the eighteen absolute and relative principles may be understood as a subject whose value and perfection is made complete by the other seventeen principles. Any principle may be placed as the subject of a proposition to which all the other principles may be attributed as predicates. We witness in this manner the mingling of one principle with all the others and in this fashion gain a greater understanding of each principle. For we now know and experience it not only in isolation or abstraction from the others, but as intimately affected in its very essence by the presence of the other principles.[3] This is necessary for although every principle is perfect

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1. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 2, ch. 4, fig. 3, p. 14; Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 3, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 12.
2. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 2, ch. 4, fig. 3, p. 14.
3. Lull, Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 3, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 12.

in its being or essence, it cannot exist except as conditioned and, as it were, strengthened by the other principles of whatever is real. Not only do we gain additional knowledge in this manner by referring or attributing to any one principle all of the others, but the artista is better able to draw additional supporting reasons for whatever stand he has chosen as the legitimate conclusion. This is because the understanding of, and the knowledge about, the nature and condition of the principles, singly or in combinations, allow us to draw affirmative or negative conclusions. We are to affirm that which agrees with what is known of our principles, and we are to deny that which is at variance with our experience of the same principles.[1]

In order to show how this attribution of predicate-principles to a subject-principle is to be conducted the Ars Brevis gives an example using goodness as the subject-principle about which additional information is gained through the remaining principles when they are considered as predicates of goodness. Thus one may say: goodness is great, it endures, it is powerful, it is able to be known, it is worthy of desire (love), it is virtuous, it has truth, it is glorious, it is a source of distinction, it brings about order and harmony, it opposes things which are not identical, it is a principle and source, it mediates, it perfects and fulfills, it embraces or accounts for what is greater, it brings about the proper measure, and it accounts even for the less perfect reality of inferior beings. Just as additional light is thrown on the nature of goodness by the other seventeen principles, so also we can receive further insight into the nature of any of these other seventeen if we see one of them as the subject of which all the other perfections operate as predicates.[1]

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[1] Lull, Lectura Artis quae Brevis, d. 2, ch. 1, fig. 3, Vol. 5, opus C, p. 2.

We have already noted the universal character of the third figure because it embraces the principles of the first two figures. It is this universality which accounts for the scientific character of the knowledge gained with the aid of this figure. A particular contingent object or a question about it can be investigated by considering closely all of the terms which express the questions. These terms may be contained in figure three either explicitly, or implicitly and reductively.[2] We must therefore choose that chamber or those chambers whose letters signify the principles more appropriate to the solution of our problem because they bear on the terms of the question as the more universal extends to its inferiors. To test and to reinforce our solution it is desirable that a problem be solved not only with the principles of one chamber but with those of many others because no sound resolution of the problem can be at odds with any other chamber and principle. Consistency is thus achieved if we make use of this mutual solidarity. Thus the question whether goodness and grandeur characterize created beings should be solved first through BC, i.e., the principles of goodness and grandeur, and afterwards by BE, BF, etc. Indeed to proceed with the investigation in a very orderly manner we can detect several methods in figure three: 1) descending from one chamber to the next one, e.g., from BC to BD, etc. until we reach BK;

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[1] Lull, Ars Brevis, part 2, ch. 4, fig. 3, p. 15.
[2] Ibid., part 10, ch. 1, p. 65.

2) ascending from one chamber to the next one laterally, e.g., from BK to CK until IK; 3) a horizontal discourse, e.g., from BC to CD, until we reach IK.[1]

In view of the description and meaning of the third figure it is possible to see its utility or finality within the methodology of the Art. One of the principal objectives is to contribute to the search for the real middle term which binds or mediates between the subject and predicate of the proposition which are also signified by the two letters of each chamber. Intimately connected with this aim is the increase and strengthening of our scientific knowledge about **particular** propositions by means of the necessary and universal principles, to which the matter of the particular propositions must be reduced and related. In order to attain this goal we cannot but grasp the importance of the increased information concerning each principle. To obtain this information may be said to be a more immediate aim of figure three. This, as we have seen, is attained by attributing to each principle, as to a subject, all the other principles as its predicates.

The first section of the Ars Brevis, which introduces the third figure, concludes by cautioning that a very important condition for its successful use is that no solutions in any of the chambers should be in opposition, or contradict, those arrived at in other chambers. All of the chambers must be in harmony and agreement with each other and with whatever is accepted as a valid conclusion because

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1. Lull, Tabula Generalis, d. 1, fig. 3, Vol. 5, opus B, p. 5.

THE FOURTH FIGURE


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of them. In other words the principles and truths of chamber BC cannot contradict the principles and truths of CD, etc. In the statement of this condition we may detect the influence of the principle of non-contradiction which is basic to thought according to Aristotelian logic, sometimes declared inadequate by Lull.[1]

D - The Fourth Figure

As indicated in connection with the previous figure the fourth and last figure of the *Ars Brevis* has no distinct designation in the *Art*, except that it is the fourth figure. This figure might have been termed the "revolving" or the "rotating" figure[2] because, as we shall see, it is made up of several circles, two of which revolve freely. Perhaps even more appropriately this last figure might be termed the "universal" figure because implicit in it are the first three figures. Indeed the fourth figure seems to be all that was retained of a *figura universalis* contained in the *Ars Demonstrativa*, the first major revision of Lull's *Art*.[3] From the explanation of the *figura universalis* it appears that it was meant to be the synthesis of all the other figures of the *Art*. The figure as it appears in the *Ars Brevis* was first introduced with the *Ars Inventiva Veritatis* in which, as it has been said before, the reduction of the figures and principles was made for the sake of those who do not possess a very acute intellect. The Ars Brevis itself merely states that this figure is more universal than the third figure which, as seen before, is a composite figure and is made up of the first two figures. And the reason given for the assertion that the new figure is more universal is that there are at least three letters in its chambers whereas those of the second figure have only two.[1] With the increase of the letters within the chambers these become more useful instruments wherewith to understand problems and to gain a more profound insight into, as well as a more extended knowledge about, reality.

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[1] Lull, *Ars Generalis*, part 7, ch. 29, p. 315; and part 10, ch. 101, p. 538; *Ars Brevis*, part 2, ch. 4, fig. 3, p. 16. See also Carreras y Artau, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 457.

[2] Lull, *Ars Inventiva*, d. 1, fig. 4, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 12; *Lectura Artis quae Brevis*, d. 1, ch. 1, fig. 4, Vol. 5, *opus* C, p. 2.

[3] Lull, *Ars Demonstrativa*, d. 1, fig. dem., Vol. 3, *opus* B, pp. 6-7; *Introductoria Artis*, ch. 22, Vol. 3, *opus* A, p. 11. See also Carreras y Artau, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 398-399.

In its geometric design the fourth figure results from placing together three concentric circles of unequal size. Each of the two inner and smaller circles may be freely rotated[2] and turned around their center and inside of the outer circle which remains fixed. In most manuscripts and in older editions, the two lesser circles are cut out of paper and are attached by means of thread[3] to the outer and fixed circle which is drawn on one of the pages or folios of the manuscript or printed text. Just as the circle of the first figure is divided into nine equal sections or chambers and to each of the chambers a letter-symbol is assigned, so each of the three circles of this fourth figure is equally partitioned into nine sections

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1. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 2, ch. 5, fig. 4, p. 18.
2. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 2, ch. 5, fig. 4, pp. 16-17; Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 4, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 12; Lectura super Artem, d. 2, fig. 4, part 1, Vol. 5, opus E, p. 109.
3. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 434.

and each section has written in it one of the nine letters of the alphabet B - K.

The purpose of the rotability of the two inner circles is to make possible a very large number of distinct combinations of the letters in each circle. These combinations are of three letters, as stated above, and produce the more complex chambers which are characteristic of this more universal figure. Two hundred and fifty-two of these chambers are possible according to the statement of the Art. This figure is the total of

$$\frac{9 \times 8 \times 7}{2} = 28 \times 9 = ((28+21+15+10+6+3+1) \times 3).$$

One of the reasons for the number being two hundred and fifty-two and no other is that, just as in the preceding third figure, no chamber which arises from the arrangement of the three circles of figure four may be formed in such a manner that the same letter is repeated within it, or that either the second or third letter of a chamber, taken from the middle and the innermost circles in that order, precede the letter(s) before either one of them in the alphabetical order. This explanation accounts for the figure of two hundred and fifty-two and because of it we must overlook the statement in the Ars Brevis that when we place the letter D of the innermost circle under the letter C of the middle circle and under the letter B of the outer circle we may note that there are nine chambers, (BCD, CDE, DEF, EFG, FGH, GHI, HIK, IKB, KBC). If the Art were to allow for either duplication of chambers or of letters, or that the second and third letters precede in alphabetical order those which they come after in the chambers the number would then be much larger.[1] Actually the combinations that might accrue from duplication of letters or for other reasons might be considered to be implied or implicitly contained in at least one of the two hundred and fifty-two chambers allowed by the Art. For example, KBC is implied by BCK.

In order to demonstrate the manner in which the fourth figure must be used in arriving at the chamber-combinations let us take an example. First we must place the letters C and D of the second and third circle under the letter B of the outer circle. With this first arrangement these seven chambers are brought about: BCD, CDE, DEF, EFG, FGH, GHI, HIK. If we now rotate the smallest circle so that the letter E appears under the letters C and B of the middle and outer circles we get six new chambers: BCE, CDF, DEG, EFH, FGI, GHK. We continue to rotate the smallest circle until we arrive at the chamber BCK. This chamber is the last one possible through rotation of the innermost circle under the letters B and C of the middle and outer circles. In order to continue and to obtain more chambers we must now rotate the middle circle so that its letter D appears under the letter B of the outer and fixed circle. We may now have a new series of chambers, e.g., BDE, CEF, DFG, EGH, FHI, GIK, BDF, CEG, etc. The process may be carried on by placing the remaining letters of the middle circle under the letter B of the fixed circle. The number of chambers allowed by figure four will thus be arrived at and it will consist of eighty-four basic letter combinations. When eighty-four is multiplied by three (because of the three distinct letters in each chamber, and each letter with the meanings of at least two principles) the total will be two hundred and fifty-two chambers. It may perhaps seem that we can obtain a greater number of combinations if we continue to place the letters of the two inner circles under those of the outer and fixed circle, except that instead of under B, we would place them under C, D, etc. Actually this involves a duplication of many of the combinations already given in the eighty-four arrived at already. This could be avoided more easily perhaps by following a different procedure suggested by the Art in the formation of the chambers. If we begin with the letters B C of the outer and inner circle we can derive first BCD, BCE, BCF, BCG, BCH, BCI, BCK. As the next step we use the B D of the outer and middle circle and we can have BDE, BDF, BDG, BDH, BDI, BDK. When we have finished with the remaining letters of the middle circle under the letter B of the outer circle, we shall have twenty-eight combinations. A similar procedure which utilizes the letter C instead of the letter B of the outer circle will give twenty-one additional combinations. The other letters (D, E, F, G, H, I, K) of the outer circle will provide combinations in these numbers: 15, 10, 6, 3, 1. This second way of constructing the chambers of the fourth figure avoids duplications more easily and yields the basic eighty-four letter combinations. The two hundred and fifty-second chamber (eighty-fourth basic combination) will therefore be HIK because if we were to attempt further combinations the letters of the two inner circles would be prior in the alphabetical order to that of the outer circle.

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[1] Plantl would correct Lull and give as the calculation 9X9X9=729. Leibnitz permitting duplication of letters comes up with a much larger figure. See Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 434; Vol. 2, pp. 315-316.

Now that the mechanical and mathematical manipulations have been described we may consider the meaning, significance and purpose of the fourth figure with its many chambers. The universality of this figure has already been referred to and it has been seen to be due to the inclusion of three letters in each of the chambers. Each letter stands, it can be gathered from the alphabet, for several principles, rules, and other general themes. The figure with its chambers is proposed by the _Art_ as a universal instrument for the solution of questions and problems.[1] Of extremely great interest is the statement that the letters of the middle circle are to be considered in a special way because they represent the middle term wherewith the subject and the predicate terms, or extremes, of a proposition may be linked. The latter terms are signified by the other two circles, the outer and the innermost circles. It is on account of the mutual participation by the subject and predicate terms in what is signified by the middle term that the _Artista_ must make use of the principles of the middle circle of figure four in his quest for a means to establish the truth and the validity of a proposition presented as the conclusion of a demonstration. What is true will shine more brightly through the multiplication of reasons which support a position and which may be found within the many chambers of this figure.[2]

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[1] Lull, _Lectura super Artem_, d. 2, fig. 4, part 1, Vol. 5, _opus_ E, p. 109.

[2] Lull, _Lectura Artis quae Brevis_, d. 2, ch. 1, fig. 4, Vol. 5, _opus_ C, pp. 2-3.

In these assertions we may discover a desire to present the fourth figure as an instrument for demonstration. This impression is further strengthened when we notice that one of the principal uses of this figure is the preparation of a "table" of combinations which appears in a later section of the Ars Brevis. This table was developed in order to provide us with a method of, and a very rich source for, augmenting the reasons which will explain and support a given conclusion.[1] If one wishes to multiply his arguments all he needs to do therefore is to revolve the circles of figure four. In this wise we alter the chambers and with them the principles signified by the letters which can be used to conduct our investigations.[2] The new chambers, however, with their new and distinct conditions and mingling of the principles, are reducible to the previous ones; at least in the sense that they may not contradict what has been affirmed or denied by the latter.

Through the fourth figure we are thus able to develop and advance our scientific knowledge and to increase and deepen the premises which support our scientific conclusions. All of this is made possible by each and all of the two hundred and fifty-two chambers or minglings of principles allowed by this figure. Each one of the chambers has a universal character as a result of the principles that constitute it.[3] Universality, as we have seen, is one of the marks of the causal and certain knowledge which the Ancients required so

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1. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 2, ch. 5, fig. 4, p. 33; Lectura Artis quae Brevis, d. 2, ch. 1, fig. 4, Vol. 5, opus C, p. 3. See also Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 435, 439.
2. Lull, Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 4, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 13.
3. Lull, Tabula Generalis, d. 1, fig. 4, Vol. 5, opus B, p. 5.

that knowledge be deemed scientific. For our purpose what we must do, the Art goes on, is to establish which of the chambers with the letters in it is most appropriate for application in connection with the terms of our question or problem. No matter what the question may be its terms are implicitly contained within the terms of the Art, and hence the same terms are reducible to those of our figures. If the terms of the problem are better related to the principles of the first figure one ought to use a chamber in which its letters stand for the absolute principles. But if the principles of the second figure are more appropriate the Artista ought to utilize a chamber with the relative principles.[1] A condition one ought always to bear in mind is that the terms which are intended as the subject and predicate terms of our conclusion should agree and not exclude each other through some incompatibility in their meanings. Indeed the agreement should extend to all the chambers. In this way we shall avoid making absurd or unwarranted statements. Arguments which may appear to support false propositions are in accordance with a limited number of chambers. A true and sound argument harmonizes with each and every one of the principles taken singly or in combinations. It could be said that a negative way of deciding the falsity of a proposition and the weakness of an argument is to show how they deny or oppose certain chambers and their conditions.[2]

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[1] Lull, Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 4, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 12.
[2] Ibid., p. 13.

CHAPTER IV

PRINCIPAL REMAINING PARTS OF THE ARS BREVIS

I - Definitions of the Principles: Part Three of the Ars Brevis

A - Reason for Definitions

In the mind of Lull one of the principal values of the *Great Art* consists in the fact that it can be utilized as an unerring instrument in man's acquisition of new knowledge. Some of the titles of some of his books in which the Art is explained are for this reason not inappropriate; for example: *Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi Veritatem*, and *Ars Inventiva Veritatis*. As we have seen, the four figures were designed to facilitate the objective of acquiring new scientific knowledge by an appeal to our visual and imaginative powers. It must not be forgotten, however, that these geometric and mechanical patterns, triangles or rotating wheels are an extrinsic structure, a shell as it were, which derives its principal value from the principles which they contain and which are symbolized by the letters in them. It is in the understanding of these principles and in their application to the matters under scrutiny that the *Art* really consists. It is only natural therefore that before proceeding any farther, and immediately after the figures have been introduced and explained, the *Ars Brevis* should propose a series of definitions for all of its principles. These, as we have seen, are eighteen in number, nine of them absolute and the other nine relative. In passing one may note that these definitions show the character of the Ars Brevis as a summary, resumé or outline of the Great Art. With the exception of the Ars Generalis Ultima, of which it is the direct summary or outline, the earlier, more extended and detailed versions of the Art contain almost exclusively minute discussions about the nature and characteristics of the principles. In order to understand better the apparently simple definitions it is almost a necessity to study these extended treatises. For example, although the definitions of the principles, transcendental in nature, do not mention explicitly anything concerning their division into substantial and accidental principles, one must keep in mind the possible realization of most of the principles in the order of substance and of accidents. A few, e.g. opposition, are always accidental and as a consequence are not universal in their extension to all of reality, at least in a strict meaning. It is as belonging to the order of substance that principles account for substantial realities, whereas accidental modifications are the result of accidental principles. There are therefore a substantial goodness, and an accidental one. Both are required to establish and maintain the reality of all good things[1] which presently exist.

Accordingly the definitions of the principles are stated in order that the Art student may have an adequate understanding of the reality and nature of the principles. This is in itself very important.

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1. Lull, Tabula Generalis, d. 2, Vol. 5, opus B, p. 6.

But in addition the definitions, either singly or in combination, yield the true, primary and necessary principles with which genuine demonstrations must begin.[1] With the definitions and truths derived from them we can judge about a question confident of reaching the appropriate conclusion. As one proceeds in the investigations one must be careful that all assertions and all denials leave the nature of the principles intact, and therefore do not contradict their legitimate definitions. No proposition may be accepted as a sound and valid conclusion if it entails a contradiction of the definitions of the principles. Likewise no one may alter the definitions in any drastic fashion because the definitions are statements of what the principles are in actuality.[2]

When the reader first meets the definitions of each principle, he may be inclined to ask how adequate they are because superficially they appear to be rather general descriptions. A few of them may even seem to be simply tautological statements. We have had occasion to note that in the case of Lull the understanding of what a definition ought to be is rather Platonic. In the Ars Generalis Ultima he declares that the Aristotelian definition is commonly stated as one which says what an object is by indicating both its proximate genus and its specific difference. But this type of a definition is unsatisfactory for it is vague and even confusing. A sound definition ought to manifest the actual nature and reality of the definiendum as it is in itself, and this in such a fashion that whatever is said of it agrees with no other object in exactly the same manner.[1] An adequate definition allows one to know things as they are in themselves. Moreover whatever it attributes to them belongs to no other kind of things in exactly the same way. We should not be amazed at the fact that Lull was not satisfied with the ideal Aristotelian definition, for after all he did not consider the logic of Aristotle the adequate instrument for an investigation of reality. Indeed this is why he proclaimed the superiority of the Art over ordinary logic, for the latter stops at second intentions, whereas the Art enables us to reach the roots of reality itself.[2]

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[1] Lull, Ars Generalis, part 3, pp. 228-229.
[2] Lull, Ars Brevis, part 3, pp. 19-20.

Lull has no interest in purely nominal definitions. These may have a certain value but for the Realist philosopher knowledge and science, made precise in definitions, are objective and have an extramental reference. A legitimate scientific definition is not merely a statement about a word or a name but rather an expression which designates and manifests the nature of actual reality. Definitions are therefore primarily real, quidditative definitions and they are of value to the extent that they manifest what an object is by indicating its root-principles.[3] Lull recognized that there are various modes of defining, some better than others. But according to him the more adequate ones may be reduced to two principal types and their subdivisions. The first principal mode offers a definition which states

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1. Lull, Lectura super Artem, d. 2, Vol. 5, opus E, p. 10.
2. Lull, Ars Generalis, part 10, ch. 101, pp. 537-538.
3. Lull, Lectura super Artem, d. 2, Vol. 5, opus E, p. 10

the nature of the definiendum in terms of at least one of the orders of causality which explain both its being what it is and how it operates. Accordingly we may explicate what something is if we indicate its efficient causes, but more adequately perhaps if we state the action of efficaciousness distinctive of the nature of what we are defining. A definition in terms of final causality, manifests the definiendum in terms of the object and end for which it is intended in a manner which is exclusive of others. A definition in terms of matter or material cause is an account of that out of which the agent through its action brings forth the effect. Instead of a formal cause, Lull mentions power or potentia as the characteristic of another causal definition. By potentia he was thinking principally of the receptive or passive character of that which is perfectible and perfected by the influence received from the agent.[1]

The second general mode of defining is by means of an expression or a statement about the definiendum in terms of the various species of rule C proposed by the Art in the following section or chapter. We shall see presently that the rule alluded to implies questions which, if properly answered, will reveal an object either as it is in itself, or in its relation to other objects. This is accomplished by statements which indicate what the object is in its very nature and being, what are its coessential perfections without which it cannot be what it is, what it becomes when it enters into the reality of other perfections and entities, and what it has in these other realities and without which it could not possibly be present or act in them.[1]

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[1] Lull, Ars Generalis, part 3, p. 228.

More than one definition is, therefore, possible for any given kind of object, or being, which we may wish to define. Some definitions are of course more basic and adequate than others, and the criterion to determine which are more perfect definitions is of course the degree to which they permit us to enter into the reality of the object which the definition is intended to manifest. In addition to the kinds of definition deemed acceptable by the author of the Art, Lull states that others have been offered but they oftentimes are too difficult or complex and may even disregard, or at least ignore, the distinct and characteristic structure of the principles of the Art and their universal application as the roots of whatever is truly real.[2] It is on this account that the logical definition in terms of genus and difference is set aside as not sufficiently clear and objective.

The remarks concerning the meaning of a definition made in the preceding paragraph may help to set aside the initial feeling which a person accustomed to definitions which yield the generic and specific notes of the definiendum may have about the adequacy, or lack of it, of the Lullian definitions. There is of course at least another factor which may be mentioned and which may help to dispel amazement. Definitions are intended for the purpose of rendering more explicit our understanding of what the nature of an object is. This is accom-

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1. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 4, pp. 23-24.
2. Lull, Ars Generalis, part 3, p. 228.

plished most successfully by revealing the reasons, causes or principles responsible for the object being precisely the kind of thing that it is. An appeal or a recourse is made to what is more basic, more simple and prior or antecedent in the order of nature. When what we intend to define is not a particular type of being but the root principles which establish all things in their reality we discover that there is nothing antecedent and more basic which may aid us to explicate the character and nature of these principles which by definition are primary and fundamental. Is it astonishing that as a result the definitions of them sound at first more like hazy descriptive statements and that the writer may seem forced to use words which are somewhat related to, if not derivatives of, the name of the principle which is being defined? These apparent imperfections should not diminish or weaken the value of the definitions of the principles. These cannot be denied or contradicted, according to Lull, unless we desire to deny our immediate experience of what is real.[1] In a sense the nature of the principles of the Art is so luminous and clear that a definition which attempts to reveal them more distinctly is bound to obscure them somewhat. We have a parallel in the case of any transcendental perfection, or even of the supreme categories: neither the former nor the latter permit an analysis or resolution into prior genera and differences either because they are the ultimate genera or because they transcend and precede the division of the categories. The most effective way to show the correctness of the definitions is to experience their actual presence in all existing things. If we seek to bring additional support the best alternative possible lies in the reciprocal support given by the definitions of other principles.[1] No definition may be denied without denying those of the other principles. And, on the other hand, a sound understanding of a principle and its definitions leads to the understanding of those of the others because of the reciprocal penetration or intermingling of the principles which is the ontological justification for the Art of combinations present in the Great Art. An important result of this reciprocal support is the combination or composition of the definitions of principles. Through composite definitions we are better prepared to define more accurately composite natures which are the natural outcome of the manifold variety of combinations and of the mingling of principles.[2] An exception here is that of the Supreme First Cause in Whom the principles are subsistent and so identified with each other in their unlimited infinity that no composite nature can be derived. Indeed no question of derivation arises in this single and unique case of God, the supremely Excellent One, because the absolutely necessary One is in no way consequent on any antecedent principle. God is the Supreme Reality, one and identical with the supreme absolute principles of figure A. And as indicated, there is no suggestion of pantheism in this position of Lull.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 229.

If the Artista keeps before him all that has been said about the definitions and above all if he sees to it that no real opposition to, and destruction of, the definitions is entailed in any position he

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1. Ibid., part 3, p. 229. See Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 436.
2. Lull, **Ars Generalis**, part 3, pp. 228-229.

has chosen to defend, he will then experience no unsurmountable problems in removing all types of error, the enemy of the mind. Moreover with the increase of scientific knowledge, by means of these definitions, the intellect will be able to discover the necessary means and the required middle term for any and all demonstrations. It is interesting to recall how the propter quid demonstration of the Posterior Analytics of Aristotelian logic calls for a middle term which is the definition of the subject term of our conclusion.[1]

It is of utmost importance if we are to profit from the Great Art that the Artista commit to memory the definitions of the principles once he has understood them sufficiently well. If he remains ignorant of them how can he proceed further with the Art? Certainly he will not be able to teach it.[2]

In the following paragraphs the individual definitions for all of the eighteen principles will be stated first as they are given in the Ars Brevis and then we shall limit ourselves to a brief explanation drawn mainly from at least one of the other versions of the Art by Lull himself. Use will also be made of the commentaries on the principles by Lullists, particularly by Anthony Ramon Pascual, "the most erudite of Lullian scholars" since the death of Lull until the turn of the nineteenth century.[3]

Both the more extended explanations of the definitions con-

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1. Aristotle, "Posterior Analytics," bk. 1, ch. 13, The Basic Works of Aristotle (ed. by R. McKeon), pp. 129-130
2. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 3, p. 22.
3. Peers, op. cit., pp. 391-392. Cf. Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 364-368.

tained in earlier versions of the Art and the less detailed presentation of them in the two works of Pascual manifest very clearly the transcendental character of each of the principles of the Art. Indeed one receives the impression that an unmistakable effort has been made to exhibit their presence and reality in the infinite realm of the Divine and in that of the finite created universe. The definitions of the principles may not, therefore, be univocally understood or interpreted. Their realizations are analogical on account of the radical and unbridgeable differences which distinguish the subsistent nature of the principles as Dignities within the Being of God from the derivative and participated character of the principles which constitute the reality of all other beings. The latter are not necessary in an unqualified sense, for their existence is a received one.

B - Definitions of Each of the Eighteen Principles

1) B = Goodness: Bonitas

Goodness is a perfection of being whereby a good being brings forth something that is good and, as a result, to be is good, and not-to-be is an evil.

The definition of goodness is given first very naturally for it is cited first in the alphabet of the Art. Goodness is an aspect or perfection at the heart of whatever is real for it is by reason of it that a being effects that which is good. This basic signification is evident in the case of divine goodness. Should God's goodness remain inoperative and non-diffusive for even a single instant it would become ineffective and meaningless. Inactivity is a defect and as such contrary to the excellence of Supreme Perfection. One must conclude that because of His goodness God is unceasingly effecting what is good. This cannot be used to argue for the necessity of creation which is a free effect. It rather shows the infinite generosity of the divine life within the immutable dynamism of God's productions *ad intra*. We can have no doubt that to act and effect what is good is a perfection. To cause what is good is indeed a most desirable attribute. It is necessary to conclude that the divine goodness, than which none is higher or more sublime since it is supreme, is the only adequate explanation as to why God causes what is good and that which is able to effect good things.[1]

Although the principles defined in the *Art* are expressed in abstract terms, as for example when it speaks of goodness, it is evident that in their primary instance or as the primary analogues, the principles designate personal and subsistent perfections which are identified with the living and free First Cause. When Lull writes of divine goodness he does not have in mind an abstraction but an infinite and personal reality, the divine Existent whose being is good and whose generosity is the ultimate source of the goodness of whatever order we may think. The goodness present in, and produced by, other beings mirrors and reflects the overflowing diffusiveness of this underived Goodness.[2]

Because of the transcendental character of goodness it is

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1. Pascual, Anthony Ramon, *Examen de la Crisis de el Rmo. Maestro Don Benito Feijoo, Monje Benedictino sobre el Arte Lulliana*, Vol. 1, p. 12.
2. Lull, *Ars Inventiva*, d. 1, fig. 1, Vol. 5, *opus* A, p. 3.

not possible to conceive the other principles of being, which are basic in an Art designed to investigate questions and problems about reality, as without the efficaciousness of goodness. Without its influence no reality and no principle of reality are possible.

The goodness of which the Art speaks is not primarily a moral quality but a metaphysical property which in its universal transcendence is convertible with the being of all existents. Were not the good a universal and a transcendental principle each individual good would be so individual and specific that the strongest bond within the order of the real would be severed. As a result the totality of real existents would be altogether heterogeneous,[1] and scientific knowledge would be unattainable because each entity would be completely disparate. Instead of an orderly hierarchic scale of beings, the universe would be a pluriverse of unrelated objects.

The transcendental nature of goodness is underscored by its analogical realization. This explains why the goodness of the more excellent entities is greater and more noble than that of ontologically inferior orders. We are reminded of Plato's vision of reality when Lull envisions a being who is Supreme Goodness, and consequently the cause and explanation in one degree or another, of all the other entities, than which it is naturally and infinitely better. In this manner it is not at all difficult to develop a demonstration of the existence of the supreme principle of goodness, a Subsistent Good, and the origin of all that is good and lovable, and hence of all beings other than Itself. With comparative ease It is identified with the Christian God who is all-good. As the *Supremum Bonum* this self-existent Good moves all other beings, at least as a final cause moves an efficient cause. Through the efficient cause is explained the reciprocal efficaciousness between the material and formal causes.[1] This does not imply that the *Bonum Supremum* is not a cause in the order of efficient causality. The definition of goodness declares that the good is the *raison d'etre* of the very existence of that which it produces or effects.

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[1] Lull, Tabula Generalis, d. 2, Vol. 5, opus B, p. 6.

It need not be pointed out that the definition of the good, as well as that of the other seventeen principles of the *Art*, is rather general. For one thing it is designed to express only the basic essential meaning of a notion which transcends or precedes the division of genus and specific differences, a division which is required for an Aristotelian ideal definition. For that reason additions or qualifications have to be made as soon as one deals with more specific types of goodness in which the universal goodness is, as it were, contracted. The *Art* will note, for instance, that goodness exists either as substantial or as accidental, the latter of course being derived from the former as a participation in essential or substantial goodness. This is the case with the goodness of the other principles which mirror and receive substantial goodness and hence are good not of themselves, but through essential and substantial goodness. It goes without saying that the subsistent Good or God is in the order of substance. Indeed it is not exactly accurate to state it in such terms because God as well as the Supreme Principles of the Art, which in their primary realization are one with God's being, have a priority over the distinction of substantial and accidental modes which characterize the created categories of finite being.[1]

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[1] Lull, *Ars Inventiva*, d. 1, fig. 1, Vol. 5, *opus* A, p. 7.

It is through the substantial good, present and effective within other substantial principles that the individual substances arise, are good in their being and are capable of producing substantial goods. On the other hand accidental goodness accounts for what is good in all of the accidental categories, for example, the qualities of a given subject or suppositum.

In goodness, therefore one can see the ultimate source of both the existence and the operations of all realities both ad intra and ad extra. It is good to be means that to be is to be good. It is good that goodness exists and is manifested in innumerable and specific goods. Whatever is good accords with existence. On the other hand evil parallels non-being.[2] Goodness is immanent when it is the source of what is good within the very essence of a being. The perfection of goodness is then greater than when its effects are transmitted to realities extrinsic to itself for in a sense we are then removed at least one step from the essence of goodness itself. Were matters otherwise it might be said that an effect has more being and perfection than the causes which account for it.[3]

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[1] Lull, Tabula Generalis, d. 2, Vol. 5 opus B, p. 6.

[2] Lull, Lectura Artis quae Brevis, d. 2, ch. 2, vol. 5, opus C, p. Also Lectura super Artem, d. 2, fig. 1, part 2, Vol.5, opus E, p.13.

[3] Lull, Lectura super Artem, d. 2, fig. 1, part 2, Vol. 5, opus E, pp. 12-13.

The good or goodness has been introduced and defined within the Art due to various reasons. One of these is that problems and particular objects may be inquired about and investigated with the knowledge of at least certain of the conditions of universal goodness alone, or by reason of its efficacious influence on the other principles, or of the latter on itself. It is true that these principles are of the ontological order. But if known and methodically used, in accordance with the logical procedures of the Art, they will enable the Art student to discover the correct middle term which will lead to and strengthen a demonstration. The discovery of middle terms is possible because a given goodness points beyond itself to other goodness on account of its conditiones or manifestations. Likewise knowledge of one good thing leads easily to that of other good things.[1] Let us take a theological example: God is good. Indeed He is Goodness. From this follows necessarily that the only reason for his acting is to produce what is good. God knows himself as good even as he brings forth what is good. If He has created, it is so that created good beings may share his love with full awareness and knowledge. Created beings become more fully good if they move in accord with what is good.[2]

2) C = Grandeur: Magnitudo

Grandeur, greatness or magnitude, is that by reason of which goodness, duration and the other principles are all-encompassing or

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1. Lull, Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 1, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 3. Also Lectura super Artem, d. 2, fig. 1, part 2, Vol. 5, opus E, p. 13.
2. Lull, Ars Generalis, part 9, ch. 9, pp. 381-382.

great, and they extend to the confines of all being.

Grandeur is the designation, therefore, for that which explains the character of greatness which belongs to each of the principles. These principles, imbued with greatness, are at the roots of all that is real according to the Art. The attribute or quality of greatness is therefore coextensive and convertible with being. Through this universal and transcendental principle, every real entity is complete and integral in its natural being. A reality is great to the extent that it achieves all of the perfection called for and allowed by the perfection of its being. On the other hand if it fails to meet the exigencies of its normal natural perfection then, to that extent, it is less noble and has a lesser being. In an infinite God grandeur finds its total realization so that through it He is great in all things. The totality of his perfections is in his Being and operations for in Him all of the divine attributes are identical with, and in, grandeur.[1]

What has been said of goodness applies, mutatis mutandis, to the principle of grandeur and to the remaining principles. There will be no need therefore, to consider the remaining definitions in as much detail.

If the Art student sees to it that everything agrees with the principles as defined he will come across needed middle terms. These are suggested by the analogical character of grandeur and with them he will then construct valid premises capable of supporting intended conclusions. One may legitimately affirm or deny only those propositions, the acceptance or rejection of which is in complete harmony with the nature of grandeur and that of the other principles. This nature is made manifest in the definitions. Ask, for example, whether the world is infinite. Lull reasons that the grandeur of God is infinite in power and duration. God can produce a creatum grande. The world would, therefore, be infinite if only a created being were capable of receiving unlimited grandeur. The created world is great but incapable of equalling the infinite uncreated grandeur.[1]

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[1] Pascual, op. cit., Vol., 1, p. 13.

3) D = Duration: Aeternitas seu Duratio

Duration is that in virtue of which goodness, grandeur and the other principles continue in existence.

It is through what duration designates that whatever is good, great, etc. is able to remain in existence. This definition, Pascual states, is clear and requires no justification, for it is obvious to the intellect that objects which endure in existence must explain this continued existence through some power to maintain their being, just as what is lovable and good is so by virtue of its goodness.[2]

One may consider duration itself as consisting of a) a power of enduring, i.e., as that which enables to endure, b) a durable aspect, i.e., the recipient of the influence which is duration and c) the act itself which reduces to unity the active source and the

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1. Lull, Ars Generalis, part 9, ch. 10, pp. 382-383.
2. Pascual, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 13.

passive receiver of duration. After we learn in this wise the secret meaning, or the invisible pattern, of its intelligibility we can then proceed to use the knowledge about duration in the investigation of other secrets, hidden also within the nature of things.[1]

There are two principal types of duration. It may be understood first without the succession of moments and as infinite: this is eternity and it signifies an uncreated Life and Existence. The second kind of duration entails a succession of moments, essential to time. This existence with succession is not of the essence of duration. Time is an effect which, in its own manner, reflects but does not completely measure, the infinity of duration or eternity.[2] This is a difficult question for it deals with a point which, according to Lull, probably transcends our power to comprehend.

A conscious awareness of the meaning of time is an invaluable source of middle terms always required for demonstrations which bear on reality. As with goodness and grandeur, examples here would show that these demonstrations are rather in the nature of _monstrationes_, arguments by analogy or analogical applications of the principles to each thing under consideration. The middle term in an Aristotelian syllogism is only one type of middle term. A logic of analogy would include others, as suggested in the second figure treated in a previous section.[3]

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[1] Lull, _Tabula Generalis_, d. 2, Vol. 5, _opus_ B, p. 7.
[2] Lull, _Ars Inventiva_, d. 1, fig. 1, Vol. 5, _opus_ A, p. 4.
[3] What has been said about the middle terms and demonstrations is applicable to all of the principles even though it will not be repeated in each instance.

4) E = Power: Potestas

Power is a perfection in virtue of which the good, the great etc. have the capacity for existence and for action or operations. This principle accounts therefore not only for power realized in existence, but also for whatever actions may follow after existence. The very nature of an existent demands this efficaciousness, or second act, in order to achieve its proportionate greatness and completion. Power, therefore, means a power to operate also. Otherwise it becomes meaningless and reality lacks one of its most valuable characteristics, namely its activities. A power which excludes the capacity for action beyond mere existence would not be a genuine reflection of the Divine Power which in Its overflowing efficaciousness cannot be static and inoperative.[1]

A distinction may be made between the power as the source prior to its actual exercise and the power as it is exercised, that is, in act. Indeed being able or capable here and now is an effect or a result not unlike that in which the act of understanding is an effect of the intellect or understanding. The possible has its origin likewise in the principle of power. It is through it that the possible is possible or able to be realized.[2]

Should one come across a Power wherein the source or support is one and identical with its own possibility and its exercise of power, one must assert that it is the Supreme Power. It is easily shown that unless this supremely Excellent Power is an actual existent, no other reality can possibly exist and endure since all the other principles would remain ineffective and incomplete, and hence meaningless.[1]

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[1] Pascual, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 13.

[2] Lull, Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 1, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 4; Tabula Generalis, d. 2, Vol. 5, opus B, p. 7.

5) F = Wisdom: Sapientia

Wisdom is that by reason of which the sage and wise man is able to understand and actually understands. In strict accordance with the universality intended by the Art the term "wisdom" ought to be understood as a most abstract and general concept which designates in common both the possession of reasoning by rational beings and the natural instincts present in non-thinking substances. The meaning is similar to that intended by the writer of the Book of Proverbs[2] when he sends a man to learn wisdom from an ant because this insect gives more than abundant evidence of the animal's instinct to gather, during the summer months, its food for the winter season.

Now God alone has a supreme intellect through which all things are known to him. Since all other beings mirror and are a likeness of the Creator it is not strange that in them we discover a reproduction of His Intellect. Through this replica within themselves, in various and distinct ways, they are able to know and to pursue whatever is fitting and agrees with their natures.[3]

In itself wisdom is an essential whole whose limits or

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1. Lull, Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 1, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 4.
2. The Book of Proverbs, ch. 6, v. 6.
2. Pascual, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 14.

integral parts are a) the intellect as the power to understand, b) the intelligible, as the knowable, the object which provides the term for the operation, and c) the binding act of understanding. These three are the constitutive essential correlatives throughout which the essence of wisdom is extended. The presence and extension, however, is not quantitative, for wisdom is intensively present in each of the correlatives, considered separately.

Just as it was the case with previously defined principles so also now the Art asserts that there is a supreme Subsistent Wisdom wherein the Trinity of Intellect, intelligible, and act-of-understanding are identical in essence. In this unique instance we have Wisdom itself. Thinking as a Christian, Lull identifies it with God who is in no way limited by the ternary designations.[1]

6) G = Will: Voluntas

The will signifies that in virtue of which goodness, grandeur, etc. are able to be desired and are deserving of love. Again as with the principle "wisdom," now the term "will" must be understood in a most general meaning; one that will include both what is designated oftentimes as natural appetites, (unconscious ones), and what is more properly referred to as will. There should be no serious difficulties in granting this understanding for within all things the condition or cause of love or desire may be discovered.[2]

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[1] Lull, Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 1, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 5.
[2] Pascual, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 14.

The definition given in the Ars Brevis seems to describe the will in terms of its object rather than in itself. Elsewhere it is clear that "will" is a name for that which is within a good and great supposit and accounts for its inclinations and volitions. In this context one can easily understand how all the principles are conceived by the author of the Art as very concrete realities which, in the case of their primary and supreme realization, are identified with the being of the living and personal God of monotheistic traditions. That is, they are not to be considered principally or exclusively as accidental abstract qualities which may inhere in a substance because the existence and distinction of principles precede the division into substances and accidents. This does not deny that if sufficiently contracted, they are manifested in either order of categorical being.[1]

7) H = Virtue: Virtus

Virtue is the name for the origin which gives rise to, and accounts for, the unity which obtains in goodness, grandeur, etc., either singly within their being or inner structure, or with each other, even though they remain distinct principles. The unity spoken of here extends beyond mere existence to the operations of an entity, and it refers not only to the bringing together of distinct and separate perfections, but also to the identity which exists among the really indistinct attributes of the Godhead. The definition signifies, therefore, that in the virtue of a particular thing one discovers the origin or roots of the unity amongst its perfections, both in the existential and the operational orders. As a result harmony follows between the nature of a being and the exercise of its proper activity. And as a result the operation is good, great, etc. This is manifest in the moral life. Virtue may, on this account, be correctly treated along conventional lines as the mean between extremes. In a different order, it is by reason of the infinity of His virtue that the attributes of God are identified so that they are all equally present in His being and operations. On the other hand all created virtues have at least a relation of likeness with the original Virtue.[1]

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[1] Lull, Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 1, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 5; Lectura super Artem, d.2, fig. 1, part 2, Vol. 5, opus E, p. 18.

The efficacy of virtue applies to itself, both for its existence and for its operations. Virtue is naturally greater when its essence is considered, not as it is present in other principles, e.g., goodness, but as present in virtue itself as a distinct principle. Its presence in other principles renders their operations efficacious with the consequence that composite substances are formed. These substances are able to continue existing because they have sufficient virtue and they are good, great, etc. Distinct from "power," the principle of virtue seems to add to power the character of being exercised in the proper measure. Because of it, power is exercised in an orderly manner and its manifestations or effects are of value.

8) I = Truth: Veritas

Truth is what causes and explains the integrity of goodness, grandeur, etc. Truth signifies primarily the integrity and perfection of the principles as far as their essential being is concerned. There is question here, therefore, of an ontological truth, one that is commensurate and convertible with being. Because of truth, whatever is good, great, or indeed in some way an existing reality, both exists and operates in accordance with its distinctive nature. There should be no obstacle to envisioning the analogical nature of truth which exists first in God, and then in the created reflections of His being.[1]

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[1] Pascual, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 14.

If truth explains the fulness and integrity characteristic of the principles and realities it is only natural that itself exhibit the perfection of being integrally all that it ought to be and without which it would be defective and deficient. Within truth itself there shine order and harmony, for we look upon it as constituted of itself as the source of the act-of-verifying, of its act and of the verified term, that is the verifiable.[2]

The definitions of truth and of the other principles suggest a mutual convertibility which is due to the presence of one in the others. Truth as received and mirrored by the other principles is of an accidental nature when compared with truth, seen in its own being, whence other truths flow. But it is by reason of this interpenetration of principles that a defense or quasi-demonstration of the principles is possible by means of each other. Strictly speaking the definitions of the principles are undemonstrable because we are dealing with

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1. Pascual, _op. cit._, pp. 14-15.
2. Lull, _Ars Inventiva_, d. 1, fig. 1, Vol. 5, _opus_ A, p. 6.

underived principles. As fundamental and radical principles they allow no premises out of which we may deduce them. However since one cannot deny a definition without thereby contradicting the nature and reality of the other principles it may be asserted that one definition supports the others.[1]

9) K = Glory: Gloria

Glory is the bliss, or the delight, which accompanies the fulfilment and repose of what is good, great, etc.

The common joys that we are most familiar with are pleasures of sense. But just as when the senses attain their object, that for which they exist, one experiences a certain pleasure because the object is agreeable to the senses; so other entities experience an analogous satisfaction when they attain that which conforms with their nature and bent. In an analogous way the other principles have a natural repose or bliss in being what they are and in the fulfilment of their operations. There is likewise for each being a satisfaction and a joy which agree with its distinctive essence, and are in some form analogous to the glory which surrounds God's attributes, both in their existence and in their immanent operation.[2]

The principle of glory may be considered as a final cause, than which none is higher. In a way its efficaciousness is superior to that of the other principles for it is the goal or fulfilment which

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1. Lull, Tabula Generalis, d. 2, Vol. 5, opus B, p. 9; Lectura super Artem, d. 2, fig. 1, part 2, Vol. 5, opus E, p. 21.
2. Pascual, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 15.

initiates their activity. And it is, of course, of greater perfection when one considers it in its own essence as a substantial principle, rather than as received and mirrored by the other principles.

Though it is in itself non-sensible, glory as one of the general principles of the *Art* is present in sensibly pleasurable experience and objects, and should guide us in our enjoyment of particular pleasures even as we adhere to the Glory defined in the *Art*. True glory should be utilized to appreciate the real meaning and value of legitimate pleasures. These should raise us up to a love of a genuine bliss whence we might descend to a better appreciation of the lesser joys. Naturally the higher and more perfect a being is, the more glorious and capable of delight it is. Lesser beings become sources of greater pleasure if in some way they are present in and seen by more perfect beings. One must conclude that the pleasures of intellect are more valuable than those of sense, and that the highest joy will be obtained when the mind experiences its highest joys aware of their value in so far as they participate in, and lead to a knowledge of, the divine *dignitates*, and particularly of divine Bliss.[1]

10) TB - *Difference: Differentia*

Difference is what brings about that goodness, grandeur, etc. be not confused for each other. Difference also causes them to possess clearly distinct essences. All of the principles are clearly capable of differentiation. This is true of both the Uncreated and created being. For even though within the simplicity of the divine substance there obtains only the real distinction of persons, still one attribute cannot be confused with another one from which it is in reality indistinct. The intelligible pattern or structure of each attribute, as it were, and the operations thereof belong exclusively to each one. In the realm of created being this clarity and non-confusedness becomes a real distinction of predicable perfections.[1]

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[1] Lull, *Lectura super Artem*, d. 2, fig. 1, part 2, Vol. 5, *opus* E, pp. 21-23.

The principle of difference distinguishes, at least as individuals, sense-objects and intellectual beings. A *fortiori* does it separate entities of distinct orders. All of this is suggested in one of the angles of figure T. The all-embraciveness of difference extends to the heart of the principles themselves for one can clearly distinguish the ternary correlatives. If the principle of difference is ignored or denied, otherness becomes unintelligible, for the active agent becomes one, and identical in meaning, with a possible receiver and with the act which intervenes between both of them. Without difference the "to-be" of reality would consist in privation rather than in a positive perfection. The latter, even as it posits a being, distinguishes it from those which are not itself.[2]

Difference need not introduce plurality. This can be observed in the case of the divine nature. Without a denial of the plurality of Persons, this nature is distinct from all else on account of its unique unity and identity. In the whole without parts, which the

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1. Pascual, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 15.
2. Lull, *Lectura super Artem*, d. 2, fig. 2, part 2, Vol. 5, *opus* E, pp. 26-27.

Being of God is, the principles, or the attributes, introduce no distinction of parts.[1]

11) TC = Concordance: Concordantia

Concordance is that on whose account goodness, grandeur, etc. can be ordered and unified into either a single being, or into a group of more than one. This definition is somewhat similar to that of the absolute principle of virtue. The main difference between the two can be understood as a distinction between efficient and final causalities. Final causality may then be linked with concordance. Through this principle, therefore, each of the others contributes towards the reality of which they are the ontological constituents in perfect harmony because of their reciprocal relatedness and interpenetration. The concordance of principles within entities varies and is expressed analogously in accordance with the purpose of their subject. In God, for example, the harmony both within and between divine perfections is infinite and absolutely without bounds. The perfections of created beings, on the other hand, also exhibit a perfect harmony of varied but proportionate degrees, in agreement with the nobility of their being.[2]

The efficaciousness of concordance extends to the correlatives within the principles. It operates also between the existence and the operations which flow from any reality, as well as between distinct orders of real being. In the nature of concordance we must

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1. Ibid., p. 28.
2. Pascual, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 15.

seek the adequate explanation for the steady interpenetration and co-presence of the principles, a sine qua non for their existence and that of the entities they give rise to.[1]

Should concordance be excluded altogether from the order of the real, no thing could be directed to its appropriate end and contradiction would be at the very roots of reality. Order, harmoniousness and concordance would be then non-existent, whereas contradictoriness and privation would equate being.[2]

12) TD = Contrariety: Contrarietas

Contrariety is the ad invicem reciprocal resistance of realities which tend or are drawn towards distinct ends. Because one thing or reality has an inclination to its proper end it is thereby opposed to the other thing which is drawn to an opposite goal or end. At least it must disregard the latter in order to attain its own end first.

Since contrariety and concordance are opposites, we may reason about the nature of contrariety in the created universe, by understanding that which is opposed to and is against God's perfect concordance which excludes contrariness within the divine being.[3] Opposition is a universal principle whose influence reaches to other principles and substances but because of its negative character in the Lullian perspective, it can only exist in the order of the accidental.

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[1] Lull, Lectura super Artem, d. 2, fig. 2, part 2, Vol. 5, opus E, p. 28; Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 2, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 7.
[2] Lull, Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 2, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 8.
[3] Pascual, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 15-16.

Were it a substantial reality it would make impossible the fulfilment and the attainment of the term and repose by the other principles. Again both concordance and contrariety would then become identical and synonymous with being.[1]

13) TE = Principium

Principium or principle signifies whatever stands in and accounts for, a relation of priority over other things. Neither term, "priority" nor "principle," is used here in too strict a sense. Thus a principle may denote the origin or primeval reason of a reality as well as of a series of properties. In this sense goodness is a principle because it is the primitive essence of what is good. From it follow or are derived the powers to produce and to receive the good. In the same broad meaning it can be said that each divine attribute is the principle of all that is found in the divine essence, and of which it is the essential reason. Analogously created perfections are also principles in their own order.[2]

Although one in its essential meaning, principium is manifold through multiplication into the many principles of the Art which participate of its nature.[3] However there exists a Supreme Principle which is both principle and end of Its very essence.

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[1] Lull, Lectura super Artem, d. 2, fig. 2, part 2, Vol. 5, opus E, p. 30; Lectura Artis quae Brevis, d. 2, ch. 2, Vol. 5, opus C, p. 2.

[2] Pascual, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 16.

[3] Lull, Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 2, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 8; Lectura super Artem, d. 2, fig. 2, part 2, Vol. 5, opus E, p. 33.

14) TF = The Middle: Medium

The principle of middle designates the subject through which the influence of the end comes to the principle and in turn the influence of the latter is returned back to the end, or to its term. In a way, therefore, the middle shares in the nature of both, the source and the fulfilment. The term "middle" is used here in a broad sense. Likewise the terms "to influence" and "to return the influence" include any participation, relatedness and reference which may obtain between various objects because of the intervention, or through the medium, of a third object. It is in this sense that one divine perfection stands as the middle between two other divine perfections since they merge in its infinite communicability.[1]

There is no doubt that the notion of the middle presupposes those of principle and of end for in a way it is an image which mirrors both of them. In a certain sense, it may be gathered from the definition of "middle" that there is a priority over the middle on the part of both the *principium* and the end. Of itself a most general and universal principle, the middle allows for contraction into more specific kinds of middles.[2]

15) TG = The End: Finis

The end signifies that wherein a principle comes to rest because it is now complete and has reached its fulfilment. It is only when the latter is possessed or achieved that there is a halt and no further search. Each of God's perfections is an end of the others, and His being is the end of all of them. Created perfections imitate the finality of the uncreated principles in their own way.[1]

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[1] Pascual, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 16.
[2] Lull, *Ars Inventiva*, d. 1, fig. 2, Vol. 5, *opus* A, p. 9.

As are other universal principles, "end" is contracted or made more specific into less universal ends, and as a result there follow various types of ends. This is signified in the angle of the end of the second figure. There are limit-ends, privation-ends, and ends which are final causes.[2] Some ends are subordinate, and hence directed, to other, perhaps superior, ends. At the end or ultimately we reach an End-in-itself which is not directed to any thing outside of Itself, and to which all other ends and objects are directed either directly or indirectly.

16) TH = Majoritas

Majoritas is a likeness or image of the immensity characteristic of the principles of grandeur, goodness, eternity, etc. This statement defines only created majoritas which bears the likeness of the divine immensity. In a strict sense majoritas can exist only in a created entity. Through its presence some created beings and principles exceed the perfection of others. We may speak of God's superiority, which is really identical with his immensity, only by analogy. Hence if one wishes to use it in a most general way so that it may be said of God and created being majoritas ought then to be described as the plenitude of perfection whereby one thing surpasses, and is higher than, another.[1]

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[1] Pascual, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 16.
[2] Lull, Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 2, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 9.

In its analogous variety of realization majoritas is predicable of: 1) substances, 2) substances and accidents, 3) accidents only.[2] By definition, a substance is greater than, or superior to, its accidents. But it may occur that certain accidents, because of their inherence in a superior nature, are more perfect than a given substance. On this account this principle, as well as others, may be compared to a ladder. On its rungs one may rise to, and descend from, a consideration of the superior, and even of the highest being, through that of intermediate natures, to that of the lesser or inferior beings.

The student of the Art is advised to inquire and study the more perfect realities. He will then be equipped to discover the secrets of the lesser beings which are reflections of the divine immensity. This may resemble the Platonic descent from Ideas to things. However, Lull recognized the partially sensory nature of man. Man's initial awareness of the principles is by means of his experience of concrete objects. But after the initial ascent to the principles, an adequate understanding of them makes possible a fuller and more genuine knowledge of the things in nature. A knowledge of the nature and conditions of majoritas itself enables the investigator to choose as a conclusion that which accords with the greater and superior perfection, on the condition that no violence is thereby done to the

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1. Pascual, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 17.
2. Lull, Ars Inventiva, d. 1, fig. 2, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 10.

definitions of the other principles.[1]

17) TI = Equality: Aequalitas

Equality is the state wherein the principles of goodness, grandeur, etc. enjoy complete concordance. This definition is explained easily if we keep in mind that the various principles must all be present if we are to have a concrete entity. Moreover in it they must achieve their fulfilment in the proper measure. In God equality is expressed as the identity of His perfections. In creatures, a likeness of this exists in the proper measure and accord which obtains among their constitutive principles.[2]

18) TK = Minoritas

Minoritas is the aspect of reality closest to non-being or nothingness. Just as through superior perfection entities come closer to the Supreme Being and its immensity, so through lesser being or perfection, they approach pure non-being or nothingness. It may be noted that because of its proximity to non-being *minoritas* is altogether absent from the supreme equality of God.[3] It is therefore a principle only in created beings.

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1. *Loc. Cit.* One may wonder if Leibnitz did not arrive at his principle of perfection under the influence of Lullian thought. See Copleston, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, pp. 282-288.
2. Pascual, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 17.
3. Lull, *Ars Inventiva*, D. 1, fig. 2, Vol. 5, *opus* A, p. 11.

II - The Rules: Part Four of the Ars Brevis

A - Meaning of "Rules" in General

The term "Rules" is the designation in the *Ars Brevis* for ten very general questions which form one of the columns of the alphabet. In these most general questions are implicitly contained all other questions, as the more specific and particular is virtually present in the more universal.[1] And since in a way the answer resolves the difficulty which originated the question and must, therefore, be regulated by the question, all answers and solutions may be said also to be implicitly in these universal questions. Every question and its answers are, therefore, reducible to these most general and universal questions, in a manner analogous to the way in which according to the Latin grammar, for example, all nouns are declined after the pattern of the basic five declensions.[2]

The ten rules of the *Art* are like index-signs in man's search for truth. They are channels which, like to commonplaces of Aristotle's *Topics*, serve to guide the mind and allow it to be more readily and better informed about the truth of a particular matter. Platonic and Aristotelian dialectical elements are brought together with accepted rhetorical procedures. In rhetoric the "commonplaces" are rules for finding pertinent data and material which relate to the disputed theme or point in question.[3] In the *Art* these are expressed

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1. Lull, *Ars Brevis*, part 4, pp. 22-23; *Tabula Generalis*, prol. and d. 3, Vol. 5, *opus* B, pp. 11, 15.
2. Lull, *Ars Generalis*, part 4, pp. 229-230.
3. Platzeck, *La Combinatoria*, Vol. 13 (1954), p. 147.

in, or reduced to, ten very general questions. These are, with their corresponding symbolic letter: 1) B, whether this thing exists?, 2) C, what is it?, 3) D, whereof is it?, 4) E, why is it so?, 5) F, how great is it, how much of it?, 6) G, of what kind (quale) is it?, 7) H, when is it?, 8) I, where is it?, 9) and 10) K, how is it?, and wherewith is it?[1]

To each question-rule a letter is therefore assigned as a sign or symbol of it. The same letters which signify the principles of the Art, both the absolute and the relative ones, are used. This will facilitate the systematic mingling of the principles and rules as well as the introduction of the rules into the third and fourth figures. This mingling, which will be explained later, also renders the Art more embracing and universal in its utility. This allows an investigator to seize the truth about things with greater penetration and appreciation of their fundamental principles.[2]

It is not necessary to insist on the general character of the question-rules. As a matter of fact we can easily come up with less general questions which, in a division of the general questions, would be the dividing members. To be of scientific value these members of the division must not be so specific as to refer only to the singular and contingent as such. The division into less general questions, which are the immediate members of the division, may be considered as one which gives rise to the species, types or stages which contract the universal rules.[3] If the Art Student makes use of them and of

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1. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 4, p. 23.
2. Lull, Tabula Generalis, prol. and d. 3, Vol. 5, opus B, pp.2, 15-21.
3. Lull, Ars Generalis, part 4, p. 230.

their species, he will arrive in an orderly and regulated fashion at a well-organized and adequate understanding of any subject matter about which he wishes to inquire. The question-rules are the mirrors whereon the mind seeks for reflections of the diverse aspects which surround but yet help to reveal the secret essence of the things in nature.[1]

The designation 'rule' was appropriately retained in the last version of the Art, of which, as noted earlier, the Ars Brevis is an introduction and concise form. In the earlier versions the rules stood for definite categories of thought and reality. These categories made possible an ordered and systematic approach to a given problem, and naturally resulted in methodic procedures to regulate the scientific quest.[2]

If the rules are both kept before the mind and observed, the questions and problems one faces will be answered and solved correctly and with a certain amount of facility. Of course, to achieve this end the rules must be carefully applied to the matter of the problem, bearing in mind the correct meaning of both the rules and their species. After this has been done one must continue the examination of the problem by means of each of the principles, mingling them with the ten rules. In the process one must also make the proper use of the definitions of the principles as we apply them to the problem to be

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1. Lull, Ars Inventiva, d. 3, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 37. See Sanchez de Lizarrazu, op. cit., p. 117; Llinares, op. cit., p. 218.
2. Lull, Ars Inventiva, d. 3, Vol. 5, opus A, p. 37. See Sanchez de Lizarrazu, op. cit., p. 117.

solved. Then only will the intellect choose wisely, whether it be to affirm or deny a given position, because it accords with what is more intelligible and removes all doubts on the question.[1]

Our next step is to list the species or modes in which the ten general rules are, as a matter of course, expressed most often. To manifest the meaning more clearly the Ars Brevis applies them to the problem of the intellect as an example.

B - Individual Rules

1) First Rule: Whether?

The question or rule signified by B asks whether a thing is or is not. Certain versions of the Art refer to it as the rule of the possible. This first rule yields three species in accordance with the three possible states of mind in the presence of a problem, namely, doubt, assent, and denial. Before an investigation has been undertaken the rule advises that one must not prejudge the issue. In this connection we may recall the later Cartesian doubt, but unlike the formal doubt of Descartes, what is signified here is a state of indifference. In this indifference one does not incline to either side of a question because one has not had the opportunity to weigh the evidence. As a consequence at the beginning the mind recognizes that both the affirmative or the negative conclusions are in a sense possible. It then proceeds to look for reasons and proofs. A decided value in this approach is the avoidance of precipitous and unreasoned faith. The intellect demands knowledge as its natural state, rather than faith. Other writings of Lull make it very clear that exception has to be made in matters of revealed truths for an infinite truth cannot be exhausted and comprehended by a finite understanding.[1] As for the criterion, or the measure utilized by the mind in its acceptance or rejection of a proposition, it can be said that it is partially, at least, the intelligibility of what it says. What is more intelligible satisfies the yearning of the mind for truth and accordingly the mind accepts it.

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[1] Lull, Ars Brevis, part 4, p. 23.

2) Second Rule: What?

Question or rule C may be designated the rule on quiddity because the question "what is it?" bears on the essence and being of reality in all of its extension. The main purpose of this rule is the formulation of adequate definitions which will permit the location of the concept defined in its correct relation to other ideas. This makes the Lullian definitions more like Plato's, through reference to the more perfect prototype, than like Aristotle's through what is prior in knowledge only.[2]

Since there are four principal aspects, or conditions, of the quidditative elements this second rule gives rise to four species or modes. One may ask: a) What is a particular entity viewed in itself? This more specific question may be given the name of definition-type or mode because the answer should express exactly what is that which makes

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1. Avinyo, op. cit., p. 47.
2. Platzeck, La Combinatoria, Vol. 13 (1954), p. 148.

this thing to be the kind of thing it is. The remaining three modes allow for more descriptive statements rather than strict definitions according to Lull's understanding. b) What does this reality possess within itself as its essential constitutive elements? This may be known as the mode or species of the coessentials. c) What is this reality because of its presence in things other-than-itself? d) What does a reality have when it is present in another reality? With the example of the intellect these questions may be answered thus: a) The intellect is a power whose proper act is to understand. b) It has as its immanent essential correlatives the intellect as power, an intelligible nature, and the act of understanding which links the first two and completes the essence of the intellect. Without the three there is no intellect. c) Through, or in, grandeur the intellect becomes and is great; through the good it is good. d) In science the mind has knowledge, whereas in faith belief.[1]

3) Third Rule: Whereof?

Question or rule D, "whereof," inquires concerning the origin of things. The term whereof allows for three interpretations and hence there are three species to this third rule: a) The material or primitive mode wherein one asks out of what is this made. The question supposes a prior and preexisting material, elements or principles out of which this new thing becomes or is made. In connection with the problem of the intellect one may say that it is of itself to indicate

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1. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 4, pp. 23-24.

that it has been created directly and hence it is out of nothing. The created principles of its being are reflections of Uncreated dignities which always remain other and unchanged. b) "Whereof" may be also understood as of what does the reality consist here and now? What constitutes it for what it is? The question therefore is about the intrinsic structure and its constitutive elements. As for the intellect one may answer that within its being one discovers a specific form and a specific non-material matter. These in turn account for the distinct and specific act of understanding proper to intellects. c) The third species may be called the possessive mode because "whereof" is now interpreted as whose is this?, or to what does it belong? To "Whereof is the intellect?" one may reply that it is man's; it is of that man whose part it is.[1]

4) Fourth Rule: Why?

Question or rule E may be said to bear on the "why" of the existence and the operations of things.[2] It presents two main forms or types. These may be known as the formality and the finality species:[3] a) The former mode or species is best explained with an example. To the question of "why the intellect is or acts so?," the reply may be that it is because it has certain intrinsic constituents, i.e., a specific form and matter which determine it to exist and act as understanding. b) The mode of finality signifies that one is then asking for the purpose or end for which a thing is or acts. One may thus have answered instead that the intellect exists in order that reality may be actually intelligible and known, and that bodies of science may consequently be constructed.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 25. *Cf.* *Lectura super Artem*, d. 1, Vol. 5, *opus* E, pp. 3-4.

[2] Lull, *Ars Generalis*, part 4, ch. 4, p. 144. See Carreras y Artau, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 437.

[3] Lull, *Lectura Artis quae Brevis*, d. 2, ch. 3, Vol. 5, *opus* C, p. 9.

5) Fifth Rule: Quantum?

The fifth question or rule, that of quantum, concerns problems about reality which arise in connection with its being extended, numbered, and in general subject to quantity. In agreement with the ordinary division of quantity into continuous and discrete the Art distinguishes two types or species of this rule: a) One may speak of an intensive mode wherein the investigation is not so much about predicamental quantity, but rather about the character or condition of greater or lesser perfection within a substance or an essence. Concerning the intellect it is correctly concluded that it is as great as its activity reaches in consonance with its essence. The greatness here is not in the order of lineal extension, but of inner intensity. Retaining this analogical signification one may speak of this first type as continuous or simple quantity.[2] b) The second species of the fifth rule concerns discrete quantity. Again speaking of the intellect one may state that it is great and that it reaches as far as it is possible because of the extent of its coessential correlatives whereof, and wherein, its essence is supported and diffused, namely the intellect, the intelligible and the act of understanding. It is through their

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1. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 4, pp. 25-26.
2. Avinyo, op. cit., p. 50.

being co-present that the intellect operates either speculatively or with a practical knowledge, sometimes concerning universal matters and at other times about particular ones.[1]

6) The Sixth Rule: Quale?

The next question or rule, signified by G, concerns qualities or reality as endowed with the characteristic of being qualified. As in the previous rule there is no question here of the predicamental quale only. Rather quality embraces perfections in the order of substance and essence whose being need not be one of inherence.[2] Likewise, according to the Art there are two principal species: a) First, proper and primary qualities which are, as it were, the immediate and adequate expression of the reality in question. For example the intellect has as a proper quality the intelligibility which attaches to its own nature. Still a proper quality, but in a sense secondary and extrinsic, because one step removed, is its act of understanding the reality of exterior beings through species. b) There are also appropriated qualities. These are in a sense borrowed and lack the measure of perfection called for by a being in its basic nature. To believe and have opinions are appropriated qualities of the intellect.[3] Of the two species of qualities the proper ones are in a sense innate whereas the appropriated ones are acquired.

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[1] Lull, Ars Brevis, part 4, pp. 26-27.
[2] Avinyo, op. cit., p. 51.
[3] Lull, Ars Brevis, part 4, pp. 27-28.

7) Seventh Rule: When?

The question or rule of when, or H, extends to inquiries that raise the problem of time. It is not an easy matter to comprehend and to appreciate the meaning of time and hence it is very difficult to reveal its essence. A keen intellect is needed; one ready to discipline itself in order that through repeated attacks from various vantage points some understanding of time may be gained. These vantage points are the fifteen species of this rule. Though rooted in movement time has a being of its own whose integral elements are the correlatives of *temporativum*, *temporabile* and *temporare*. There is a suggestion here that time has a reality of its own. This may be due to the influence of Scotus Erigena. For Erigena time and space were created before the primeval elements which evolve into the four elements of ancient science.[1] Because of its very complex nature one need not be amazed that there are fifteen species of the rule "when." These species result from asking in connection with "time" the species of questions signified by the rules C, D, and K. Of rule C it has been seen that there are four modes; of rule D there are three; and of the two rules signified by K there are four modes or species for each one. On account of the abbreviated character of the *Ars Brevis* and because it should not be difficult to apply the rules mentioned there is no need to review all of the modes of this rule. A brief example suffices. When it is asked how can the intellect be in time since it, unlike a line or a body, is unextended, the answer ought to

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1. *Cf. Supra*, p. 146.

be that it is in time because it had a beginning and also because it exists united to that which has duration in a succession of mechanical and corporeal movements.[1]

8) Eighth Rule: Where?

In connection with the question or rule I, where, the problems are about place, and things in place, or as they are not in place because their nature is such that they cannot be in, or outside of, a place. Place, like time in the previous rule, has an entitative character for things are located in it or in place. Place itself therefore has as its inner structure a locativum, locabile, and locare. Moreover place has a nature which is underived and hence was made to exist through an immediate creation. By essence it is of the order of intelligibles, and not of that of sensibles.[2] This explains why it is understood and seized by the intellect, and not only by the senses. The complex nature of place explains its division into fifteen species. As with the previous rule of "when" these species arise through application to questions of "where" of the rules C, D, and K. Again brevity calls for a short example. Where is the intellect? The reply is that it is in the subject of which it is a part, though it is not contained as a part is in the whole, but rather diffused through the whole subject. The reason for this is that the intellect cannot be measured as we may a line.

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1. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 4, p. 28; Ars Generalis, part 4, p. 246. On the ontological character of time see Yates, op. cit., p. 11.
2. Lull, Ars Generalis, part 4, p. 247. See Yates, op. cit., p. 11.

9 & 10) Ninth and Tenth Rules: Quomodo and cum quo

The ninth letter of the alphabet within the Art stands for the remaining two rules which might be known as the modal and the instrumental rules. The reduction of the figures and principles of the Art to four and nine, respectively, necessitated that these last two rules be signified by one letter.[1]

For each of these final rules there are four main forms or species. It shall be noticed that they are quite similar. The species of the rule how or in what manner may be expressed: a) How does a principle or a whole, considered in itself, exist?; b) How can a reality be a part of another part?; c) How is the part in a whole and the whole in its parts?; d) How does a principle transmit or communicate its influence or likeness to that which is other than itself? If these questions were asked about the mind one may readily reply that it exists in the manner already determined as we have reviewed the rules and their species. Also that it understands by reasoning through middle terms which bind a subject with its predicates, and by multiplying the species it has drawn or abstracted from sense and imagination. These are the species it produces within itself, knowing that it does so.

The last rule asks wherewith? or with what? Its four species are very similar to those of rule nine. For example we may inquire: a) With what does a principle, e.g., intellect, exist?; b) With what is it linked to another part?; c) With what is a part in

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[1] Lull, Tabula Generalis, d. 3, Vol. 5, opus B, pp. 20-21.

THE TABULA GENERALIS

BCDT	CDET	DEFT	EFGT	FGHT	GHIT	HIKT
DCTB	CDTC	DETD	EFTE	FGTF	GHTG	HITH
BCTC	CDTD	DETE	EFTF	FGTG	GHTE	HITI
BCTD	CDTE	DETF	EFTG	FGTH	GHTI	HITK
BDTB	CETC	DFTD	EGTE	FHTF	GITG	HKTH
BDTC	CETE	DFTE	EGTF	FHTG	GITH	HKTI
BDTD	CTCD	DFTF	EGTG	FHTH	GITI	HKTK
BTBC	CTCE	DTDE	ETEF	FTFG	GTGH	HTBI
BTBD	CTCF	DTDF	ETEG	FTFH	GTGI	HTHK
BTCD	CTDE	DTEF	ETFG	FTGH	GTHI	HTIK
CDTB	DETC	EFTD	FGTE	GHTF	HITG	IKTH
CDTC	DETD	EFTE	FGTF	GHTG	HITB	IKTI
CDTD	DETE	EFTF	FGTG	GHTH	HITI	IKTK
CTBC	DTCD	ETDE	FTEF	GTFG	HTGH	ITHI
CTBD	DTCE	ETDF	FTEG	GTEH	HTGI	ITHK
CTCD	DTDE	ETEF	FTFG	GTGH	HTKI	ITIK
DTBC	ETCD	FTDE	GTEF	HTFG	ITGH	KTKI
DTBD	ETCE	FTDF	GTEG	HTFH	ITGI	KTHK
DTCD	ETDE	FTEF	GTFG	HTGK	ITHI	KTIK
TBCD	TCDE	TDEF	TEFG	TFGH	TGHI	THIK

the larger whole, and the whole in its parts?; d) With what does a principle communicate its likeness to others? With the example of the intellect the replies are that it exists with its essential constitutives without which it cannot be or understand. And the species by which it understands is the instrument wherewith it seizes other objects.[1]

III - The Table: Part Five of the Ars Brevis

A - Description:

The table, to which frequent allusions are made within Lull's *Art*, is the result of a very careful manipulation of the circles which constitute the fourth figure. It is, therefore, correctly stated that the table is derived from the fourth figure.[2]

As given in the abbreviated *Ars Brevis* the table is only a small part or section of a more extensive and complete one drawn out in the more detailed versions of the *Art* written after the book *Tabula Generalis* (1293-1294). In the *Ars Brevis* the table has seven columns, each column containing twenty variations, or chambers, of distinct four letter combinations. This table has been reproduced in the preceding page. Three of the letters are taken from the basic nine letter alphabet of B through K and the fourth letter is the letter T. The reader is warned by the author of the *Art* that in these seven columns and one hundred and forty chambers are implicitly contained the remaining columns and chambers of the more completely drawn out table.

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[1] Lull, *Ars Brevis*, part 4, p.30; *Tabula Generalis*, d. 3, Vol.5, *opus* B, p. 21; *Lectura super Artem*, d. 1, Vol. 5, *opus* E, p. 9.

[2] Lull, *Tabula Generalis*, d. 4, Vol. 5, *opus* B, p. 22. See Avinyo, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

The latter consists of eighty-four vertical columns with one thousand six hundred and eighty chambers; twenty in each of the eighty-four columns. No two columns are identical, for at least one of the three variable or basic letters is different. The twenty variations of each column are obtained by the introduction of the letter T in one of four possible places: at the beginning, or at the end, or between the first two letters, or between the last two. The letter T suggests the second or triangular figure for its principal function is to determine whether the other letters stand for the absolute or the relative principles. When a letter in the group precedes the letter T, then that letter signifies, as it does in the first figure, an absolute principle. On the other hand when it follows the letter T, then the letter must be interpreted as a relative principle of the second figure.[1]

Take the combination B C D T as an example. This "chamber," or group of letters, may be read in this form: Is there an instance where goodness is as great as it is eternal? The question may be resolved if we look closely at the definitions of one or all of the absolute principles signified by the letters B, C, and D. Since these letters precede the letter T, in this chamber their meanings are from the first figure. According to Lull the answer must be affirmative because otherwise these principles would be void. That the principles be void cannot be because without them reality would be non-existent. Let us next change the combination to read B C T B. This new group of letters may be read: Is there a good so great that it contains within itself distinct, yet coessential, elements? In this case the answer will again be "yes" according to Lull. The reasons are based on the nature of two absolute principles, goodness and grandeur (B, C) and of one relative principle, difference (B).[1]

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[1] Lull, Ars Brevis, part 5, p. 33; Ars Generalis, part 5, p. 258.

B - Formation of the Table

The basic group of three significant and variable letters which distinguishes a column from the other eighty-three (six in the *Ars Brevis*) is obtained by methodically rotating the innermost and the middle circles of the fourth figure. Of the three circles in the figure only those two are movable, we may recall. The free circles must be stopped and so placed that a letter from each circle is directly above or under those of the other circles. In this way we shall have groups, or chambers, of three letters. A further caution is to the effect that no letter in the smaller circles may be the same as, or precede, in the alphabetical order, the letter of larger circles. In other words since the letters of the group should be read in order, taking the outer circle first and the smallest circle last, the letters which follow in the group should not precede alphabetically, or be the same as, those before it in the group or combination. What has been stated about the order of the letters holds true only for the basic pattern which initiates each different column and in which the letter T will occupy the fourth and last place of the group.

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[1] Lull, *Ars Generalis*, part 5, ch. 1, pp. 25-260.

From these operations with the fourth figure under the conditions stated a rather large number of basic groups results. Of these one can see that seven will begin with the letters BC and have as the third letter one from D through K. Six will have BD as the first two letters and the third one will be from E through K. The number of possible groups beginning with B decreases until only one column is possible with the first two letters BI because only one letter can follow, namely K. Should one begin with the letter C six columns are possible if the first two letters are CD; five if CE, until we come again to a single column for CI, namely CIK.

It is not difficult to see that the process may be continued if one begins with a new letter from the non-rotating circle until we reach the letter H which allows for only one combination, HIK. The total will yield eighty-four groups which account for the eighty-four columns of the table. Very simply they may be summarized in this manner: 1) twenty-eight begin with the letter B (seven begin BC; six, BD; five, BE; four, BF; three, BG; two, BH; one, BI). 2) Twenty-one begin with the letter C (six begin CD; five, CE; four, CF; three, CG; two, CH; one, CI). 3) Fifteen begin with the letter D (five begin DE; four, DF; three, DG; two, DH; one, DI). 4) Ten begin with the letter E (four begin EF; three, EG; two, EH; one, EI). 5) Six begin with the letter F (three begin FG; two, FH; one, FI). 6) Three begin with the letter G (two begin GH; one, GI). 7) One begins with the letter H (HIK).

This is the list of the eighty-four basic combinations:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
bcd	bce	bcf	bcg	bch	bci	bck	bde	bdf	bdg	bdh	bdi
13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
bdk	bef	beg	beh	bei	bek	bfg	bfh	bfi	bfk	bgh	bgi
25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36
bgk	bhi	bhk	bik	cde	cdf	cdg	cdh	cdi	cdk	cef	ceg
37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48
ceh	cei	cek	cfg	cfh	cfi	cfk	cgh	cgi	cgk	chi	chk
49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60
cik	def	deg	deh	dei	dek	dfg	dfh	dfi	dfk	dgh	dgi
61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72
dgk	dhi	dhk	dik	efg	efh	efi	efk	egh	egi	egk	ehi
73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84
ehk	eik	fgh	fgi	fgk	fhi	fhk	fik	ghi	ghk	gik	hik

Once the basic letter groups have been obtained the individual twenty chambers of each column may be had by the introduction of the fourth letter, the letter T. First it is added at the end of a group of three letters so that we have the first chamber, e.g. BCDT. The next step it is moved one space so that it now follows two letters and precedes one of still the same basic group. Thus, for example, if we begin with BC, we can have BCTB, BCTC, BCTD. If one begins with BD one can have BDTB, BDTC, BDTD. One may begin with CD and there results CDTB, CDTC, CDTD. We have obtained nine more chambers. Next we move the letter T one more space so that now it follows one letter and is followed by two of the basic group characteristic of the column. If we begin with B, we will have BTBC, BTBD, BTCD. We may begin with C, and we shall have CTBC, CTBD, CTCD. Or we may begin with D, and have DTBC, DTBD, DTCD. Nine more chambers have been added to the first column. The last and twentieth chamber is arrived at by again moving the letter T one more place so that it is now the first of the four letters of the group. There is only one combination possible TBCD, and therefore only one more chamber is added to the column. It is to be noted that the statement about the alphabetical order of the letters holds for the chambers also whenever the basic letters are not separated by the constant T.

The results of this process may again succintly be shown by listing the chambers in the order in which they appear in the columns. Taking the group BCD as an example the twenty chambers are: BCDT, BCTB, BCTC, BCTD, BDTB, BDTC, BDTD, BTBC, BTBD, BTCD, CDTB, CDTC, CDTD, CTBC, CTBD, CTCD, DTBC, DTBD, DTCD, TBCD.

In order to help the reader to visualize the table with its columns and chambers the first five columns are given:

1	2	3	4	5
b c d T	b c e T	b c f T	b c g T	b c h T
b c T b	b c T b	b c T b	b c T b	b c T b
b c T c	b c T c	b c T c	b c T c	b c T c
b c T d	b c T e	b c T f	b c T g	b c T h
b d T b	b e T b	b f T b	b g T b	b h T b
b d T c	b e T c	b f T c	b g T c	b h T c

b d T d	b e T e	b f T f	b g T g	b h T h
b T b c	b T b c	b T b c	b T b c	b T b c
b T b d	b T b e	b T b f	b T b g	b T b h
b T c d	b T c e	b T c f	b T c g	b T c h
c d T b	c e T b	c f T b	c g T b	c h T b
c d T c	c e T c	c f T c	c g T c	c h T c
c d T d	c e T e	c f T f	c g T g	c h T h
c T b c	c T b c	c T b c	c T b c	c T b c
c T b d	c T b e	c T b f	c T b g	c T b h
c T c d	c T c e	c T c f	c T c g	c T c h
d T b c	e T b c	f T b c	g T b c	h T b c
d T b d	e T b e	f T b f	g T b g	h T b h
d T c d	e T c e	f T c f	g T c g	h T c h
T b c d	T b c e	T b c f	T b c g	T b c h

Let us take six chambers or letter-groups from the first column and see how Lull reads them. Only the first three and the last three groups are interpreted.

BCDT; first question: Is goodness as great as it is eternal? Answer: Yes.

BCTB; second question: Is there a good which in its greatness includes distinct and yet coessential constituents? Answer: Yes.

BCTC; third question: Is there a great good which has within its being coessential constituent elements which are in perfect harmony? Answer: Yes.

DTBD; eighteenth question: To whom belongs the difference of eternity and opposition? Answer: Both to God and the world, but only if the eternity of the world is posited.

DTCD; nineteenth question: To what would one assign harmony between contrariness and eternity? Answer: To two eternal durations, one of God and one of the world, but only if the eternity of the world is presupposed.

TBCD; twentieth question: To what belong difference, concordance and contrariness? Answer: To themselves because they are genera which are most common.[1]

One cannot but marvel at the painstakingly methodical presentation of the table. The care with which it was devised allows for mathematical precision. The number of the columns and chambers obeys the following mathematical formula.[2]

$$\frac{(9 \times 8 \times 7)}{(1 \times 2 \times 3)} \times \frac{(6 \times 5 \times 4)}{(1 \times 2 \times 3)} = 1680$$

This mathematical equation is the legitimate expression of the fact that each letter, with the exception of the non-significant T, has at least two possible meanings; one that of an absolute principle, and the other that of one of the relative principles. The particular meaning which it has in a given chamber is determined by whether it precedes or follows the symbol T.

It cannot but be conceded that Lull's Art is not a haphazard meaningless invention. It was carefully arrived at to aid in the solution of problems and questions which the curiosity of man and his desire to know impel him to wrestle with. There is a tight reasoning which is almost mathematically abstract because Lull wished to come as close to a certainty which is nearly mathematical. Because of its abstractness this type of reasoning may of course be almost tedious to the modern mind. This mind is accustomed, not to the formal structure of an argument, but to literary expressions of it. And these appeal not only to the intellect but also to other aspects of man's being.[1]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 258-267.

[2] Platzeck, La Combinatoria, Vol. 13 (1954), p. 142.

As was stated previously the table of the Ars Brevis has seven columns only. These columns have as their basic letter groups those that arise when the three circles of figure four are ordered in a way that the first chamber is BCD. At the same time we also have the groups CDE, DEF, EFG, FGH, GHI, and HIK. In these basic patterns the three letters composing them are in strict alphabetical order. Since each group permits of twenty chambers the total number of chambers in this shorter table is one hundred and forty. In this relatively small number are implied the remaining chambers of the larger table. The implicitness can be explained by the manner in which the columns are arrived at, namely, the rotation of the same three circles which have given the basic or primary combinations.

C - Utility of the Table

In the mind of the author of the Art, the table's principal function is to permit, with as little of an effort as possible, both the search for and the discovery of solutions to most important problems. The table was envisioned as a logical instrument which would prove useful and necessary to resolve all kinds of questions which may be proposed. This end might be accomplished by directing the attention to the meanings of the letters which appear in the chambers, and proceeding to apply them to the terms of the proposition under discussion. Whether in concluding one affirms or denies a position, he must see to it that agreement obtains between the solution accepted and the principles and rules defined and explained before.[1]

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[1] Avinyo, op. cit., p. 54-55. Cf. Bove, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

Just to see how Lull goes about showing that this can be done with the table let us take up again the question whether there is an existent goodness which is equally great and eternal. We have seen that Lull answers in the affirmative. This he proceeds to show in this manner. First the definitions of goodness, grandeur and eternity make it clear: through goodness the good does what is good. Grandeur accounts for the greatness of what is good and enduring. And by definition eternity makes what is good and great to continue in existence. All of this necessitates that the act of goodness be infinite and eternal with the result that it is of the essence of goodness to be infinite and eternal.

The same conclusion, that a goodness exists which is both great and eternal, can be shown by going through the various species or modes of the rules signified by B, C, and D. For example without greatness and eternity there is no act which is eternal and infinite. This would exclude from existence the act of giving and producing goodness. But according to rule B, as well as by the second species of rules C and D, it must be defended that there is such a goodness-giving act. Moreover, the first species of rule D establishes that eternity is a primordial essence. There is nothing beyond or outside of it. Because of its character of being primary it is good and great. From all of this it follows with necessity that a goodness exists which is great and eternal.[1]

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[1] Lull, Ars Brevis, part 5, p. 33. See Llinares, op. cit., p. 206 and 224.

An important logical value of the table is that it was intended as the source for innumerable supporting reasons and arguments. Each column can occasion or supply validating premises for topics of controversy, as many as the correct applications of its principles will permit through recourse to the many chambers of each column.[2] Due to the manner in which these columns were originally obtained by the revolution of the circles, the Ars Brevis states that each column and each chamber implies the others. As a result they also provide mutual support and in turn there is engendered among demonstrations that arise from them a sort of logical solidarity. The correct solution of a problem cannot be at odds, or contradict, other true and valid propositions. Rather it should help to establish further true conclusions. There is consistency in truth, since all particular truths ultimately share in the unlimited perfection or principle of Truth.[3]

In the table and its chambers, the intellect has adequate means to enlarge its character of universality because by correctly using it the mind is better equipped to understand and to abstract from it knowledge concerning particular truths about the most diverse types of problems. In order to be successful in the acquisition of further truths one must apply to the problem the principles and rules signified by the letters in the appropriate chamber. This will be the chamber which has the terms of the proposition being tested either explicitly or at least implicitly. Through the application of the principles and rules to the problem, one will learn the properties and the nature of the object about which a predication has been made. The universality of the intellect is in the process strengthened because now with the table it can defend intended conclusions with a variety of proofs, at least with the twenty reasons suggested in each column.[1]

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[1] Lull, Ars Generalis, part 5, ch. 9, pp. 258-259.
[2] Sanchez de Lizarazu, op. cit., p. 249.
[3] Avinyo, op. cit., p. 49.

Another manner in which the correct use of the table is manifested is in the mastery, by the intellect, of the epistemological procedures of ascent and descent. The intellect ascends when the direction of its knowledge is towards the more universal, more perfect and what is absolutely first. The corresponding descent is towards the manifold particulars which in nature follow rather than precede. There is also what may be called a unifying effect accruing from the table to the intellect. This is due to the harmony of explanations extracted from columns obtained from one and the same figure.[2]

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1. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 5, p. 33; Tabula Generalis, d. 4, Vol. 5, opus B, p. 22.
2. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 5, pp. 33-34; Ars Ultima, part 5, p. 528. See Sanchez de Lizarazu, op. cit., p. 253.

More than any other element of the _Art_ the table suggests what has been referred to as the _Ars Combinatoria_ of Lull and which has appealed to men of genius, such as Leibnitz. According to Lull's thought there is conformity between the ideal and the real orders whenever human knowledge is objectively sound. The laws of thought are identical with those of being because the laws of thought are derived from the order of reality. Their principles must, therefore, be and act in similar fashions. And since nature and reality exist as the result of the interplay of fundamental ontological principles which are expressed in things in various degrees of perfection, the _Ars Combinatoria_ strives to do nothing but to reflect the structure of the real. In nature we frequently find that the greater includes the lesser, and the less perfect and smaller mirrors what is better and greater. The universal is present in the particular according to various proportions or in analogical degrees. Unity exists amidst diversity. To seize, through knowledge, this universal unity and analogy, which render _omnia in uno_, is the aim of scientific understanding. To reveal and manifest all of this is the purpose of an _Ars Combinatoria_ which attempts to duplicate or to reproduce noetically the manner and processes whereby the mingling of principles causes the being of what is real.[1] The _Ars Combinatoria_ was invented as a natural and logical method which, Lull thought, clarifies and facilitates the penetration into the most difficult but fundamental philosophical problems. Its diagrams, letters and figures were designed to make easier the formation and the retention of clear and distinct concepts, judgments and arguments by appeals made to the senses, imagination, and memory. These ought to aid, not hinder, the vision of an unclouded understanding.[1]

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[1] Avinyo, _op. cit._, pp. 54-55.

IV - Parts Six and Seven of the Ars Brevis

The next two sections of the *Ars Brevis* have been combined because of the similarity between them.

A - The Evacuatio of the Third Figure

1) Meaning of Evacuatio

The *evacuatio* or the emptying of the third figure, treated next in the *Ars Brevis*, designates a process whereby the intellect educes, extracts, or draws out from the third figure all that it is able to and all that which will be of interest for the matter of discussion. This is done with the previous acceptance of the meanings which were assigned to the letters of a given chamber. It has been indicated before that the chambers of figure three are binary letter groups. As one reviews the meaning of these letters he must note whether the meaning can be used effectively in connection with what has been proposed for analysis and disputation.[2]

2) Forms or Types of Evacuatio

a) From any chamber of the third figure the *Artista* can form or extract twelve propositions. As it has been seen each chamber is a binary combination and its two letters can stand for either the absolute or the relative principles. This means that there are four principles each of which may be made the subject of three distinct propositions, whose predicates will be one of the other three principles. Since there are four possible subject-terms, each allowing three propositions, the total number possible from any binary combination is twelve propositions. All of this takes for granted the validity of simple conversion in which the original predicate becomes the subject of a new proposition, and whose new predicate was the original subject. This is a legitimate procedure in accordance with the principles of the Art even before there has been any contraction of them to particular existing realities.

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[1] Platzeck, *La Combinatoria*, Vol. 13 (1954), p. 140.
[2] Lull, *Ars Brevis*, part 6, p. 34.

To show this first kind of evacuatio one may take the first chamber, BC, each letter of which signifies two principles, one from each of the first two figures. These principles are goodness, grandeur, difference and concordance. The twelve propositions will result by placing successively each of these four principles in the subject position of a proposition with the distinct predicate terms being the other principles. These propositions may be stated thus: goodness is great, it is different, it exists in harmony; grandeur is good, it is distinct, and it is harmonious; difference is good, it is great, it exists in concordance; concordance is good, it is great, it has differences.[1]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 37-38.

b) The second element that may be extracted or educed from any chamber is the middle term. In the instance of things which are in agreement a middle term may intervene as the genus or species which accounts for the union of a predicate to its subject in a proposition. Since there have been formed twelve propositions from a single chamber it can also provide at least twelve middle terms which can be shown to guarantee the linking of the subject and predicate of those propositions which were implicit in the binary chambers. For example with the grouping BC one may reason that whatever is magnified by grandeur is great and that since goodness is magnified through the presence of grandeur, therefore goodness and whatever shares in it is to that degree great. A well developed capacity to discover, and to make good use of, middle terms is a characteristic of him who masters the evacuatio of the third figure. And of course it will follow that he will be able to reason, argue and dispute correctly.[1]

c) The third stage of evacuatio may be the formation of twenty-four questions, two of which are implicit in each of the twelve propositions arrived at in the second evacuatio. Each chamber has only two letters, but according to the alphabet each letter, with the exception of K, stands for one of the rules or most general types of questions. Any of the twelve propositions may therefore be somewhat modified so that it will take the form of the questions suggested by the chamber. In order to see this through an example let us recall that the letters in chamber BC suggest the questions whether it is so? and what is the nature of this reality? As a result, about the statement that goodness is great one may ask the questions: Is goodness great? and What is goodness when it is great? About "goodness is distinct" one may ask: Is goodness truly distinct? and What is difference in goodness? The process might be continued until the twelfth and last proposition yields two final questions.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 34-38.

d) The next step or degree of evacuatio may be obtained by attentively considering the content within the chambers with a special regard for the definitions of its principles and for the particular species of its relative principles.

d) A still further evacuatio may be had if, to the principles of a chamber and the matter examined by means of it, one applies the various species of the rules signified by the letter which form the particular chamber.[1]

B - The Multiplication of the Fourth Figure

1) Meaning and Purpose of the Multiplication of the Fourth Figure

The evacuatio, it has been seen, served to reveal whatever is implicitly and virtually contained in the diagram and chambers of the third figure. In a similar manner the term "multiplicatio" denotes the procedures whereby the rich and varied potentialities of the most universal of the figures of the Art, and of the table which results from it, are made manifest and explicit. This is accomplished when one brings forth, or extracts the many conditions, propositions and ways of establishing conclusions which it is possible to educe from the fourth figure.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 38.

The novelty of this new section of the Art is the evident attempt to turn the art of syllogistic disputation into an almost mechanical affair. In this connection the Ars Generalis Ultima well-nigh insists that with the procedures of the Art the finding of middle terms, proofs and demonstrations, and the detection of erroneous or fallacious thought acquires a rigor proper to mathematical calculations. This is mainly due to the extensive use and manipulations of symbols envisioned by means of the Ars Combinatoria. The main mathematico-logical interest centers around the claimed power to discover middle terms. These we are told may be found principally, though not exclusively, by recourse to the second letter of each ternary group. This letter is derived from the second circle of figure four as we know.[2]

2) Description of the Various Kinds of Multiplicatio

a) The chief form of the multiplication of the fourth figure is based on the fact that within each of the many ternary chambers there are at least six conditiones. By a condition is meant a self-evident proposition which arises by combining two principles as the subject and predicate of a proposition. The self-evidence of the condition is due to the fact that it is an immediate proposition directly deducible from the definitions of the basic principles. In the case of the first chamber BCD, for example, the letter has a distinct condition with C, and a second one with D; that is, it can be the subject in propositions of which either C or B is the predicate. B has one condition with C, and another one with D. The same procedure may be repeated placing either C or D as the subject, and the other two letters as predicates. As a result it can be stated that from this single chamber the intellect has at its disposal at least six conditions. With them the mind is in a better condition and disposition to look for and to find supporting reasons, to raise legitimate objections, and to demonstrate with determination in matters which require it.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 39-40
[2] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 447.

Should one proceed to turn the innermost circle so that there appears its letter E with the letters BC of the other two circles he will be in possession of six additional conditions. Just one alteration of a single letter has provided a new chamber with six new conditions and as a result the intellect has increased its store of them. The number of conditions at one's disposal will continue to be augmented as long as one can create new chambers by the revolution of the free circles of the fourth figure. Rhetorically the Ars Brevis asserts that it would be far from easy to enumerate all of the possible conditions.[1]

b) A second multiplication may be realized with the extraction of thirty propositions and ninety questions from each chamber. This is similar to the third figure evacuatio of twelve propositions

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1. Lull, Ars Brevis, part 7, p. 40.

and twenty-four questions. The numbers thirty and ninety in this instance are arrived at in this manner. Each of the three letters in the chamber may stand for two distinct principles. A single principle may therefore occupy the position of subject in five propositions of which the other principles will in turn be the predicates. Since it is possible to have six different principles as subjects, and since each one permits five propositions, we may conclude to the number thirty, or six times five, as the number of propositions educible from each chamber. Moreover since all of the letters, with the exception of K, signify one rule or general question, when we multiply the number of propositions by three, which is the number of possible questions on each proposition, we get ninety questions.[1]

V - Commingling of Principles and Rules: Part Eight of the Ars Brevis

The procedures described as evacuatio and multiplication of the third and fourth figures make explicit what was implicit in those figures. A similar statement can be made concerning 'The Mingling of Principles and Rules'. What is done is to bring out explicitly an aspect of the **Art**, present in some measure in the first three figures. There is no need therefore other than to state what the meaning or nature of the commingling is.

It is soon apparent that the question here is one of intermingling and linking the first three columns of the alphabet. We can distinguish two stages or degrees in which this is accomplished.

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[1] Loc. cit.

First, one may utilize any of the eighteen principles in the first two columns as the subject of propositions in which the remaining principles will operate as predicates. This may be repeated until each of the principles has been made the subject to which have been joined all the others as its predicates. In this manner we study the ubiquitous presence of the principles and their reciprocal influence. In a second stage of the mingling the same principles may then be more closely scrutinized and investigated, should one take each one in conjunction with all of the general rules and their species.[1]

In the explanation of the first two figures it was suggested that the circular design reveals the interdependence of the principles which allows that any principle may be predicated of any of the others. It is apparent that this is what occurs in one of the stages of the mingling. This could also be done with the ordered chambers of the third figure. On the other hand the mingling of the principles with the rules and their species is also present in the third figure as one of the possible *evacuationes*. But in connection with the *evacuatio* the mingling is accomplished individually in one chamber at a time.

VI - Applications of the Ars Brevis

A - On the Nine Subjects: Part Nine of the Ars Brevis

The first eight sections of the *Ars Brevis* concern ideas which may be considered essential to the methodology proposed as the

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

Great Art. These ideas are themes and procedures which one must be well acquainted with in order to become adept in handling the Ars Combinatoria. The matter of the remaining five chapters of the Ars Brevis may be, legitimately, deemed extrinsic to the integrity and essence of the proposed method. Only a quick glance at the content of these chapters, two of which cover many pages in the printed text, is needed here.

First of all, since the Art had been envisioned by its creator as an instrument to be made use of in learning the truth about reality it is only natural that a division of reality be given. This is what the section on the nine subjects proposes. In it we have a list of the principal types of beings. The list could be considered an outline, a blueprint, of a treatise on ontology.[1] This will be clear if we consider these points:

1) The term "subjects" designates the most general or universal categories of being. Whatever exists must be in one of these classes or categories. And vice-versa nothing can be thought which is not in some form one of these subjects. The number of subjects is **nine and they may be** conveniently classified under the nine letters of the Art alphabet. With the corresponding letter the nine subjects are: B, God; C, Angel; D, Heaven; E, man; F, imaginative nature; G, sentient nature; H, vegetative nature; I, the elementative nature; and K, instrumental being. Each of these subjects can become matter of study, and we then have natural theology, astronomy and astrology, anthropology

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[1] Carreras y Artau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 450.

and psychology, etc.

2) In the longer Ars Generalis Ultima each one of the subjects is then considered separately. To throw light on the nature of each of the subjects all of the principles and rules are carefully applied to the subject. The result is that one thus learns much about its nature and properties. This process of deduction is only implicit in the abbreviated text, and is left to the keen and serious student to carry it out.

3) Without entering into any details of the treatment of the individual subjects, or applying to them the principles and rules, we may list the definitions of them in the Ars Brevis:

a) God (B) is a being who stands in need of nothing outside of Himself because in Him all perfections exist and do so in their plenitude.

b) The angel (C) is a spirit not intended to be united with a body.

c) The heavens (D) are the first mobile substance.

d) Man (E) is an homificans animal.

e) The imaginative nature (F) is that by whose functions things are represented imaginatively.

f) The sensitive nature (G) is a power whose proper function is to sense.

g) The vegetative nature (H) is a power whose proper function is to account for the existence and operations of vegetable life.

h) The elemental nature (I) is the power which accounts for the existence and the modes of being proper to the elements.

i) The instrumental nature (K) is the power which accounts for that which of itself has no value and which functions as the means toward something other than itself. It may be said that whatever reality it has is one that is for others.[1]

Instruments are either natural or moral. The former are instrumental beings discovered in nature, e.g., the eye is an instrument of vision. The moral instruments include the mechanical and liberal arts, in addition to what may better be designated the ethical instruments which concern human action and customs. These are principally the virtues and vices which constitute the fifth and sixth columns of the alphabet.[2]

B - Parts Ten and Eleven of the Ars Brevis

The remaining four sections of the Ars Brevis deal with the actual putting into practice of the doctrinal and methodological positions which constitute the Art. Because the first two of these remaining sections are more directly concerned with the matter of the Art they shall be treated together at this point, leaving the last two brief sections for a separate treatment afterwards.

1) Application

Under this heading the Ars Brevis treats briefly of the

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1. Ibid., part 9, chs. 1-9, pp. 48-61
2. For the definitions of both the virtues and vices see Lull, Ars Brevis, part 9, ch. 9, pp. 62-64.

principal ways in which application of the principles, rules and procedures of the Art may be made to a particular problem not explicitly dealt with in it. Before listing these procedures or ways it should be added that they are followed by a series of definitions of what the Art calls "one hundred forms." In a sense, also the distinct chapter listing a large number of specific questions belongs as another part of the application of the Art.

a) Types of Application

i) Should the terms which compose the question be other than those explicitly used in the Art the artista knows that they are implicitly in it because of the universal character of its principles and rules. For example if the question is whether there are angels, since angel is not one of the explicit principles of the Art one can come up with a reasonable reply by investigating whether it is good that such entities exist.

ii) A second type of application is to the effect that abstract terms must be explained by reduction to their corresponding concrete terms. If one can explain the relation, for example, between goodness and the good, between grandeur and a great one, he may assert that he understands the relation which binds abstract and concrete perfections.

iii) Another obvious application consists in referring particular questions and problems to the appropriate place in the Art, wherein the means and method of arriving at the solution have been outlined.[1]

b) The One Hundred Forms

The one hundred forms are a series of one hundred principles, most of which are only implicitly in the principles of *Art*. Because of their rather general character they should be known clearly and utilized by him who is an *Art* expert. Indeed the application of the *Art* to *omnes res scibiles* will be greatly facilitated, according to the *Art*, by an adequate understanding of these additional basic principles. Since it is needless and a rather tedious process to repeat the individual definitions,[2] it is sufficient that some of these forms be only listed here:

> Entity, essence, unity, plurality, nature, genus, species, form, matter, substance, accident, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, habitus, position, time, place, motion, immobility, instinct, beauty, metaphysics, being, the nature of points, lines, triangles, quadrangles, circles, color, proportion, theology, philosophy, geometry, astronomy, arithmetic, music, rhetoric, logic, and grammar.

2) The Questions

The *Art* had been originally conceived, in a large measure, as an *ars solvendi quaestiones*. The reader of Lull's works does not have to go very far to see that large sections of his more scientific and philosophical writings are given to series of questions which arouse the curiosity of man. Some of the questions are resolved, others are left to the reader with suggestions that they can be solved with comparative ease by making use of the procedures of the Art. It must be stressed that most of these questions are particular in character, that is, limited in their subject matter. Thus they are different from the general questions, designated as the rules, which in their generality are abstract and formal, rather than particular and material.

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[1] Lull, *Ars Brevis*, part 10, ch. 1, pp. 65-66.
[2] *Ibid.*, ch. 2, pp. 67-80.

There are by far too many questions in the Ars Brevis, and it would be pointless to list them here. It may be said however, that in the Ars Brevis the questions are arranged according to their subject matter and in an order which shows that the solution is best sought for by going to a particular section of the Art.[1]

C - Parts Twelve and Thirteen of the Ars Brevis

Because of the almost extrinsic relation of these last two sections to the theories of the Art they are only outlined.

1) Mastering the Art

The main steps sketched by the Ars Brevis when it describes how one advances and becomes an expert in the Art are:

a) A solid familiarity and acquaintance with the order and disposition of the thirteen parts into which the Art is divided. This is a sine qua non condition.

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[1] Ibid., part 11, ch. 1-21, pp. 80-122.

b) More important, however, is the next degree. In it one begins to develop as an expert, and becomes able to interpret correctly the manner and modes of procedure outlined throughout the text of the Ars Brevis. At this point the expert should experience little difficulty with questions and matter not explicitly dealt with in the Art. The problems and resolutions found in the Art are given only as examples.

c) In the final stage the expert shows familiarity and dexterity in the use of the Art and is able to increase considerably the number of questions and resolutions.[1]

2) Teaching the Art

The successful teaching of the Art ? requires that these four points be faithfully complied with:

a) The artista must, of course first of all, understand well and commit to memory the initial alphabet and the figures of the Art, the definitions of the principles and the rules. He must be an expert also in the manipulation of the chambers which form the table.

b) Next it is necessary that the teacher explain the text in a clear and reasonable manner. In his explanations to students he must avoid even the appearance of being guided by the authority of others, rather than by reason, when he comments on the meaning of the text. Should the students still have doubts after the matter has been explained, they should reveal them to the teacher.

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[1] Ibid., part 12, pp. 122-123.

c) The teacher ought to raise questions before the students, and he must try to answer them in a manner which is in accordance with both reason and the Art. Without good reasoning the artist will not be able to use the Art well. The best companions of the Art are: a keen and subtle intellect, an effective reason, and a good intention.

d) Questions should be proposed to the students by the teacher. And the students are to be encouraged to look for and to multiply reasons which can support their position as a valid conclusion or answer.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*, part 13, pp. 123-125.

CONCLUSION

Now that the exposition of the Ars Brevis has been completed, it is well to outline the salient points of this study. In order to assure that the reader was acquainted with the author of the Great Art, the study was introduced in the first chapter with a short biographical account. From this statement of the life of Lull it is manifest that he was firmly convinced that the Art was heaven inspired and that consequently it could not but be a priceless and infallible guide which would raise the minds and hearts of men to truth and love, two evangelical names of God. In the eyes of Lull, therefore, the Art was not just an academic or logical instrument which might have some value without any direct reference, either in its principles or in its aim, to a salvific truth. This truth can be possessed fully and adequately only when understood as ultimately rooted in the Personal Truth and Love which are identical with God. If one is to appreciate better the meaning of the Art, one must see it in relation to the driving forces of the existence of Lull after his conversion. Eager to turn others to God, he gradually developed and perfected his conception of an Art which might be utilized as a logic to convert the minds of men. In this wise, with the aid of the logical processes and rules of conversion, inference and demonstration, men would be converted to the ways and truths of God.

The brief outline of the history of Lullism, which followed the biographical account, cannot fail in being an impressive testimony of the grandeur and challenging inspiration of Lull's thought throughout the centuries since his death. Today the Art may be much ignored and even unknown, but for a long period it acted as a strong stimulus inspiring many minds, great and small. The repeated and varied efforts to improve, develop and apply the principles and methods of the Lullian Art reveal how many were the usages, all related to knowledge, which were envisioned by those who believed that they had understood the secrets of the Art. The combinatory schemes of its figures and tables suggested to some a mnemonic Art which might help in the retention of truths learned perhaps after a great deal of zealous effort. This was the case, it has been seen, during the Renaissance era. The notion of the Art as an inventive logic or one of discovery, a usage suggested by the title of one of the expositions of the Art by Lull, Ars Inventiva Veritatis, was strengthened in the minds of those who sought for a global, unitary and universal science whose principles would establish those of the more particular sciences.

The title of this study implies that its main consideration is the Great Art as it is presented in the concise Ars Brevis. In order to gain helpful clarifications other writings by Lull on the Art were made use of. No one will reasonably dispute the contention that the best exponent and commentator of the doctrines which are the chief elements of the Ars Brevis is its author. This can be asserted because of his many expositions and other writings in which he explains, or makes applications of, the Art. And since there seems to be no important reason to deviate from the order in which the Ars Brevis proceeds, its order was, rather closely, followed. This explains why this presentation of the Art commenced with some words on the alphabet. This was followed by a treatise on the figures, the definitions of their principles, and the rules. Prior to the mingling of the principles and rules there then followed the evacuatio and development of the figures and of the table, which, as noted, were apparent attempts to develop a mechanical scheme of syllogistic reasoning. In continuing with the remaining sections of the Art, their relatively lesser importance was alluded to, stating that their function is one of application, rather than one of an essential role within the structure of the Art.

Since without a doubt, earlier sections of the Ars Brevis are the more basic parts, they required a more lengthy analysis. First in order to facilitate the more adequate understanding of the nature of the Art and of its principles, a number of pages dealt with the gradual evolution of the Art as it may be gathered from the writings of Lull. Again, taking into account the more recent advances in the search for the historical antecedents and influences on the thought of Lull, several allusions were made to possible predecessors amongst Arabian, Jewish and Christian writers. In connection with the Christian tradition, which definitely influenced Lull's thought more than any other tradition, the Neo-Platonic tradition which was continued down to, and by, Scotus Erigena seems to stand out as a very important influence.

By reason of the close association of science and the perfection of love or amantia which it calls for, the Art reveals its Neo-Platonic, Augustinian and Franciscan inspirations. What is perhaps of greater significance is that the Art, on that account, stands out as a logic chiefly intended and designed for the discovery of religious truth. However for a Christian of Lull's character all truths are basically religious, for whatever is real and intelligible can only be so in the measure that it participates in, and mirrors, the supreme principles. These, in turn, are identical with the highest Personal Truth which is in no way distinct from the symbolic **A** of the first figure of the Art. It has been insisted that the identity of the dignitates within the undivided being of the all-encompassing and transcendent God distinguishes Him from each and all created imitations.

In the Chrstian order envisioned by Lull, the final intention or purpose of the search for truth by man's speculative intellect is to raise the latter, together with the powers of memory and will, above themselves. By transcending his natural powers the human person may begin and continue his progressive return to his divine source. There is no need to repeat that this contemplated mystical return excludes all trace of Pantheism and is genuinely Christian.

Although, as suggested, the essential features of the Great Art are found in the rather concise Ars Brevis, an adequate study of it cannot leave out completely some of the explanations of its principles and of its development in the other expositions of the Art by Lull himself. This required the inclusion, in the appendix which follows, of some rather pertinent material which relates to the manuscript tradition and to the various printed editions, both of the Ars Brevis and of the other principal writings on the Art by Lull. In a like manner, valuable and numerous can be the insights and suggestions which may be gathered from an acquaintance with the works of persons who at different periods have manifested an interest in the Lullian Art. For this reason there have been added the listings of known commentaries on the Art which are in existence, either in manuscript or printed form. The amount, the variety and the differences in geographical and chronological origin of such material cannot but be an impressive challenge to the student of the history of Lullism.

In the present stage of research, no study on Lull's thought can be exhaustive or claim to resolve every problem that may be raised in regard to the elements of the Ars Brevis. A great deal of work remains to be done before philosophers can rediscover and retain all that may be of lasting philosophical value in the conception of an Art whose principles have inspired some and repelled others. The writer can only hope that this analysis may contribute to the wider understanding and appreciation of a master of Christian Medieval thought who was at one time almost universally so acknowledged. The variety of Christian philosophical visions and Schools ought not be rejected or used to argue for either Scepticism or Relativism. Both of these philosophies spell the death of genuine philosophical thought. However, there is a place for more than one philosophical tradition and this is possible because of the richness and complexity of reality which thought, even as Christian, endeavors to comprehend. Thus under the inspiration of St. Augustine, Christian thought will bear witness to a faith which seeks both to understand and to be understood. An acceptance of and a fidelity to the truths of faith do not diminish the desire and obligation of man to receive created truths. Only when strengthened by truth will both intellect and reason guide a well regulated will to the appropriate end of man.

Though the aim of this dissertation has been an expository one, it is well to attempt a general evaluation of the meaning and principal features of the doctrine in the Ars Brevis. For details on the more specific points the reader must be referred to the appropriate sections of the Art.

At the outset it may be stated that there is nothing mysterious or of a magical character in the Art of Lull. There would be no need for saying this except that the suggestion has at times been made because it is possible to compare the diagrams, tables and algebraic symbols of the Art with the mechanical schemes, such as the revolving wheels, utilized by astrologers and necromancers. Whatever numerology is present in the Art it was not inspired by a Pythagorean interpretation of reality in mathematical terms. It is true that Lull envisioned, as did other medieval Christian thinkers, the created universe according to St. Augustine's biblical conception with all things in their proper measure, weight and number. The Creator's imprint is visible in the beings of nature. One need not be surprised that the metaphysics of Lull is of the Exemplarist type, one which sprang forth from an intellect imbued with a deep religious faith. This, without a doubt, must have proved more than an occasion for Lull to feel that he had discovered traces of the Christian Triune God in natural beings. Expressed in conceptual terms, this became the doctrine of the correlatives in which the fundamental principles of both being and thought reveal a triadic pattern.

Clearly for Lull, the purpose of the figures, letter-symbols and the combinatory tables was to facilitate the thought process by engaging the aid of the senses and of the imagination. Visual and other sensory images can help the mind to seize its object. In this manner, abstract conceptual truths may be derived from those which are more concrete and simple to grasp. It has to be stressed that the meaning and finality of the Art, according to the author, is to enable man's intellect to achieve a firm grasp of the genuine nature of reality in order to discover in this reality reflections of the Divine Being. The Art was to equip man with an instrument with which he can begin his ascent to God through knowledge. In order to be complete, this ascent must be crowned by kindling the will with a love of divine things.

Should one forget the attitude and frame of mind animating the conception just described, it becomes very difficult to make much sense out of the Lullian Art. Our manner of thought today is in many ways very different from that of a thirteenth century Christian in Spain, a country then engaged in dialogue and armed conflict with the invading Moors. As initially conceived by Lull, the Art was a method of contemplation and conversion. Soon he hoped that it might aid in bringing men to understand better the true secrets of nature and man. These might in turn reveal more intimately the secrets of the Divine Nature and Life. There is no reason to deny that the Art proved successful in this respect as far as Lull himself was concerned. His numerous books are a solid argument that he was able to live and to reveal a life close to God. Whether the Art could succeed as a logic of conversion in which propositions and demonstrations might bring about personal conversions is quite another question. A charge made against the Art by Eymeric is that no infidel has been brought to Christianity through use of the Art.

It cannot be said that Lull had, or indeed could have, any conception of the recent advances of modern science or a conception of science as a type of knowledge distinct from philosophy. More to the point, however, is the question of the function and role which Lull attributed to logic, or more precisely what he considered Aristotelian logic. On this point the history of the Art proves very illuminating. In its history the Art has given rise to opposing views about both its nature and its claim as a substitute for Aristotelian and Scholastic logic. Some, particularly the Anti-Lullists, found the Art without value and without any results which might be deemed of logical merit. There were others, particularly during the Renaissance, who gave the impression of expecting from the Art even more than had been intended by its creator. We find, in this second group, that the Art frequently provided an impetus for the continuing search for an almost artificial method capable of transcending the limitations of Aristotle's logic. The new method had to be a logic of discovery. The deductive syllogistic logic was simply an instrument for ordering and developing what was already known. Still needed was an organon for finding new knowledge. Without necessarily renouncing what was valuable in the method of deduction, this new logic might perhaps be more closely associated with modern scientific inductive procedures, if not as such at least in their aims.

If we interpret the Art as a logic, it must still be admitted that many of the statements of Lull are exaggerated and that they reveal a trust and confidence not borne out by the facts. Perhaps, as suggested above, what lies at the heart of the problem is the meaning of logic. Lull was aware of the problem, for he categorically states that Aristotelian logic fails to yield science, or genuine knowledge of reality, because traditional logic, by definition, deals with second intentions. Accordingly, Lull affirmed that the _Art_ was more comprehensive, for it goes beyond, though it does not exclude, second intentions.

Apart from the understanding of traditional Aristotelian logic by Lull, certain similarities and differences between it and the _Art_ can be pointed out. Both were put forward as instruments of correct reasoning. Both again presuppose the principle of non-contradiction, the corner-stone of all thought. For the purpose of correct reasoning and demonstration, both Aristotelian logic and the _Art_ require an identifying or a separating middle term, although, as noted, Lull understands the term in a wider sense. One cannot read about certain of the principles and about the rules of the _Art_ without noticing a strong resemblance with the Aristotelian categories. Without much difficulty a close parallel could be established between most of the rules and the categories, although Lull seems to think in terms which are more ontological than purely logical.

Some of the differences are perhaps more striking. The use of diagram figures, particularly of the table of algebraic letter symbols, is quite an innovation with Lull; the more so when we recall that Lull seemed to be attempting to reduce the rules of thought and reasoning to a method of almost mechanical and mathematical precision.

The explanation of the triadic character of the principles serves to place the Art in the tradition of logic that may be called of analogy. This also stands out with Lull's predilection for what he called the argument per aequiparantiam. Perhaps the most important of all the differences is the direction or finality of the Art when contrasted with the logic of Aristotle. The Art was consciously God-directed or -centered. This is suggested by the first of the figures, figure A. A proposed instrument for the search of truth is immediately defective if it excludes, hinders, or in no way contributes to the knowledge of God and to the knowledge of things in so far as these are related to God whom they mirror in their being.

From the vantage point of modern logic it may, with justice, be admitted that the Art appears only as a vague and almost unrecognizable forerunner. If Aristotelian logic, as understood by Lull, deals with second intentions and hence fails to grasp the real, what likeness will the Art have with modern symbolic logic which seems to pride itself in its character of a truly formal logic? The only logic seriously allowed by Lull, in the Art, must be instrumental to the point of being almost a material logic. Its values are to be tested by its principles which must be laws of thought and of reality. It may be argued on the other hand, that symbolic logic, in its concern with the purely formal elements of inferences, well-nigh admits that it is removed from science as a knowledge or reality. As soon as we enter the realm of science, we are entering a realm of non-logical problems. The question here touches on the nature and function of logic. And the history of philosophy shows that this discipline has not always been interpreted or understood in the same way.

But it is by reason of its frequent use of letter-symbols, singly or in combinations in the figures and in tables, and by reason of the commingling of its principles and rules in a way suggestive of mathematical computations that some recent and present day writers look upon the Art of Lull as a distant anticipation of modern symbolic or mathematical logic. This idea appears more credible when linked with the name of Leibnitz. This modern philosopher was inspired by Lull in the composition of an Ars Combinatoria. Mainly on this account, Leibnitz is often presented as one of the more immediate and authentic historical predecessors of the founders of modern formal symbolic logic. Without overlooking the elements of truth in this hypothesis of a historical kinship, we must admit that there are important and decisive differences. As noted before, by reason of the logical doctrines which are a part of the Art and by the manner of their treatment, the Art must be considered a material rather than a formal logic. According to the intent of Lull the intrinsic value of the Art must be measured by the object for which it was intended and which justified its formulation. Its value must needs be considered on account of the metaphysical principles which it proposes and on which it is based. As a logic, the Art is of first intentions, and Lull declared it superior to that of the Schools because its demonstrations lead to an understanding of reality. In the absence of this, Lull held that we are dialecticians and remain on the level of pure thought.

Notwithstanding apparent similarities, it is true that logic has advanced to such a degree and in a manner which causes us to look upon the efforts of Lull as rather primitive. The high expectations placed on the Art by Lull seem to fall short of the promised gains. There is, therefore, no serious question of resurrecting the Art as a substitute for scientific methodology or as a logic of discovery. Indeed, in retrospect, it may appear that, apart from its insistence on a methodology which calls into play other powers besides the intellect, the only genuine logic of argumentation present in the Art is already discoverable in the Aristotelian Organon.

However, an understanding of the complete history of ideas, which runs from the logic of the Greeks down to the logicians of the twentieth century, requires that we do not overlook the efforts and inspiration of Lull, a man in many ways ahead of his times. His efforts were due in part to his ideal of a universal method which could simplify and unify all human knowledge. In this ideal of a unifying science and method, Lull stands out as a rather modern phenomenon. His idea of a logic which would surpass the syllogistic of Aristotle was shared by the initiators of modern philosophy: Bacon, Descartes, Espinoza and Leibnitz. In these men the thought of synthesizing human knowledge gave way to that of a unitary and universal wisdom. Distinctions between sciences became rather accidental, and they were treated as a single knowledge with an identical method. The analogical conception of the principles of the Art permitted Lull to bring unity to the sciences while retaining their diversity.

The last point is of interest because it serves as a note of caution to logicians and reminds them that the principles of thought studied in logic are not operative in a vacuum. A thought is of something. Thought is therefore relational and its function is to express what is real as accurately as possible. Logic should therefore have a solid basis and continue, on its own level, the metaphysical principles which underlie all being, the entia rationis included.

In accordance with the views expressed about the Art, it may be added that though it was not able to fulfill all of the aims foreseen by Lull, it is of value for those who wish to understand his numerous books as well as the books of many other writers, chiefly Renaissance men who were inspired by the conceptions of the Art. As already noted, among Renaissance writers the Art suggested the creation of a mnemonics or a memory scheme. This may be related to later efforts to devise other mechanical means which today have culminated in computer machines. Of course, there is no suggestion that Lull had any idea of these later developments.

APPENDIX

THE TRADITION OF THE ARS BREVIS

This chapter contains several lists which are useful for further examination and study of the *Ars Brevis*. At least they indicate the importance and value which its ideas have had both for its author and for many thinkers who came after him.

Since each of the lists will be introduced with a brief explanation of its content, it is sufficient here to note in general the character of each one of them. They are as follows: 1) a list of the manuscripts of the *Ars Brevis* which are known to be still in existence; 2) a list of the printed editions of the same work; 3) a list of the other expositions of the *Art*, or part of it, by Ramon Lull himself; 4) a list of commentaries, in manuscript form, by other writers, first on the *Ars Brevis*, and secondly on the *Art* in general; 5) a list, similar to the previous one, of the principal printed expositions, commentaries, and developments of both the *Ars Brevis* and the methods of the *Art* in general.

I - Manuscripts of the Ars Brevis

In this first list mention is made of the extant manuscripts of the *Ars Brevis*.[1] A basis for separation of these manuscripts is naturally the language in which they are written. By far most of them are in Latin and are therefore given first. They are then followed by the few manuscripts in other languages. These are, therefore, translations, or may be so considered. Of them the Catalan manuscripts merit to be mentioned first if we bear in mind Lull's native language.

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[1] The main sources for the manuscripts' entries on this list, as well as on the third and fourth lists which follow, are these:

Anonymous, "Els Manuscrits Lullians de les Biblioteques Nordiques," *Mediterraneum*, Vol. 1 (1936), pp. 105-113.

With this initial distinction which is based on the language in which they are written, the order in which the manuscripts appear on the list is alphabetical according to the city and library where they are found today.

Immediately after the location, and for identification

Avinyo y Andreu, Joan, Les Obres Autentiques del Beat Ramon Lull, Barcelona, 1935.

Batista y Roca, Joseph Maria, Catalech de les Obres Lulianes d'Oxford, Barcelona, 1916.

Batllori, Miguel, "El Lulismo en Italia," Revista de la Filosofia, Vol. 2 (1963), pp. 253-313, 479-537.

Blanco, Pedro, "La Apologia del Dr. Dimas de Miguel, y el Catalogo de las Obras de Raimundo Lulio del Dr. Arias de Loyola. Manuscritos ineditos de la Real Biblioteca del Escorial," La Ciudad de Dios, Vol. 17 (1908), pp. 326-333, 412-420, 590-596.

D'Alos-Moner, Ramon, "Inventari de Manuscrits Lul-lians de Mallorca Segons Notes de Jeromi Rosello," Miscel-lania Lul-liana, Barcelona, 1935, pp. 384-402.

Littre, Paul Emile and Haureau, Barthelemy, "Raymond Lulle," Histoire Litteraire de la France, Vol. 29, Paris, 1885.

Longpre, Ephrem, "Raymond Lulle," Dictionaire de Theologie Catholique, Vol. 9, cols. 1071-1141, Paris, 1926.

Marx, J., Verzeichnis der Hanschriften-Sammlung des Hospitals zu Cues bei Bernkastel, Treves, 1905.

Obrador y Bennasar, Mateo, "Notes per a un catalech d'alguns Codexs Lul-lians de les Biblioteques de Palma de Mallorca," Estudis Universitaris Catalans, Vol. 17 (1932), pp. 166-183; "Ramon Lull en Venecia. Resena de los Codices e Impresos Lulianos Existentes en la Biblioteca Veneciana de San Marcos," Boletin de la Sociedad Arqueologica Luliana, Vol. 8 (1900), pp. 301-324; "Viatge d'investigacio a les biblioteques de Munich y Mila," Anuari d l'Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 1908, pp. 598-613.

purposes, the codex or manuscript numbers are indicated. These are assigned to the manuscripts by the libraries whose possession they are today. The Roman numerals in parentheses stand for the century of the manuscript. Whenever possible both the Incipit and the Explicit are stated. And in a few instances indications are given about the condition of the manuscript, particularly if it is incomplete.

A - Latin Manuscripts

1) Bologna, Univ. Lat. 926, f. 83rd-97va.

2) Bourges, Lat. 298 (XIV), f. 124-242v.

Ottaviano, Carmelo, L'Ars Compendiosa de R. Lulle, avec une Etude sur la Bibliographie et le Fond Ambrosien de Lulle, Paris, 1930.
Perez Martinez, Lorenzo, "Los Fondos Lulianos Existentes en las Bibliotecas de Roma," Anthologia Annua, Rome, Vol. 8 (1961), pp. 331-480; "Los Fondos Manuscritos Lulianos de Mallorca," Estudios Lulianos, Vol. 2 (1958), pp. 209-226, 325-334; Vol. 3 (1959), pp. 73-88, 195-214, 297-320; Vol. 4 (1960), pp. 83-102, 203-212, 329-346; Vol. 5 (1961), pp. 137-151, 325-348; Vol. 7 (1963), pp. 89-96, 217-222.
Platzeck, Wolfram-Erhard, Raymund Lull, Vol. 2, pp. 3-84, Dusseldorf, 1964.
Tarre, Jose, "Los Codices Lulianos de la Biblioteca Nacional de Paris," Analecta Sacra Tarraconensia, Vol. 14 (1941), pp. 155-182.

Of great assistance for information on Lullian manuscripts is the microfilm collection of the Lullistiches Institut at the University of Freiburg in Bresgau, Germany. This is true particularly in reference to manuscripts in German libraries, and to isolated manuscripts in libraries in the U.S.A. and some North-European countries. This collection of manuscripts' microfilms was gathered in view of the required critical texts for the edition and publication now in progress, as noted in the previous section in connection with the history of Lullism, of Lull's Latin Opera. Undertaken under the auspices of the Schola Lullisticha Majoricensis this edition is being directed by Prof. Friedrich Stegmuller of the University of Freiburg in Bresgau. I wish to express my gratitude to Prof. Stegmuller for his readiness to provide the writer with information on the manuscripts of the Ars Brevis known to be in existence.

3) Brussels, Bibl. Royale, Lat. 1188 (XIV), (ex monasterio de Korssendock), f. 163-169.

Incipit: Deus . . . quae imago artis generalis . . . Ratio quare facimus istam artem brevem, est ut ars magna facilius sciatur . . . Explicit: Tunc temporis artista sive magister doceat scolares de praedictis.

4) Copenhagen, Ny. Kgl., Lat. S 638 (XIV) 8', f. 151-185v.

Incipit: Ratio quare facimus illam artem brevem . . . Explicit: Scolares de praedictis . . . finivit Raimundus hunc librum Pisis in monasterio Sancti Dominici mense Januarii anno Domini 1307.

5) Copenhagen, Ny. Kgl., Lat. S 640, (XV) 8', f. 107-142v.

Incipit: Ratio quare facimus illam artem brevem . . . Explicit: Scolares de praedictis . . . Finivit Raimundus hunc librum Pisis in monasterio sancti Dominici mense Januarii anno Domini 1307 inc. Domini nostri.
(Followed in f. 143-147 by Tabulae)

6) Cremona, Bibl. Gubernat., Lat. 64, f. 1-56.

7) Cues (Cusa), Lat. 81, (XV), (fortasse scripsit Card. Nicolaus Cusanus), f. 1-11.

Incipit: Jesus, Maria, Raymundus. -Deus cum tua gratia . . . quae est magnae artis imago, quae sic . . . ultima. -De prologo. -Explicit: Tunc temporis artista sive magister doceat scolares de praedictis. -Ad honorem et laudem Dei et publicae utilitatis . . . de mense Januarii anno 1307 inc. D. n. J. XI.

8) Danzig, Staatbibliothek (nunc: W. Gdansku, Biblioteka Polskiej Akademi Nauk), Lat. ms. 2224 (XV), f. 128-235v.

Incipit: Ratio quare facimus istam artem brevem . . . Explicit: Magister doceat scolares. Explicit: Ars Brevis R. L. Deo gratias.

9) Escorial, Lat. ms. f. IV. 12 (XIV), 33. fol.

Incipit: Deus cum tua gratia, sapientia et amore incipit ars brevis, quae est imago . . . Explicit: Magister doceat scolares de praedictis. Ad honorem et laudem Dei . . . et sancti Domini mense Januarii anno 1307 D. n. J. XI.
(Provenientia: Este libro es del doctor fray Alonso de san Cibian y Dexolo; olim Bibl. del Conde-Duque de Olivarez.)

10) Florence, Riccardiana, Lat. ms. 1001 (XV), f. 34-43.

(Scriptum 1417-1418 per manus fratris Nicolai Muckrenwal de Prussia ordinis fratrum Heremitarum Sti Augustini de conventu provincia Thuring.)

11) Genoa, Bibl. Civita Berio, Lat. ms. D bis 12 2 33 (XVII, 1631), f. 1-36.

Followed by a Brevis ac etiam dilucida in Artem Brevem divi Raymundi Lulli Martyris subtilis declaratio with a new pagination of its 113 folios beginning with f. 1.

12) Innichen, Tirol. Collegiata San Candido, Lat. VIII. c. 11, (XV) (292-210mm.), f. 112-122.

Incipit: Deus, cum tua gratia, sapientia et amore incipit ars brevis, quae est imago artis generalis. Nam ista scita ab intellectu subtili et fundato, ipse potest scire generalem artem. -Ratio quare facimus . . . Explicit: Pisis in monasterio sancti Dominici anno ab incarnatione Domini 1307.

13) **Karlsruhe**, Lat. ms. perg 92 (St. Peter Schwarzwald) (XIII-XIV), f. 28v-39v.

Incipit: Deus in timore tuo et de tua gratia magna confidens, incipit ars brevis generalis, quae est imago artis magnae electa ex textu artium Raimundi Lul cuiusdam regis Maioricarum Senescalli ordinata per partes, ut patere potest sequendo litteram. -Ratio quare fecimus istam artem brevem . . .
(Fragmentum, ut videtur, cum comentariis et cum excerptis ex Arte generali et ultima.)

14) Kontwoliere: St. Gallen, Lat. Vad. 487 (XV), f. 1r-75r.

(Ars Parva Generalis)

15) London, Brit. Museum, Lat. Sloane 2416 (XV), n. 2. f. 124-131.

Incipit: Deus cum tua gratia et sapientia et amore incipit ars brevis Raymundi Lullii. -Ratio quare facimus istam artem brevem . . . Explicit: mensis Januarii anno 1308 inc. Domini. -B significat Bonitatem.

16) Milan, Bibl. Nazionale Braidense, Lat. ms. A.D. XV 17/2 (XVI), (of Spanish Origin).

17) Milan, Bibl. Amb., Lat. I. 66 Inf., (XVII), f. 1-63.

18) Milan, Bibl. Amb., Lat. Y. 21 Sup., (XIV-XV), f. 1-41.

19) Munich, Etaat Bibl., Lat. Clm 10506 (XIV), f. 1-12v.

Incipit: Deus, cum tua gratia . . . Incipit: ars brevis quae est imago artis generalis . . . Ratio quare facimus istam brevem artem, est ut ars magna facilius sciatur . . . Explicit: tunc temporis artista sive magister doceat scolares de praedictis.

20) Munich, Etaat Bibl., Clm 4381 (Aug. S Ult. 81) (XV), f. 1-34.

Incipit: Deus, cum tua gratia . . . Incipit: ars brevis quae est imago artis generalis . . . Ratio quare facimus istam brevem artem, est ut ars magna facilius sciatur . . . Explicit: tunc temporis artista sive magister doceat scolares de praedictis.

21) Munich, Etaat Bibl., Lat. Clm. 10531 (XIV), f. 9-40.

Incipit: Deus, cum tua gratia . . . Incipit: ars brevis quae est imago artis generalis . . . Ratio quare facimus istam brevem artem, est ut ars magna facilius sciatur . . . Explicit: tunc temporis artista sive magister doceat scolares de praedictis.

22) Munich, Etaat Bibl., Lat. Clm. 10552 (XV), f. 30-51v.

Incipit: Deus cum tua gratia et sapientia et amore incipit ars brevis Raymundi Lullii. -Ratio quare facimus istam artem brevem. Explicit: Si vero scolares nesciant . . . mense Januarii anno a nativitate Domini 1307. -Deo gratias.

23) Munich, Etaat Bibl., Lat. Clm. 10587 (XVII), f. 25-39v.

24) Munich, Etaat Bibl., Lat. Clm. 10661 (XV-XVI), f. 178r-184v.

Incipit: Deus, cum tua gratia . . . Incipit: ars brevis quae est imago artis generalis . . . Ratio quare facimus istam brevem artem, est ut ars magna facilius sciatur . . . Explicit: tunc temporis artista sive magister doceat scolares de praedictis.

25) Munich, Etaat Bibl., Clm. 14524 (XV), f. 14-44v. (Olim S. Emmeran F. 27)

Incipit: Deus, cum tua gratia . . . Incipit: ars brevis quae est imago artis generalis . . . Ratio quare facimus istam brevem artem, est ut ars magna facilius sciatur . . . Explicit: tunc temporis artista sive magister doceat scolares de praedictis.

26) Munich, Universitats Bibl., Lat. Cod. ms. 296 (XV) 8', f. 122-153.

Incipit: Deus cum tua gratia, sapientia et amore incipit ars brevis quae est imago artis generalis intitulatur . . . Ratio quare facimus istam artem brevem . . . Explicit: tunc temporis artista sive magister doceat scolares de praedictis. -Ad laudem et honorem Dei et publicae utilitatis finivit Raymundus hunc librum Pisis in monasterio sancti Dominici mense Januarii anno 1307 inc. D. n. J. X. amen.

27) Munich Etaat Bibl., Lat. Clm. 19857 (XV; 1484) (Olim Tegernsee 1857) f. 67r-93r.

28) Munich Etaat. Bibl., Lat. Clm. 18445 (XV), (Tegernsee 445), f. 36-46.

29) Naples, Bibl. Naz., Lat. VIII. F. 27 (XV), f. 1r-23r.

30) Naples, Bibl. Naz., Lat. VIII. F. 38 (a 1447), f. 1r-19v.

31) New York, The Franciscan Institute Library, St. Bonaventure, Lat. ms. 3 (XV), f. 2-28.

32) New York City, Columbia Univ., Library of the late George A. Plimpton (61 Park Av.), Lat. ms. 187 (XV?), f. 26-49.

Incipit: Deus cum tua gratia et amore Incipit Ars Brevis . . . Explicit: Finivit Raymundus Artem Brevem Pisis Monasterio Sancti Dominici Anno ab Incarnatione Domini 1307 Explicet: Feliciter.

33) Oxford, Corpus Chr. College, Lat. 247 (XV), f. 1-16.

Incipit: Ratio quare facimus istam artem brevem est, ut ars magna facilius sciatur; Explicit: ad honorem Dei et publicae utilitatem mense Januarii anno inc. D. n. J. XI. 1347. Deo Gratias.
(Poss: Hic est unus librorum quos habuit a dominis Mixley Patricius Saunders. 1606 Julii 7).

34) Palermo, Bibl. Comm., Lat. ms. II. B. 21, (XV?).

35) Palma de Mallorca, Conv. Francisc., Lat. 3-9 (XV; 1492), f. 215v-238.

36) Palma de Mallorca, Bibl. Publ., Lat. 111, (XVII; 1642), f. 1-74.

(Raymundi Lull ars brevis. Comp. et isagogue artis magnae, mendis castigata . . . per Franciscum Marcal, finivit Palma 1642).

37) Palma de Mallorca, Bibl. Publ., Lat. 993 (Olim L. 148), (XV; 1432), f. 1-46.

Incipit: Deus cum tua summa gratia, sapientia et amore incipit ars brevis, quae est imago artis, quae sic intitulatur . . . Ratio quare facimus . . . Explicit: Artista sive magister doceat scolares de praedictis . . . Parisiis (Pisis?) in monasterio Sct. Dominici Jan. 1307 inc.

38) Palma de Mallorca, Bibl. Publ., Lat. 994 (olim L. 149) (XIV), f. 7v-48v.

39) Palma de Mallorca, Bibl. Publ., Lat. 996 (Olim L. 151), (XVI)

(Ars brevis ed. Barcinone anno 1511 cum approbatione eiusdem libri data ab academia Parisiensi. In libro approbatio non jam exstat).

40) Palma de Mallorca, Bibl. del Conde de Ayumans, Lat. ms. (XIV), 201 fol., Int. 1.

41) Paris, Bibl. Nat., Lat. nom acq. 1505 (XV; 1473-1480), f. 5v-16v: dq.

42) Parma, Bibl. Palatina, Lat. Palatino 309 (XVI) 4' perg., f. VIr; f. 1r-24v.

43) Rheims, Lat. ms 881 (XV), f. 1-16.

Incipit: Deus cum tua gratia, . . . imago artis, quae sic intitulatur: Deus, cum tua summa perfectione incipit ars generalis ultima. -Ratio quare facimus istam artem brevem est. Explicit: Magister doceat scolares de praedictis. -Ad honorem et laudem Dei et publicae utilitatis finivit Raimundus Lull hunc librum Pisis in monasterio sancti Dominici mense Januarii anno inc. D. n. J. X. 1307. Deo gratias.

44) Salamanca, Biblioteca de la Universidad, (XIX; 1875), f. 88-104.

45) Trier, Staat Bibl., Lat. Cod. Trev. 1925/1482 (XV), (Provenientia: St. Alban, Trier), f. 10-39.

Incipit: Deus, tua bonitate, magnitudine et potestate incipit ars sancta ad tuae fidei defensionem et tuae sapientialis maiestatis honorificentiam et gloriam. Amen. -Ratio quare facimus istam artem brevem est, ut ars magna facilius sciatur. Explicit: Tunc temporis artista sive magister doceat scolares de praedictis. Deo Gratias. -Ad honorem et laudem

Dei publicaeque utilitatem finivit Raimundus egregius doctor in omni facultate hanc artem minorem, quae est introductoria in magnam, quae est circa XII sexternos. Omnia tamen, quae sunt in alia hic sunt breviter tacta etc. Anno MCCVII incarnatione D. n. J. XI. Amen.

46) Uppsala, Kntl. Universit. Bibliotek, Lat. ms. C 51 (1400), Int. VI, f. 128-143.

47) Vatican, Chigi Lat. A. IV. 105 (XV), C 190 X 135 mm., f. 113v-120r. (Fragments).

(Incomplete; it ends with these words: Discursus divinae Bonitatis.)

48) Vatican, Palat. Lat. 984, (XV), f. 95-107 (260x223mm.)

Incipit: Ratio quare facimus istam artem brevem est ut ars magna facilius sciatur . . . Dividitur iste liber in tredecim partibus . . . Explicit: tunc artista sive magister doceat scolares de praedictis. Ad laudem . . . Pisis in monasterio sancti Dominici in mense Januarii anno MCCCVII.

49) Vatican, Vat. Lat. 3069 (XV), (240x170mm.), f. 13r-37v.

Incipit: Ars brevis quae est imago artis generalis. Deus cum tua gratia, sapientia et amore . . . incipit. Ratio quare facimus hand artem brevem est ut ars magna facilius sciatur . . . Explicit: Artista sive magister doceat scolares de praedictis. -De perfectione huius artis. Ad honorem et laudem Dei et publicae utilitatis finivit Iohsant hunc librum in palacio dominorum Bonnonie de mense maii anno millesimo CCC sexagesimo sexto . . .

50) Vatican, Regin . Lat. 1289 (XV), (330x230mm.), f. 137-149.

(Incomplete)

51) Vatican, Urbin Lat. 1442, (XV) (230x145mm.), f. 102-123.

Incipit: Ars brevis quae est imago artis generalis. At end: Deo dante divinum opus ars brevis reverendissimi Raymundi Lull nuncupatum anno millesimo quadrigentesimo quinto XIIII Februarii optime feliciter finivit.

52) Vatican, Vat. Lat. 9232 (XVI), f. 265r-v. (fragmentum, IV pars).

53) Venice, Bibl. Marc., Lat. ms. CXLIII cl. VI (XV; 1462), f. 243r-251r.

Incipit: Deus: in tua perfectione. -Ratio quare facimus istam artem . . .
(This ms. seems to have been written, at least in part by Fr. Bernardine Aquilani de Fossa.)

54) Vienna, Lat. 2529 (Rec. 664) (XV), f. 32-74.

55) Vienna, Lat. 5169 (Rec. 609) (XV), f. 1-33r.

56) Vienna, Lat. 11379 (?), f. 1-77.

57) Wolfenbuttel, Lat. 4180 (96 Weissenb.) (XV), f. 237-250v.

B - Manuscripts of Translation of Ars Brevis

1) Milan, Bibl. Amb. Catalan ms. 0.87 Sup, Latinus Chartaceus (XV), f. 1-63.

(Although referred to in title page as Raymundi Lulli Ars magna it is really the Ars Brevis.

2) Palma de Mallorca, Colegio de Monte Sion, Catalan (Romans Lemosi), (XV), f. 1-64.

3) Palma de Mallorca, Franciscan Convent, Catalan, ms. IV, 67 (XV), f. 1-13.

(Fragments).

4) Palma de Mallorca, Bibl. Publ., Castillian ms. 999 (Ars Brevis).

5) London, Brit. Museum Sloane, French, gall. ms. 2385 n 2 (XVII), f. 20-51.

L'Art bref de M. Raymond Lulle. L'agrege, etc. L'introduction du grand art. -O Dieu, avec ta grace et ta sapience . . .

6) Paris, Bibl. Nat., French, Franc. ms. 19965 (XVII).

L'Art Bref de Raymond Lulle, qui est un abrege et entree au grand Art.

II - *Printed Editions of the Ars Brevis*

This second and shorter list takes into account all of the known printed editions of the *Ars Brevis*.[1] With one or two exceptions these editions are known through copies which still exist in various libraries throughout the world.

Each entry has the title under which the edition appears, the publisher if known, the city and date of publication. For further details on these editions there is indicated at the end of each entry, in addition to the location of at least one copy, the corresponding number assigned to the particular published edition in the *Bibliografia de les Impressions Lul-lianes* of Elies Rogent and Estanislau Duran, (in the lists it is referred to as R. D.); or to the catalogue of Lull's writings in *Raymond Lulle, Philosophe de l'Action* of Armand Llinares.

A - *Latin Editions*

1) *Ars Brevis sive Artificium*, n.p. Barcelona, 1484.
   (Cf. Llinares N. 127).

2) *Ars Brevis sive Artificium*, Eucharus Silver, Rome (?), 1485.
   (R.D. 6, Palma, Bibl. Prov.)

3) *Ars Brevis sive Artificium*, Peter Posa, Barcelona, 1489.
   (R.D. 10, Palma, Bibl. Prov.; Barcelona, Bibl. Universitaria.)

4) *Ars Brevis sive Artificium*, n.p., Spain, n.d. (Spanish Incunabulum).
   (R.D. 28, Lyons, Bibl. de la Ville de Lyon.)

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[1] The best and most complete source of information for entries on this list is Rogent, Elies and Duran, Estanislau, *Bibliografia de les Impressions Lul-lianes*, Barcelona, 1927.

5) *Ars Brevis sive Artificium*, Chales Amoros, Barcelona, 1511.
(R.D. 44, Madrid, Bibl. Nac.)

6) *Ars Brevis sive Artificium*, n.p., Avignon, 1511.
(R.D. 3a.)

7) *Ars Brevis sive Artificium*, n.p., Rome, 1513.
(R.D. 49, Munich, Royal Lib.)

8) *Ars Brevis sive Artificium*, Stephen Baland, Lyons, 1514.
(R.D. 52, Madrid, Bibl. Nac.; London, British Museum.)

9) *Ars Brevis sive Artificium*, Claude Bornat, Barcelona, 1565.
(R.D. 102, Palma, Bibl. Prov.; Barcelona, Bibl. Univ.; London, British Museum.)

10) *Ars Brevis sive Artificium*, Giles Gorbin, 1578.
(R.D. 121, Madrid, Bibl. Nac.; London, British Museum)

11) *Ars Brevis sive Artificium*, n.p., Strassbourg, 1612 (?).
(R.D. 170)

12) "Ars Brevis sive Artificium," in *Generalis et Admirabilis Methodus ad Omnes Scientias Facilius et Citius Addiscendas, in quo Explicatur Ars Brevis Raymundi Lulli* of Pedro Geronimo Sanchez de Lizarazu, pp. 9-41, Charles of Lavayen, Tarragona, 1613.
(R.D. 172, Barcelona, Bibl. Univ.)

13) "Ars Brevis sive Artificium", in *Generalis et Admirabilis Methodus ad Omnes Scientias Facilius et Citius Addiscendas, in quo Explicatur Ars Brevis Raymundi Lulli* of Pedro Geronimo Sanchez de Lizarazu, pp. 9-411, Charles of Lavayen, Tarragona, 1619. (Reprint of 1613 Edition.)
(R.D. 186, Palma, Bibl. Prov.; Barcelona, Bibl. Univ.)

14) *Ars Brevis sive Artificium*, Rafael Moya, Mallorca, 1669.
(R.D. 264, Barcelona, Bibl. de Catalonia.)

15) "Ars Brevis sive Artificium," *Opera Parva*, *opus* A, pp. 1-125, Peter Anthony Capo, Mallorca, 1744.
(R.D. 325, Palma, Bibl. Prov.; Barcelona, Bibl. Univ.)

16) *Ars Brevis sive Artificium*, Peter Anthony Capo, Mallorca, 1744.
(R.D. 326)

17) "Ars Brevis sive Artificium," in *Opera ea quae ad Adinventam ab Ipso Artem Universalem*, pp. 1-43, Lazarus Zetzner, Strassbourg, 1598.
(R.D. 144)

18) "Ars Brevis sive Artificium," in Opera ea quae ad Adinventam ab Ipso Artem Universalem, pp. 1-42, Lazarus Zetzner, Strassbourg, 1609.
   (R.D. 162, N. Y. 42nd St. Lib.)

19) "Ars Brevis sive Artificium", in Opera ea quae ad Adinventam ab Ipso Artem Universalem, pp. 1-42, Lazarus Zetzner, Strassbourg, 1617.
   (R.D. 180)

20) "Ars Brevis sive Artificium," in Opera ea quae ad Adinventam ab Ipso Artem Universalem, pp. 1-42, Heirs of Lazarus Zetzner, Strassbourg, 1651.
   (R.D. 233, N. Y. 42nd St. Lib.)

B - Printed Editions in Translations

1) Ars Brevis sive Artificium, French trans. by Mr. DeVassy, Anthony Champenois, Paris, 1632.
   (R.D. 206, Paris, Bibl. Nat.)

2) Ars Brevis, French trans., Bibl. Chacornac, Beaugency Imp. Laffray, Paris, 1901.

3) Art Breu, Catalan trans., explained and adapted for the modern reader by John Avinyo, Academia de Bones Lletres de Barcelona, Barcelona, 1934.

III - Other Expositions of the Art by Ramon Lull

The third list includes the titles of, and brief comments on, other works which Lull wrote in order to explain what he believed was an inspired art. These expositions are concerned directly with the principles and procedures of the Art, either in whole or in part. Although most of them preceded the Ars Brevis they may still be considered its best commentaries since they were written by the same author in order to impart, explain or apply the positions taught in it.

The series of these writings is given in the strict chronological order of their composition. The date and place of composition are not always certain. This is indicated by the question marks which follow the name of the city or the date after the title of each book.

Latin titles are given first. And in the case of works of which the Catalan text is known, (and which may have been the original, at least for the poems), the Catalan title is added immediately after, in parentheses. At the end of each entry the number assigned to the work in various well-known catalogues is given for persons desiring further details or brief resumés of the content of these books. The abbreviations used for these catalogues are as follows:

Li. = Paul Emile Littre and Barthelemy Haureau, "Raymond Lull," Histoire Litteraire de la France, Vol. 29, pp. 1-386, Paris, 1885.

Lo. = Ephrem Longpre, "Raymond Lulle," Dictionaire de Theologie Catholique, Vol. 9, cols. 1071-1141, Paris, 1926.

Ot. = Carmelo Ottaviano, L'Ars Compendiosa de R. Lulle avec une Etude sur la Bibliographie et le Fond Ambrosien de Lulle, Paris, 1930.

Av. = Joan Avinyo, Les Obres Autentiques del Beat Ramon Lull, Barcelona, 1935.

Ca. = Joaquin Carreras y Artau and Thomas Carreras y Artau, Historia de la Filosofia Espanola. Filosofia Cristiana de los Siglos XIII al XV, Vol. 1, pp. 231-640, Madrid, 1939.

Pl. = Erhard Wolfram Platzeck, Raymund Lull, Dusseldorf, 1964.

1) Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi Veritatem seu Ars Magna et Maior (Art Abreujada d'atrobar Veritat). Palma, 1273-1275.

This Ars is the first of the artes written by Lull probably at home or at the monastery 'La Real' soon after 1272. It is referred to in the Contemporary Life and in the earliest catalogue of 1311.

This Ars begins: Haec Ars dividitur in tres distinctiones, quarum prima dividitur in duas partes: Prima pars continet expositionem quinque figurarum . . . A ponimus quod sit noster Dominus Deus.

Latin edition: Vol. 1, pp. 1-49, Mainz, 1721.

Mss.[1]: 1) Lat.: Palma, Bibl. Publ. (XV), in 4 incomplete; Munich, Staat Bibl. 10514, & 10528. 2) Cat.: Munich Cat. ms. (XIV).

Cf.: Li. 1, Lo. Ph. 1, Ot. 7, Av. 1, Ca. 13, Pl. 3.

2) Ars Universalis seu Lectura Artis Compendiosae Inveniendi Veritatem, Palma, 1273-1275. (Montpellier?, 1277?).

This Ars or Lectura was written to explain the Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi Veritatem but it is almost as difficult to read.

It begins: Finalis intentio huius artis est reperire y (sive veritatem).

Latin edition: Vol. 1, pp. 1-124, Mainz, 1721.

Mss.: Lat.: Mainz, Seminary Lib. (XIV); Munich, Staat Bibl. 10502 & 10591.

Cf.: Li. 2, Lo. Ph. 4, Ot. 19, Av. 2, Ca. 14, Pl. 5.

3) Ars Demonstrativa (Art Demostrativa), Montpellier, 1275-1281.

This new Ars is the first major revision of the Art, although it is stated that it was composed according to the manner of the Ars Compendiosa Inveniendi Veritatem. The Ars Demonstrativa is mentioned in the catalogue of 1311.

It begins: Quoniam haec ars sequitur regulam Artis compendiosae inveniendi veritatem.

Latin edition: Vol. 3, pp. 1-112, Mainz, 1722. Catalan edition: Obres de R. L., Vol. 16, pp. 3-288, Palma, 1932.

Mss.: Lat.: Innichen, Collegiata VIII, C 13; Milan, Bibl. Amb. P 198 sup (XIV); Munich, 10539 & 10588; Mainz, Sem. Lib., A. 1 (XIV); Oxford, Bodleian Lib., Digby 192 (XIV); Palma, Bibl. Publ., R. L. 51 (XIV); Paris, Bibl. Nat., 17.825; Venice, Bibl. Marciana, 185 a 250 I, 182. Cat. ms. in the Sem. Lib. of Mainz.

Cf.,: Li. 13, Lo. Ph. 5, Ot. 21, Av. 18, Ca. 17, Pl. 21.

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[1] See p. 325, footnote 1.

4) *Regulae Introductoriae in Practicam Artis Demonstrativae* (*Regles Introductories*), Montpellier, 1275-1281.

This composition is in verse form and has five stanzas. Written in order to make the *Art* more popular, it is included in fifteenth century (1460-1488) catalogues.

This poem begins: In principio solutionis convenit sic ordinare.

Latin edition: Vol. 4, pp. 1-6, Mainz, 1729. Catalan edition: *Obres de R. L.*, Vol. 16, pp. 291-294, Palma, 1932.

Mss.: Lat.: Mainz, Bibl. Comm. Cf. Gottron L'Edicio, p. 81; Munich, Staat Bibl., 10.527, 10568 & 10.579.

Cf.: Li. 20, Lo. V. 5, Ot. 28, Av. 19, Ca. 233, Pl. 22 & 23.

5) *Ars Inveniendi Particularia in Universalibus*, Montpellier (?), 1275-1281, (Mallorca, 1277?)

In the prologue it is stated that this book is "Quasi ramunculus extractus ab Arte Demonstrativa". Its authenticity is attested by two fifteenth century catalogues of the Lullian School at Barcelona.

This *Ars* begins: Cum apud nos sint infinita particularia.

Latin edition: Vol. 3, pp. 1-50, Mainz, 1722.

Mss.: Lat.: Cortone, Bibl. Comm., ms. 215; Munich, Staat Bibl., 10589; Paris, Bibl. Nat., 17.829.

Cf.: Li. 17, Lo. Ph. 10, Ot. 25, Av. 22, Ca. 22, Pl. 25.

6) *Liber Propositionum Secundum Artem Demonstrativam*, Montpellier (?), 1275-1281. (Mallorca, 1277?)

In this book a number of conclusions are drawn for the *Ars Demonstrativa*. It is mentioned in the catalogues of 1460 and 1488 of the Barcelona Lullian School.

This book begins: Ab arte demonstrativa trahic hoc opus exordium.

Latin edition: Vol. 3, pp. 1-62, Mainz, 1722.

Mss.: Lat.: Innichen, Bibl. Collegiata, VIII. C. 8; Milan, Bibl. Amb., P. 198 Sup. (XIV); Munich, Staat Bibl., 10.502, 10525, 10.553, 10589, and 10.594; Palma, Bibl. de Vivot, fifteenth century ms.; Paris, Bibl. Nat. 16.113, and 17.829; Venice, Bibl. Marc. 189. a.250.I. 182.

Cf.: Li. 18, Lo. Ph. 11, Ot. 26, Av. 23, Ca. 23, Pl. 26.

7) *Liber Exponens Figuram Elementalem Artis Demonstrativae*, or *Liber de Gradatione Elementorum*, or *Liber de Figura Elementali*, Montpellier, 1275-1281. (Mallorca, 1277?)

As two of the titles indicate, this book was written in order to explain the manner in which the figure of the four elements should be used.

The beginning of the book reads: Elementa sunt quattor principia rerum naturalium.
Latin edition: Vol. 4, pp. 1-6, Mainz, 1729.
Mss.: Lat.: Milan, Bibl. Amb., N 184 Sup. (XVI; 1567).
Cf.: Li. 19, Lo. Ph. 12, Ot. 27, Av. 25, Ca. 24, Pl. 31.

8) Compendium seu Commentum Artis Demonstrativae (Coment Maior). Montpellier (?), 1275-1281. (Mallorca, 1277?-).

A very clear explanation of the Ars Demonstrativa this commentary is probably the Coment Maior of the two ancient catalogues of The Barcelona School.
This Compendium begins: Quoniam omnis scientia est de universalibus, ut per universalia sciamus de particularibus reddere rationem, igitur auxiliante gratia omnipotentis Dei hanc artem omnibus scientiis.
Latin edition: Vol. 3, pp. 1-160, Mainz, 1722.
Mss.: Lat.: Alcobaca, Bibl. de Alcobaca, ms. 385; Innichen, Bibl. Collegiata, VIII, B. 10, & VIII, C. 3; Munich, Staat Bibl., 10.502, 10.512, and 10.526; Palma, Bibl. Publ., fifteenth century ms.; Paris, Bibl. Nat., 16.112, (XIII), 16.614 (XIV), and 6443D (XIV); Troyes, Bibl. Nac., 1462; Venice, Bibl. Marc., 195.a.189.I.138.

9) Lectura Super Figuras Artis Demonstrativae, Montpellier, 1275-1281. (Mallorca, 1277?).

As the title indicates, this Lectura is an explanation of the many figures found in the Ars Demonstrativa. Its authenticity is attested by its inclusion in the two ancient catalogues of the Barcelona Lullian School (1460-1488).
The Lectura begins: Quoniam Deus est multum recolibilis.
Latin edition: Vol. 3, pp. 1-51, Mainz, 1722.
Mss.: Lat.: Munich, Staat Bibl., 10.571, 10.584, and 10.596; Paris, Bibl. Nat., 16.113, and 17.825; Venice, Bibl. Marc., 194.a.240. I. 168.
Cf.: Li. 14, Lo. Ph. 8, Ot. 23, Av. 21, Ca. 20, Pl. 30.

10) Ars Inventiva, or Ars Inventiva Veritatis, or Ars Intellectiva Veri, Montpellier, 1289-1290.

The best catalogues, as well as those of the ancient Lullian School of Barcelona show that this is also an authentic writing. This new version of the Art stands out as an attempt to simplify the number of principles and of the figures of the Art. The original Catalan text is no longer in existence, or at least it is not known. It was the basis for a translation into the Arabic language by Lull himself in 1291. The latter is also unknown.

It begins: Ars praesens descendit ab arte demonstrativa.
Latin editions: Didac de Grimiel, Valencia, 1515; Vol. 5, pp. 1-206, Mainz, 1729.
Mss.: Arras, Arras Bibl. ms. 100; Brussels Bibl. Royal, 2956; Munich, Staat Bibl., 10.501, 10.508, 10.562, and 23.802; Paris, Bibl. Nat., 10.204, 12.973, 15.450.
Cf.: Li. 34, Lo. Ph. 13, Ot. 41, Av. 38, Ca. 26, Pl. 55.

11) *Quaestiones per Artem Demonstrativam seu Inventivam Solubiles*, Montpellier, 1289-1290.

In this work several questions are resolved following the procedures recommended in the *Art*. Its condemnation of alchemy is interesting in view of the reputation Lull had as an alchemist for many centuries.
This book begins: Quaestiones plurimas ex pluribus et diversis materiis sumptas laboramus adducere ad praesens opus.
Latin edition: Vol. 4, pp. 1-205, Mainz, 1729.
Mss.: Lat.: Bologna, Bibl. Univ., 20; Innichen, Bibl. Collegiata, VIII. B. 10, and VIII. C. 3; Paris, Bibl. Nat., 16.118, (XIII-XIV); Vatican, Bibl. Apost. Ottob. 1095, and Urbin Lat. 1394.
Cf.: Li. 21, Lo. Ph. 14, Ot. 40, Av. 39, Ca. 27, Pl. 57.

12) *Tabula Generalis ad Omnes Scientias Applicabilis* (Taula General), Naples. 1293.

This writing was begun in Tunez a few months before it was concluded. It is the first book of Lull in which he states the date and place of composition. In it are explained, and application is made of, the *Ars Inventiva* and the *Ars Amativa*. A chief novelty is the introduction of the Table, an extended effort to develop an *Ars Combinatoria*. The authenticity of this work is beyond doubt. References to it are made in the 1311 catalogue and in two fifteenth century inventories of the Barcelona Lullian School.
This *Tabula* begins: Ratio quare ista tabula ponitur generalis.
Latin editions: In *Ars Inventiva Veritatis*, Didac de Grimiel (Gothic), Valencia, 1515; Vol. 5, pp. 1-80, Mainz, 1729.
Catalan edition: *Obres de R. L.*, Vol. 16, pp. 297-522, Palma, 1932.
Mss.: 1) Lat.: Munich, Staat Bibl., 10.508, 10.509, 10.531, 14.524, and 18.988; Palma, Bibl. Prov. one fourteenth century and two fifteenth century mss.; Palma, (in possession of S. Galmes one sixteenth century ms.); Paris, Bibl. Nat. 12.773; Vatican, Bibl. Chigi. E. 4-118; Venice, Bibl. Marc. I.II. (XV; 1462). 2) Cat. ms. Palma, S. Galmes used a fifteenth century ms. for Vol. 16 of the Palma edition of *Obres de R. L.*
Cf.: Li. 35, Lo. Ph. 15, Ot. 49, Av. 51, Ca. 29, Pl. 67.

13) Lectura Compendiosa Tabulae Generalis, Naples, 1293.

This Lectura is an exposition and commentary of the Tabula Generalis and it was prepared to make the latter easier for Lull's students at Naples. It is mentioned in the 1311 catalogue and in the two inventories of the Barcelona fifteenth century Lullian School.

The Lectura begins: Cum theorica et practica in textu nostrae tabulae generalis satis.

Latin editions: Didac de Grimiel (Gothic), Valencia, 1515; Vol. 5, pp. 1-15, Mainz, 1729.

Mss.: Lat.: Munich, Staat Bibl., 10.562, and 10.652; Paris, Bibl. Nat., 15.450.

Cf.: Li. 37, Lo. Ph. 16, Ot. 50, Av. 52, Ca. 30, Pl.68

14) Lectura Super Artem Inventivam et Tabulam Generalem (Art de fer e solre questions), Naples-Rome, 1294-1295.

Originally written in Catalan, Lull expresses his desire for a Latin translation in the prologue. A rather extensive writing with a list of a thousand questions and it is another attempt to render easier both the Ars Inventiva and the Tabula Generalis, particularly in matters of theology. Its authenticity is unquestioned and it is mentioned in the 1488 inventory of the Barcelona Lullian School.

This Lectura begins: Haec ars abbreviata sequitur modum et doctrinam artis inventivae.

Latin editions: In Ars Inventiva Veritatis, Didac de Grimiel (trans. by Proaza), Valencia, 1515; Vol. 5, pp. 1-358, Mainz, 1729.

Mss.: 1) Lat.: Mainz, Sem. Lib. A.4 (trans. made by Salzinger for the Mainz edition); Munich, Staat Bibl., 10.538; Munich, Bibl. Palat., Cod Chart. XIV century; Paris, Bibl. Nat., 12.972. 2) Cat.: Munich, Staat Bibl., 598, Hisp. 54A.

Cf.: Li. 38, Lo. Ph. 18, Ot. 51, Av. 53, Ca. 32, Pl. 74.

15) Ars Compendiosa, or Compendium Artis Generalis seu Practica brevis super Tabulam Generalem, Paris, 1299.

A concise summary of the doctrine explained in the Tabula Generalis. Most of the Ars Compendiosa was later incorporated into the Ars Generalis Ultima. According to Ottaviano who edited the text in 1930 this writing of Lull was heretofore unknown. Care must be taken that it is not mistaken with the Lectura Artis quae Brevis Practica Tabulae Generalis Intitulata Est which is found in the fifth Vol. of the Mainz edition and which is given there the title of Brevis Practica Tabulae Generalis.

The Ars Compendiosa begins: Alphabetum Tabulae generalis est hoc quod cordetenus scire oportebit.

Latin edition: Ed. Ottaviano, Paris, 1930. (This is Vol. 12 of Etudes de Philosophie Medievale, ed. E. Gilson, Paris, 1930.)

Mss.: Milan, Bibl. Amb., I. 121. Inf.; (Munich, Staat Bibl., 14.111, 14.260, 18.444, and 23.880; Oxford, Bodleian Lib. (parts only), Arch. Geld. B. 25; Paris, Bibl. Nat. 6433, and 6443; these mss. in parentheses may be of the Lectura referred to before.) English Ms.: Oxford, Bodleian Lib., Ashmole 1508, (Cat. col. 1411),(XVI), f. 253-261v. (See Batista y Roca 35.)

Cf.: Li. 134, Lo. Ph. 21, Ot. 66, Av. 70, Ca. 34, Pl. 92.

16) Applicatio Artis Generalis ad Varias Scientias (Aplicacio de l'Art General), Mallorca, 1301.

A poem of 1131 verses, this Applicatio was intended to popularize the Art, particularly as applied to various sciences. There is no reason to doubt of its authenticity.

Since there is no published Latin edition the beginning given here is that of the Catalan poem: Deus glorioso! per vostr' (vos) amar est' Art general aplicar.

Catalan edition: Obres Rimades de Ramon Lull, Ed. J. Rossello, Palma, 1859; Obres de R. L., Vol. 20, pp. 209-251. Palma, 1938.

Mss.: 1) Lat.: Munich, Bibl. Palat., 10.593; 2) Cat.: Palma, ms. (XIV) in Soc. Arqueologica de Palma de Mallorca.

Cf.: Li. 100, Lo. V. 13, Ot. 83, Av. 87, Ca. 241, Pl. 107.

17) Liber de Intellectu seu Ars Intellectus, Montpellier, 1304.

A resumé of the Ars Inventiva, this brief introduction to the Art has not been edited yet.

It begins: Quidam homo multum considerans, mirabatur, quare mundus in ita statu perverso.

Mss.: Lat.: Cortone, Bibl. Comm., 213; Milan, Bibl. Amb. I.66 Inf. (XVI-XVII); Paris, Bibl. Nat., 16.116, 16.615.

Cf.: Li. 140, Lo. Ph. 27, Ot. 95, Av. 103, Ca. 40, Pl. 120.

18) Lectura Artis quae Intitulatur Brevis Practica Tabulae Generalis, Genoa, 1304.

This is a commentary on the abridged version of the Tabula Generalis. As indicated before it was printed in the Mainz edition under the title of Brevis Practica Tabulae Generalis.

Latin edition: Vol. 5, pp. 1-358, Mainz, 1729.

Mss.: Lat.: Munich, Staat Bibl., 10.591, 14.260 (XV), Monac. 18.445 (XV), Monac. 18.446 (XIV), Monac. 23.880 (XV); Palma, Bibl. Prov., one fifteenth century ms. acc. to Masso i Torrents; Paris 6.443 C.; Venice, Bibl. Marc. ms. 99.

Cf.: Li. 36 and 134, Lo. Ph. 30, Ot. 98, Av. 95, Ca. 43, Pl. 123.

19) *Introductorium Magnae Artis Generalis*, Montpellier, 1306.

In a very schematic form there are successively given the principles of the General Art or Science, and those of the particular sciences.

This *Introductorium* begins: Quoniam omnis scientia est de universalibus, ut per universalia sciamus ad particularia descendere et de ipsis reddere rationem, propter hocsequuntur universalia infrascripta.

Latin editions: Ed. Gilbert de Villiers, Lyons, 1515; in *Arbor Scientiae*, ed. John Pillehote, Lyons, 1635, and again in 1637. Other languages: Fr. tr. by Mr.De Vassy, Paris, 1633; Sp. tr. by Alonzo de Zepeda, Brussels, 1663, and again in 1664; Sp. tr. in *Biblioteca de Autores Espanoles*, Vol. 65, pp. 95-102, Madrid, 1873.

Ms.: Bergamo, Bibl. Civica, *Δ.4.27* (XV).

Cf.: Li. 131, Lo.   , Ot. 223, Av. 115, Ca. 49, Pl. 139.

20) *Ars Generalis Ultima*, or *Ars Magna Generalis Ultima*, Pisa, 1308.

This version of the *Art* was begun in 1305, three years before its completion in the city of Lyons. It was intended as the definitive form of the *Art*, the last and most detailed exposition of it in order to convince those that doubt its value. The *Ars Brevis* was written as an introduction to, and an outline of, this more extensive *Art* as it has been noted.

The *Ars Generalis* begins: Quoniam multas artes fecimus generales, ipsas volumus clarius explanare per istam, quam vocamus ultimam.

Latin editions: Philip Petio, Venice, 1480; (Peter Posa and Peter Brun, Barcelona, 1481: with title *Artificium sive Ars Brevis ad Adsolvendam omnium Artium Encyclopediam*); Peter Posa, Barcelona, 1501; James Marchal, Lyons, 1516; John Sauer, Frankfurt, 1596; in *Opera ea quae ad Adinventam ab Ipso Artem Universalem*, pp. 237-681, Lazarus Zetzner, Strassbourg, 1598; Heirs of Gabriel Guasp, Mallorca, 1645; in *Opera ea quae ad Adinventam ab Ipso Artem Universalem*, pp. 228-663, Lazarus Zetzner, Strassbourg, 1609, and 1617; in *Opera ea quae ad Adinventam ab Ipso Artem Universalem*, pp. 218-663, Heirs of Lazarus Zetzner, Strassbourg, 1651. French edition: *Le Grand et Dernier Art de M. Raymond Lull*, tr. by Mr. de Vassy, Louis Boulanger, Paris, 1633.

Mss.: Lat.: Innichen, Bibl. Collegiata, *VIII, C. 8* (fragm.); *VIII, C. 13* (fragm.); *VIII, C. 11* (XV); Mainz, Sem. Lib. *II, 234*; Milan, Bibl. Amb., *Y 21 Sup*; Munich, Staat Bibl., *Monac. 5.936* (XVI; 1508); Oxford, Bodleian Lib., *Digby 85* (XV), *Asmole 1471* (XV); Palma, Bibl. Publ., one fifteenth century ms. in 4to. and one in folio; Paris, Bibl. Nat., *16.115*, (XIII-XIV); *15.450* (XVII).

Cf.: Li. 51, Lo. Ph. 37, Ot. 109, Av. 120, Ca. 54, Pl. 146.

21) *Introductoria Artis Demonstrativae*, Montpellier, 1272-1281. (Mallorca, 1277?).

This *Introductorium* may have been written as an initiation to the *Ars Demonstrativa*.

It begins: Introductoriam Artis demonstrativae tradere volentes . . . Or (acc. to Ot. 22) Cum velimus tradere introductoriam Artis demonstrativae.

Latin edition: Vol. 3, pp. 1-38, Mainz, 1722.

Mss.: Lat.: Munich, Staat Bibl., *10.590*; Paris, Bibl. Nat., *17.829*.

Cf.: Li. 12, Lo. Ph. 7, Ot. 22, Av. 20, Ca. 19, Pl. 27.

22) *Liber de Experientia Realitatis Artis Generalis*, Montpellier, 1308.

In this work Lull attempts to illustrate the efficacy of the *Art* in demonstrations that concern matters of faith. It is also mentioned in the 1311 catalogue and in the two fifteenth century inventories of the Barcelona Lullian School.

The *Liber de Experientia* begins: Quoniam experimentum est fundamentum, supra quod intellectus fundat suum intelligere.

Editions: None.

Mss.: Lat.: Munich, Staat Bibl., *10.568*, *10.651*; Palma, Causa Pia Luliana 1, and 11; Palma, Sociedad Arquaologica Luliana, 3; Paris, *15.096*, *15.450*, *16116*, and *17.827*.

Cf.: Li. 135, Lo. Ph. 40, Ot. 121, Av. 130, Ca. 57, Pl. 155.

23) *Ars Infusa* or *Scientia Generalis ad Habendam Certam Cognitionem Dei et Rerum Omnium Creaturarum, Infusa per Gratiam Spiritus Sancti*, Mallorca, 1312-1313.

As the title suggests this *opusculum* tries to apply the principles and the *combinatoria* of the *Art* to theological problems.

The *Ars Infusa* begins: Ars sive scientia ista . . . est a Deo et ideo certa Dei cognitio.

Latin Editions: Ed. S. Galmes, *Estudis Universitaris Catalans*, Vol. 17 (1932), pp. 291-301; *item*, *Studia Monografica et Recensiones*, fasc. VII-VIII, Palma (1952), pp. 52-64; *item*, *Miscellanea Lulliana*, Vol. 1, pp. 41-54, Maioricensis Schola Lullistica, Mallorca, 1955.

Ms.: Lat.: Palma, Bibl. Prov., *A. ms. R. L. 62* (XV); Palma, in possession of S. Galmes, (XVIII) (A copy of the one in the Palma, Bibl. Prov.)

Cf.: Li. , Lo. , Ot. , Av. 192, Ca. 129, Pl. 224.

IV - Commentaries in Manuscript Form

This fourth list is made up of two groups of commentaries and expositions known to exist in manuscript form. First there are given those which deal directly with the *Ars Brevis* or sections of it. Then selected expositions on the *Art* in general are listed.

Both of these groups of manuscripts are listed according to authors and alphabetically. To the customary information of place, and codex or manuscript number, which identifies them occasionally, pertinent remarks which bear on the text itself may be **added**.

A - On Ars Brevis

1) Anonymous, *Commentarium in Artem Brevem*, ms., London, Wellcome Historical Medical Library, *448* (XVII), f. 1r-71v.

2) Anonymous, *Commentum Artis Brevis Theologiae*, ms., Vatican, *Bibl. Apost., Palat. Lat. 984* (XV), f. 109-138.

   This commentary follows the *Ars Brevis* in the same manuscript and it begins: Deus gloriosus, misericordia motus dignatus est largiri ex gratia speciali hanc sacratissimam Scientiam, vidilicet generalem artem, suo famulo devotissimo B. Raymundo de Cathalonia.

3) Anonymous, *Curso del Arte del Illuminado Doctor Martir Ramon Lull*, Sp. ms., Milan, Bibl. Amb., *N. 5 Sup* (XVI-XVII), f. 1-48.

   It explains both the *Ars Brevis* and the *Ars Generalis Ultima*.

4) Anonymous, *Practica in artes breves abreviata et incepta primo Aprilis anno 1535 Valenciae*, ms. Palma, Bibl. Publ., *996* (XVI), Int. II, f. 43v-44.

   Incipit: In primo modo artista sciat quare . . . fecit artem brevem, secundo subjectum quid sit, tertio 13 partes artis sciat. - In secundo modo alphabetum sciat.

5) Ludovicum a Flandia, Abstractum Artis Brevis B. Raymundi Lulli, ms., Palma, Bibl. Publ., 998 (XVIII), f. 1-174.

6) Victor de Palermo, Brevis ac Dilucida in Artem Brevem divi Raymundi Lulli Martyris Subtilis Declaratio, ms., Genoa, Bibl. Civita Berio, D bis. 12. 2133 (XVII), f. 1-113.

B - On the Art in General

1) Anonymous, Artis Generalis Glossa, ms., Munich, Staat Bibl., Lat. Monac. 18.988 (XV), f. 126-157.

(Incomplete)

2) Anonymous, Artis Inventivae Expositio Compendiosa, ms., Oxford, Bodleian Lib., Ashmole 746 (XVII), f. 1-62.

3) Anonymous, Commentarii in Artem Lulli, ms., Paris, Bibl. Nat., 19965 (XVII).

4) Anonymous, Declaratio Definitionum Artis Generalis, ms., Innichen, Bibl. Collegiata, VIII. b. 9. (XV-XVI), f. 56a-91v.

5) Anonymous, Declaratio Definitionum Artis Generalis, ms., Innichen, Bibl. Collegiata, VIII. c. 3 (XV).

6) Anonymous, De Fundamento Artis Generalis, ms., Milan, Bibl. Amb., Y 21 Sup. (XIV-XV), f. 17-112.

7) Anonymous, De Modo Applicandi Doctrina Brevis et Utilis (Fragm. of a commentary), ms., Innichen, Bibl. Collegiata, VIII.c.11 (XV).

8) Anonymous, Figurae Artis Raymundi Lulli, ms., Milan, Bibl. Amb., N. 4 Sup (XV), f. 1-10.

9) Anonymous, Generalis Usus et Divisio Artis Lullianae, ms., Florence, Bibl. Naz. Centrale, II.XI. 86 (XVII).

10) Anonymous, Lectura super Artificium Artis Generalis, ms., Innichen, Bibl. Collegiata, VIII. b. 9 (XV-XVI) f. 1-54v.

11) Anonymous, Puncta sive Conclusiones magis alte in Arte de Conditionibus Principiorum, ms., Innichen, Bibl. Collegiata, VIII.c.11 (XV), f. 123-126.

12) Anonymous, Raymundi Lulli Ars Generalis ad Praxim Reductam, ms., Milan, Bibl. Amb., N 186 Sup. (XV), f. 1-9.

13) Anonymous, Reflexions sur l'Art de Raymond Lull, ms., Paris, Bibl. St. Genevieve, 3112 (XVII-XVIII), f. 155-159.

14) Bullons, John, Commentarium in Lecturam Artis Generalis, ms., Oxford, Bodleian Lib., Can. Misc. 26 (XV; written by the Barcelonese J. Bullons in 1488 at Venice), f. 1-121.

15) Bullons, John, Lectura super Artificium Artis Generalis, ms., Modena, Bibl. Estense, Est. Lat., 1264; A.H. 10. 2 (XV).

V - Printed Editions of Principal Commentaries

The fifth and final list is very similar to the previous one, except that it takes into account only texts which have been printed. It lists two groups of printed texts, first those writings which comment on, or explain directly the Ars Brevis, or develop sections of it.[1] This group is followed by a larger series of titles of writings which deal with the Art more generally and are not limited to the Ars Brevis alone.

As in the previous list the order in the groups is alphabetical and by authors.

Each individual entry has the following information: First the name of the author, the title of the book, the publisher of one of the known principal editions, the city and the date of publication. Then there follow in a separate paragraph other known editions, either in Latin or in another language.

If a book is listed more than once, the reason is that it has been published, not only individually as a single work, but also as part of a collection, in an edition which includes other writings by the same or a different author.

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[1] See p. 335, footnote 1. See also Mendia, Benito, Bibliografia Luliana Contemporanea, Florence, 1951.

Besides the information just detailed, the entry of books printed prior to the current century includes, as a last item, the catalogue number of that particular edition in E. Rogent and S. Duran's *Bibliografia* cited in the note at the beginning of the second list.

A - *Printed Commentaries on the Ars Brevis*

1) Agrippa von Nettesheim, Heinrich Cornelius, *Commentaria in Artem Brevem Raymundi Lulli*, John Soter, Cologne, 1531.

   Other editions: (Bering Bros., Lyons, 1531?); John Soter, Cologne, 1533; (Bering Bros., Lyons, 1535?); John Soter, Solinger, 1538; (Bering Bros., Lyons, 1566?); John Birckman and Theodore Baum, Cologne, 1568; Bering Bros., Lyons, 1580 (?); Bering Bros., Lyons, 1600.
   (Cf. R. D. No. 79-80-82-86-87-103-104-105-111-125-148.)

2) Agrippa von Nettesheim, Heinrich Cornelius, *Commentaria in Artem Brevem Raymundi Lulli* in *Opera Ea Quae ad Adinventam ab Ipso Artem Universalem* of Ramon Lull, pp. 810-940, Lazarus Zetzner, Strassbourg, 1598.

   Other editions: pp. 79-896, Strassbourg, 1609, and 1617; Heirs of Lazarus Zetzner, Strassbourg, 1651.
   (Cf. R. D. 144-162-180-233.)

3) Alsted, John Henry, *Idea Brevis Artis Lullianae* in *Clavis Artis Lullianae*, pp. 126-162, Lazarus Zetzner, Strassbourg, 1609.

   Other edition: pp. 106-134, Heirs of Lazarus Zetzner, Strassbourg, 1652.
   (Cf. R. D. 163-234.)

4) Guevara, Peter de, *Arte General y Breve para todas las Ciencias en Dos Instrumentos*, Heirs of Alonso Gomez, Madrid, 1584.

   Other edition: Philip Vlaugert, Brussels, 1661.
   (Cf. R. D. 130-243.)

5) Marcal Francis, Ars Brevis B. Raymundi Lulli, Castigata, Capitibus Divisa, Atque Scholiis Locupletata, Raphael Moya et Tho., Palma, 1668

6) Marcal, Francis, Scholia in Artem Brevem, Raphael Moya, Mallorca, 1669.

Cf. R. D. 264.

7) Sanchez de Lizarazu, Pedro Geronimo, Generabilis et Admirabilis Methodus ad Omnes Scientias Facilius et Citius Addiscendas, in quo Explicatur Ars Brevis Raymundi Lulli, Charles of Lavayen, Tarragona, 1613.

Other edition: **Tarragona**, 1619 (Reprint of that of 1613.)
Cf. R. D. 172-186.

B - Printed Books on the Art in General

1) Agrippa von Nettesheim, Heinrich Cornelius, Tabula Abbreviata Commentariorum Artis Inventivae, Bering Bros., Lyons, 1605.

Cf. R. D. 157.

2) Agrippa von Nettesheim, Heinrich Cornelius, Tabula Abbreviata Commentarioli in Artem Brevem R. Lulli, Argentorati, 1605, Strassbourg.

3) Agrippa von Nettesheim, Heinrich Cornelius, Tabula Abbreviata Commentariorum Artis Inventivae in Commentaria in Artem Brevem Raymundi Lulli, pp. 460-478, John Soter, Cologne, 1531.

Other editions: (Bering Bros., Lyons, 1531?); John Soter Cologne, 1533; (Bering Bros., Lyons, 1535?); John Soter, Solinger, 1538; Bering Bros., Lyons, 1565 (?); Bering Bros., Lyons, 1566 (?); John Birckman and Theodore Baum, Cologne, 1568; Bering Bros., Lyons, 1580 (?); Bering Bros., Lyons, 1600.
Cf. R. D. 79-80-82-86-87-104-105-111-125-248.

4) Agrippa von Nettesheim, Heinrich Cornelius, Tabula Abbreviata Commentariorum Artis Inventivae, in Opera ea Quae ad Adinventam ab Ipso Artem Universalem of Ramon Lull, pp. 898-916, Lazarus Zetzner, Strassbourg, 1609.

Other edition: Strassbourg, 1617.
Cf. R. D. 162-180.

5) Alsted, John Henry, Architectura et Usus Artis Lullianae, Wolffang Richer, Frankfurt, 1612.

Cf. R. D. 169.

6) Alsted, John Henry, Clavis Artis Lullianae, Lazarus Zetzner, Strassbourg, 1609

Other editions: Heirs of Lazarus Zetzner, Strassbourg, 1633, and 1652.
Cf. R. D. 163-207-234.

7) Anonymous, Scientia Abscondita Elucidata sive Theses Doctorales ex. D. Raymundi Lulli Arte Compendiosa Inveniendi Veritatem extractatae, n.p., 1733.

Cf. R. D. 306.

8) Baudouin de Montarcis, Peter, **Traite de** Fondements de la Science Generale et Universelle, **Francis** le Cointe, Paris, 1651.

Cf. R. D. 231.

9) Belot, M. Jean, Traite de la Memoire Artificiele ou l'Art de Raymond Lulle, Jacques Cailloue, Rouen, 1640.

Other editions: Claude de la Riviere, Lyons, 1654; Jacques Cailloue, Rouen, 1662; David Berthelin, Rouen, 1669; John Baptist de la Ville, lyons, 1672; Peter Amiot, Rouen, 1688; G. H. Streel, Liege, 1704.
Cf. R. D. 215-235-245-266-267-273-289.

10) Belot, M. Jean, La Rhetorique par laquelle on peut discourir de ce qui est propre en l'oraison et disputable par dialectique, selon la subtilite de l'Art Lulliste et autres arts plus secrets, Nicholas Boudin, Paris, 1623.

Cf. R. D. 194.

11) Belot, M. **Jean**, La Rhetorique par laquelle on peut discourir de **ce qui est propre** en l'oraison et disputable par dialectique, **selon** la subtilite de l'Art Lulliste et autres arts plus secrets, **in** Traite de la Memoire Artificiele ou l'Art de Raymond Lulle, Jacques Cailloue, Rouen, 1040.

Other editions: Claude de la Riviere, Lyons, 1654; Jacques Cailloue, Rouen, 1662; David Berthelin, Rouen, 1669; John Baptist de la Ville, Lyons, 1672; Peter Amiot, Rouen, 1688; G. H. Streel, Liege, 1704.
Cf. R. D. 215-235-245-266-267-273-289.

12) Brice, Angel Francis, Interpretacion del Arte Magna, Maracaibo, 1955.

13) Bruno, Giordano, *De Compendiosa Architectura et Complemento Artis Lulli*, Giles Gorbin, Paris, 1582.

Cf. R. D. 128.

14) Bruno, Giordano, *De Compendiosa Architectura et Complemento Artis Lulli in Scripta quae Latine Confecit*, Vol. 2, pp. 235-283, Brodhagen, Stuttgard, 1836.

Cf. R. D. 399.

15) Bruno, Giordano, *De Lampade Combinatoria Lulliana*, Wittenberg, 1587.

Cf. R. D. 135.

16) Bruno, Giordano, *De Lampade Combinatoria Lulliana* in *De Lulliano Specierum Scrutinio*, ff. 17-67v, George Nigrinus, Prague, 1588.

Cf. R. D. 137.

17) Bruno, Giordano, *De Lampade Combinatoria Lulliana* in *Scripta quae Latine Confecit*, Vol. 2, pp. 634-702, Brodhagen, Stuttgard, 1836.

18) Bruno, Giordano, *De Lampade Combinatoria Lulliana* in *Opera Ea Quae ad Adinventam ab Ipso Artem Universalem* of Ramon Lull, pp. 698-753, Lazarus Zetzner, Strassbourg, 1598.

Other editions: Strassbourg, 1609; and 1617; Heirs of Lazarus Zetzner, Strassbourg, 1651.
Cf. R. D. 144-162-180-233.

19) Carbonel, Hugues, *Secretum Explicitum Artis Lullianae seu Memoriae Artificialis*, John Laguehay, Paris, 1620.

Other editions: Abraham Sougrain, Paris, 1620, and 1621
Cf. R. D. 189-190-191.

20) Ciruelo, Peter, *De Arte Lulli in Metaphysica*, Salamanca, 1538.

Cf. R. D. 89.

21) Cordier, Honorius, *Vera Artis Lullianae Principia*, John James Horst, Cologne and Frankfurt, 1771.

Cf. R. D. 386.

22) Feijoo, Benito Jeronimo, Carta Erudita sobre la Arte de Raymundo Lulio, Heirs of Francisco Hierro, Madrid, 1742.

Other editions: Madrid, 1745, 1748, 1750, and 1751.
Cf. R. D. 320-333-340-351-359.

23) Flandes, Luis de, Tratado Teologico del Sistema Luliano, con la Explicacion de las Figuras y Elementos de que se Compone para Entender Perfectamente Las Obras del B. Raymundo Lulio, Peter Anthony Capo, Mallorca, 1741.

Cf. R. D. 319.

24) Guevara, Peter de, Arte General para todas las Ciencias en Dos Instrumentos. -Breve y Sumaria Declaracion de la Arte General, Peter Madrigal, Madrid, 1586.

Cf. R. D. 134.

25) Guevara, Peter de, Breve y Sumaria Declaracion de la Arte General, Peter Madrigal, Madrid, 1584.

Other editions: Philip Vlaugert, Brussels, 1661, and 1666 (fourth edition).
Cf. R. D. 131-244-255.

26) Gui, Peter de (Dagui), Janua Artis Magistri Raymundi Lulli, Peter Posa, Barcelona, 1482.

Other editions: Eucharus Silver, n.d., Rome, 1485; Peter Posa, Barcelona, 1489; Paul of Cologne & Co. (i soc.), Seville, 1491; n.p., Valencia, n.d.; n.p., Seville, n.d.; Peter Levet, Paris, (XV cent. Incunable).
Cf. R. D. 4-7-8-13-27-29.

27) Kircher, Athanasius, Ars Magna Sciendi, John Jansson de Waesberg and Eliseus Weyerstraet's Widow, Amsterdam, 1669.

Cf. R. D. 265.

28) Lavinheta, Bernard de, Annotationes in Artem Magnam in Ars Generalis Ultima of Ramon Lull, passim, James Marechal, Lyons, 1516.

Other edition: John Sauer, Frankfurt, 1596.
Cf. R. D. 16-142.

29) Lavinheta, Bernard de, *Explanatio Compendiosaque Applicatio Artis Raymundi Lulli*, John Maylin, Lyons, 1523.

Other edition: (Directed by J. H. Alsted with title *Opera Omnia Quibus Tradidit Artis Raymundi Lullii Compendiosam Explicationem, et Eiusdem Applicationem* . . .) Lazarus Zetzner, Cologne, 1612.
Cf. R. D. 78-168.

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